Managing near field communication (NFC) payment applications through cloud computing by Pourghomi, Pardis
  
  
Managing Near Field Communication (NFC) 
Payment Applications through Cloud Computing 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
By 
 
 
Pardis Pourghomi 
 
 
 
Department of Information Systems and Computing, 
Brunel University 
 
 
 
 
 
 
June 2014
 i 
 
ABSTRACT  
 
The Near Field Communication (NFC) technology is a short-range radio communication 
channel which enables users to exchange data between devices. NFC provides a contactless 
technology for data transmission between smart phones, Personal Computers (PCs), Personal 
Digital Assistants (PDAs) and such devices. It enables the mobile phone to act as 
identification and a credit card for customers. However, the NFC chip can act as a reader as 
well as a card, and also be used to design symmetric protocols. Having several parties 
involved in NFC ecosystem and not having a common standard affects the security of this 
technology where all the parties are claiming to have access to client’s information (e.g. bank 
account details).  
 
The dynamic relationships of the parties in an NFC transaction process make them partners in 
a way that sometimes they share their access permissions on the applications that are running 
in the service environment. These parties can only access their part of involvement as they 
are not fully aware of each other’s rights and access permissions. The lack of knowledge 
between involved parties makes the management and ownership of the NFC ecosystem very 
puzzling. To solve this issue, a security module that is called Secure Element (SE) is 
designed to be the base of the security for NFC. However, there are still some security issues 
with SE personalization, management, ownership and architecture that can be exploitable by 
attackers and delay the adaption of NFC payment technology.  
 
Reorganizing and describing what is required for the success of this technology have 
motivated us to extend the current NFC ecosystem models to accelerate the development of 
this business area. One of the technologies that can be used to ensure secure NFC transactions 
is cloud computing which offers wide range advantages compared to the use of SE as a single 
entity in an NFC enabled mobile phone. We believe cloud computing can solve many issues 
in regards to NFC application management. Therefore, in the first contribution of part of this 
thesis we propose a new payment model called “NFC Cloud Wallet". This model 
demonstrates a reliable structure of an NFC ecosystem which satisfies the requirements of an 
NFC payment during the development process in a systematic, manageable, and effective 
way.  
 
 ii 
 
In the rest of this thesis, we design three transaction authentication protocols which execute 
over the cloud, GSM network and NFC channel respectively. Each of the proposed protocols 
is an extension of the initially proposed NFC Cloud Wallet model. However, we design each 
protocol based on a different payment scenario that improves the existing problems which 
have delayed the adoption of NFC payment technology.  Furthermore, the proposed protocols 
are carefully designed and evaluated against multiple attack scenarios in order to indicate 
their utility and value from a security viewpoint.       
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Chapter 1 - Introduction  
 
 
With NFC/ISO 18092, also specified as NFCIP1 (near field communication and transmission 
protocol), two inductively joined devices functioning at 13.56 MHz can connect through a 
Radio Frequency (RF) interface and transmission protocol. This technology can be used as a 
short-range peer-to-peer communication technique that also allows active devices such as 
PDAs and mobile phones to perform as a reader or a passive token. In this case, these active 
devices can access Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) application (Mayes & 
Markantonakis, 2008).  
 
The two entities defined by this standard are referred to as the target and the initiator, and 
handle two modes of communication: active and passive. The active communication mode 
provides a channel in which both target and initiator should generate RF field. The process 
begins with the modulation of the initiator’s carrier which should be performed by the 
initiator itself. Once the modulation is finished, the initiator switches off the carrier and waits 
for a response from the target. In order to start the communication, the target then switches on 
its carrier and transmits a response to the initiator.      
 
The passive communication mode operates when the initiator modulates its own carrier and 
generates an RF field. In this mode, the target is not required to switch on its carrier; instead 
it acts as a reader while the initiator emulates a passive token (Mayes & Markantonakis, 
2008).  
 
1.1 Payment and Ticketing   
The main drivers for the creation of the NFC standard have been payment and ticketing 
applications since the main business parties involved in this technology e.g. financial 
institutions and Mobile Network Operators (MNO) were interested to place payment and 
ticketing applications on NFC phones. Visa International’s research shows that 89 percent of 
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people, who tried NFC transactions, prefer phone-based transactions rather than alternative 
payment methods (Mayes & Markantonakis, 2008). Accordingly, NFC-enabled devices can 
be used as electronic wallets; that mean that, with the use of payment, ticketing and other 
applications, people can use their mobile phone to pay for their day to day requirements. 
Eventually, this can replace debit, credit, loyalty and other countless cards that people carry 
every day.     
 
Indeed, during the past decade, the concept of contactless card technology has increasingly 
been used in transport, ticketing and in retail. The technology helps people save time by just 
holding their contactless cards on a reader in a close proximity instead of having to insert the 
paper cards in and taking it out of some train entrance gates for example. With NFC 
technology, mobile phones can have additional functionality, such as acting as a contactless 
card to be used as an easy method of payment.   
 
Successful development of NFC technology has recently started in some countries where 
companies offer several services based on contactless card technology and mobile phones. 
Primarily, NFC-enabled devices are being used in small payment circumstances such as 
parking meters and vending machines (Innovation Research and Technology, 2011). For 
example, people can check how much credit is left on their multi-use smart ticket without 
having to check the ticket machine every time. Thus, when all the NFC infrastructure, 
security, transaction handling are in place then NFC enabled devices can be used as a proper 
credit card with a certain amount of payment limit (e.g. £30). However, gathering the 
required assets in this technology has raised a few issues that are going to be explored in this 
thesis.   
 
1.1.2 Smart Card Application Management   
The applications of NFC technology such as telecom, transport, ID credentialing and banking 
have been on trial in 38 countries during the last few years (NFC World, 2013a).The Issuer 
Centric Smart Card Ownership Model (ICOM) (Akram, Markantonakis & Mayes, 2010a) as 
a traditional model of managing smart card applications has been used on these trials to 
manage the service applications. In this model, the card issuer, as a centralised authority, is 
responsible for issuing and controlling the smart cards. Thus, the card issuer has to authorise 
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the application provider’s request to install their applications on the smart cards. The Trusted 
Service Manager (TSM) architecture provides an extension to the traditional ICOM model in 
which was deployed in the NFC service trials (GSM Association, 2007; Guaus et. al., 2008). 
The main purpose of having a TSM in the NFC service architecture is to manage the platform 
and to authorise the application installation requests from different application providers. 
Moreover, the TSM can also be responsible for card issuing.  
 
An approach based on the citizen ownership architecture has also been introduced as an 
alternative to the smart card ownership model. As the term “ownership” implies, in this 
approach the customers are in a position to decide whether they would like to install or delete 
applications on their smart cards. However, this was the only authority that was given to 
customers, and therefore the platform management remains out of their control. The platform 
itself is responsible for ensuring its reliability and security, which makes it easier in terms of 
management for application providers since they have the choice not to rely on the 
trustworthiness of the customer (Akram, Markantonakis & Mayes, 2010b). This approach is 
named as User Centric Smart Card Ownership Model (UCOM) (Akram, Markantonakis & 
Mayes, 2010a), and provides an active, pervasive, accessible and open environment.         
 
The Initial Drivers   
 
A debate was prompted by researchers about different types of controls which should be in 
place to manage the smart cards. This was because the nature of a smart card is to provide 
security for stored information, and having multiple untrusted applications raises the concerns 
of both service providers and users. Pierre Girard (1999) stated three different approaches for 
managing applications in smart cards.     
 
In the first approach, he suggested using a centralized controlling unit as the main and only 
party to manage smart card applications. This approach was widely developed before 
deployment of the multi-application smart cards concept, termed as ICOM. This architecture 
allows an organisation to obtain the smart card from the smart card manufacturer to issue it to 
different customers. The negotiation then takes place between the application provider and 
the smart card issuer to discuss the conditions of application installation on the smart card. If 
the smart card issuer does not authorise the application issuer, the application cannot be 
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installed on the smart card. The weakness of this model is that customers do not have a 
choice to decide which applications to install on their smart cards.           
 
In the second approach, Pierre Girard (1999) proposed an architecture in which a customer 
can play the role of a card issuer, just as in the first model. In this approach, a customer can 
obtain the smart card from the smart card issuer and then acquires an application (transport, 
loyalty, ticketing, etc.) from the application issuer to install on his smart card. Although this 
approach provided decision flexibility for customers, organizations did not consider this 
model as a serious approach since they cannot fully trust the customer. Moreover, they cannot 
assure the performance of the smart card platform since customers might have installed 
malicious applications on the platform.  
 
Lastly, the third approach proposes a model as an extension to the ICOM model. This model, 
suggests having a certification authority for managing the multi-application environment. The 
reason which makes this approach an extension to ICOM is that its architecture allows a 
centralised authority to issue the smart card. However, the application providers cannot 
negotiate the conditions of application installation procedures with the card issuer, instead 
they should agree with the principal certification authority to be able to install the 
applications and perform under the control of the certification authority.         
 
As M’Chirgui (2005) pointed out, the cooperative competition (coopetition) attitude of 
organizations towards the product and market improved the rapid spread of the smart card 
industry. The term coopetition refers to the cooperation of two companies towards 
establishing a market and then their competition to take a larger share than the other 
company.    
 
Examples of coopetition in the smart card industry are EMV (EMV 4.2, 2008), 
GlobalPlatform (GlobalPlatform, 2006), and the Java Card (Java Card Platform Specification, 
2009) specification. Nevertheless organisations did not follow the coopetition attitude with 
regards to deployment of multi-application smart cards due to various issues. Some of the 
issues which prevented organisations from following the coopetotion attitude towards 
managing multi-application smart cards are mentioned below (Akram, Markantonakis & 
Mayes, 2010a): 
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1) Smart Card Control (Ownership) 
2) Marketing Potential 
3) Customer Loyalty 
4) Customer Relationship Management 
5) Potential Revenue Source 
 
In the last few years, having to face the above issues in a multi-application smart card 
environment delayed the adoption of this initiative. However, since other technologies such 
as NFC, cloud, etc. have become hot topics in the industry, this concept is gaining 
momentum again.  
 
Renewed Attention!  
 
This section describes a few of the contributing factors which have revived the multi-
application initiative in the smart card industry yet again.    
 
One of the most important factors is the existence of NFC technology, which enables a 
mobile phone to emulate a contactless smart card (ISO/IEC 18092, 2004).This emulation 
enables the NFC phone to act as a contactless card payment on the current smart card 
infrastructure, such as contactless POS terminals (Mayes & Markantonakis, 2008). 
Consequently, merchants are not required to upgrade their smart card service POS 
infrastructure. The only difference is from a user perspective, since they now use an NFC-
enabled device (phone, tablet, etc.) to perform the transaction. From the merchant’s 
perspective, the POS terminal is communicating with a contactless interface which is in the 
form of a NFC mobile device. Despite what has just been said, and although NFC is on trial 
in 38 countries (NFC World, 2013a), the wide practical deployment of NFC technology is 
still in the pipeline, however.   
 
In addition to the NFC technology and its deployment issues, business dynamics have been 
significantly reshaped by a totally non-relevant area. The concept of “iPhone effect” was 
introduced to this business sector; this entails customers installing an application on a mobile 
device. Although this concept was possible with traditional smart card architectures, iPhone 
however made it easier for both service providers and customers to manage, navigate, search 
and install third party applications (Laugesen & Yuan, 2010). Additionally, installing an 
Chapter 1: Introduction  
Pardis Pourghomi   6 
 
application on iPhone did not require any negotiation between the application developer and 
the mobile operator. Moreover, application developers pay a percentage to Apple after they 
have charged customers for their service. This has enabled Apple to remain in the sales loop 
and at last, mobile operators are able to offer data usage to clients and make financial profits 
from data price plans.  With the rapid increase of multitude smart phone usage among 
younger customers, the smart card leading companies have to remain ambitious for 
introducing new services and control the platform to reduce their investments (i.e. purchasing 
of new smart cards).  
 
According to the above discussions, the concept of mobile payment can be considered as one 
of the challenges that the traditional smart card industry has faced recently. For example, 
there are existing mobile payment applications such as the PayPal app, Starbucks app, etc. 
that are available to users for download onto their mobile phones, enabling them to make 
payments for different services. However, companies are still considering alternative 
payment methods to achieve security, profit and customer satisfaction.    
 
Having new technologies such as cloud computing already developing in the market, we 
argue that the multi-application smart card model has become mature enough to be treated in 
the same way as other trustworthy business models. Nonetheless, the combination of several 
services in a single smart card remains as a natural next step in this business sector. Thus, the 
level of its success might still be open for debate. In the next section, we describe the 
challenges which have delayed the adoption of NFC transaction operation.  
 
1.1.3 Challenges of NFC Transaction Operation  
Having high security mechanisms as well as minimizing the chances of fraud in NFC 
payments have always been a major concern for both service providers and customers. In 
order to improve the security in NFC transactions, having a security controller stored within 
the NFC device is an essential requirement that can be designed in the form of a Secure 
Element (SE) (Mayes & Markantonakis, 2008). The key purpose of designing a SE is to 
provide an attack resistant microcontroller, similar to the chip that can be stored in a high 
quality smart card. Moreover, the payment application execution is supposed to be carried out 
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in a secure area within the SE that also stores confidential transaction assets such as 
transaction information, keys, and transaction application code (Association.G, 2007). 
The challenges of NFC transactions are mainly security issues with SE personalization, 
management, ownership and architecture that can be exploitable by attackers to delay the 
adaption of NFC within the society. Managing a mobile multi-application environment 
similar to NFC is very puzzling as there are many parties involved such as Service Providers 
(SP) and SE Issuers (SEI). Those parties are somehow partners as they have a dynamic 
relationship within the whole process and they also have limited control on their applications 
that are running in the service environment. They do not have full knowledge about each 
other and can only access their part of involvement, which makes the management and 
ownership of NFC challenging.  
 
One of the main challenges of the new mobile NFC service environment is that current card 
issuance models cannot support the dynamic post issuance personalization process (Konidala 
et al., 2012). This is because service providers:  
 
 Have absolutely no control over the SEs on which their applications are stored, except 
for deciding whether or not to use them 
 Have no control over the applications stored in the same SE 
 May not know their client personally, or have the opportunity to contact the SE or the 
user physically  
Therefore, there is a need for a common standard applicable to all ecosystem players in order 
to improve the interaction complexities they may have. Otherwise, isolated solutions will 
prevail and the technology will be incapable of serving the projected several hundred million 
users and thousands of service providers (Mayes & Markantonakis, 2008; Kadambi et al., 
2009; Morese & Raval, 2008).  
 
Global Platform’s Approach 
 
As an independent and non-profit organization which is concerned with smart card 
development and management, GlobalPlatform introduces a new way of managing the 
security of each application within the SIM. They have defined a way which guarantees the 
security and isolation of each application.  For instance, a bank can control/be in charge of its 
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application while the transport operator controls its own mobile ticketing application. On top 
of that, the MNO will have full control of its mobile service subscription. GlobalPlatform 
also defines a new model which can be used to add and remove applications in the Subscriber 
Identity Module (SIM) at any time. The SIM is divided into different domains and each 
Service Provider (SP) has been given a security domain. Each SP has full control of its own 
domain and no other SP can access other domains. This security model is necessary for 
division of responsibilities, roles and accesses especially an NFC ecosystem which contains 
multiple SPs. Figure 1 illustrates the GlobalPlatform SIM architecture. 
 
 
Figure 1: GlobalPlatform SIM Architecture (Gemalto, 2011) 
 
 
1.2 Research Motivations 
The SE as a single entity that acts as a controlling party is unable to carry out remote 
operations within the NFC ecosystem. The remote operations include installation and loading 
of new applications in an external party, creation of security domains for an external party, as 
well as activation and personalization of the applications that are loaded on the SE for an 
external party.  
 
At present, many restrictions and unknown constrains have created problems for the 
operations of SPs and SEIs in the mobile NFC world.  Those restrictions have presented a 
new approach for business cooperation in which collaboration is essential between unknown 
parties, and none of the parties are able to influence the service environment substantially.  
Therefore, a technical solution and a clear framework are required in order to define constant 
procedures for ecosystem players. These constant procedures improve the interaction of 
business partners, at the same time making the negotiation and description of each interaction 
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unnecessary. It also provides easy management and deployment of applications for unknown 
business partners. 
  
The NFC ecosystem will not succeed without having a clear framework as well as constant 
procedures. Technical standards and fundamental interoperability are essential to be achieved 
for industries working with NFC technology in order to establish a positive cooperation in the 
service environment. Indeed, lack of interoperability in the complex application level of the 
service environment (Mayes &Markantonakis, 2008) has resulted in the slow adoption of 
NFC technology within societies. Moreover, the current service applications do not provide a 
unique solution for the ecosystem. Therefore the service environment does not meet the right 
conditions (Guaus et. al., 2008). The current situation is that many independent business 
players are making decisions based on their own benefits which may not be acceptable to 
other business players.  Our goal is to provide a concept for an NFC ecosystem that is 
technically feasible, is accepted by all parties involved and thus provides a business case for 
each player in this ecosystem.  
 
1.3 Research Aim and Objectives  
The previous section (1.2) has highlighted that there is a considerable number of issues that 
have delayed the adaption of NFC transactions due to not having a feasible ecosystem that is 
accepted by all involved parties. Accordingly, the main aim of this research is thus:  
 
To explore the problems with existing NFC transaction ecosystem models, design three novel 
transaction authentication protocols based on our proposed transaction architectures, and to 
carry out detailed security analysis of the proposed protocols.   
 
In fulfilling this aim, the following objectives are considered important to be achieved:  
 
Objective 1: To consider the existing NFC transaction models in order to understand the 
limitations which have been raised regarding the adoption of this technology.  
 
Objective 2: To develop a payment model based on the results and limitations obtained from 
consideration of the existing models and to propose an ecosystem architecture and its 
respective authentication protocol so as to indicate the framework’s utility and value.  
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Objective 3: To design and evaluate a novel secure NFC transaction authentication protocol 
based on our second developed model that proposes a trusted relationship between a single 
MNO and the merchant in the transaction architecture.  
 
Objective 4: To design and evaluate a novel secure NFC transaction authentication protocol 
based on our third developed model which proposes a trusted relationship between multiple 
MNOs and the merchant in order to provide a complete transaction solution based on the 
second and third models.      
 
1.4 Thesis Structure  
The rest of this thesis is structured as follows:  
 
Chapter 2 presents background information on electronic payments, NFC transactions 
security and its related specifications, as well as examining the role of cloud computing in 
NFC transactions. In addition, this chapter emphasizes the level of security and manageability 
in existing NFC payment models while discussing several approaches to evaluate the 
flexibility in popular NFC transaction ecosystems. Finally, the research challenges section 
points out the research gaps that this thesis intends to tackle.     
 
Chapter 3 explains the methodology followed to conduct this research. The fundamentals of 
Design Science Research (DSR) are explained and then justified as an appropriate approach 
for this research. At the end, different stages of this research are indicated and then discussed 
in line with the DSR research cycle.    
 
Chapter 4 describes the general idea of our proposed payment model, called NFC Cloud 
Wallet. This model is a novel cloud-based approach towards managing mobile payment 
ecosystem using NFC technology. Based on the mentioned model, it then proposes a 
transaction authentication protocol which provides a secure communication channel to the 
communication parties. Moreover, it considers the detailed execution of the protocol and 
justifies the security, validity, and reliability of the protocol by providing a detailed security 
analysis and expert evaluation of such protocol.   
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Chapter 5 discusses the NFC transaction ecosystem scenario in which cloud computing 
plays an important role in the payment architecture and the merchant’s POS and MNO do not 
have a direct communication, as is the case with the first proposed protocol (chapter 4). In 
this scenario, the merchant’s POS and MNO have a trusted relationship and they only 
communicate through the NFC phone. This chapter also introduces a new insight towards 
NFC mobile payment frameworks and proposes a secure payment protocol accordingly 
which executes over the GSM network. In order to justify the security, validity and reliability 
of the proposed protocol, a detailed security analysis and expert evaluation of the protocol 
execution is provided and several attack scenarios are discussed.   
 
Chapter 6 proposes a novel cloud-based NFC transaction authentication protocol, which 
follows the same assumptions as the second protocol, proposed in chapter 5. However, this 
protocol defines a new concept, which enables the merchant to authenticate with multiple 
MNOs rather than just one MNO, as is the case with the second proposed protocol in chapter 
5. Furthermore, a detailed security analysis and expert evaluation of the protocol is provided 
to examine its reliability in different real-time attack scenarios.    
 
Chapter 7 provides a summary of the research findings and outlines the research 
contributions to the knowledge. After all, the limitations of this research are discussed and 
directions for future research are proposed. 
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Chapter 2 - Literature Review   
 
2. Overview  
In this chapter, the fundamentals of information security will be discussed and an overview of 
electronic payments will be described. This will be followed by a discussion of the role of 
cellular phones in electronic payments, which will be taken forward to discuss NFC and 
payment ecosystems in detail. Accordingly, we will start off by discussing the management 
issues within the SE architecture, considered to be one the essential components in the NFC 
payment technology. Having explained the surrounding issues in managing payment 
applications on the SE, we will add the concept of cloud computing into the discussion and 
describe its deployment models as well as its security issues. We then consider the 
importance of cloud computing in NFC payments and describe the ways in which the cloud is 
able to improve the management issues of the NFC payment ecosystem. Finally, we describe 
related work proposed by well-known industry stakeholders as well as Chen et al.’s protocol 
and highlight the existing research challenges, which have delayed the adoption of NFC 
payments.     
 
2.1 Transaction Security Requirements 
In order for a transaction to perform reliably there are a number of requirements that must be 
met to guarantee the security of information during data transmission in a communication 
channel. These requirements are confidentiality, integrity, non-repudiation, authentication, 
authorisation, availability, and privacy. They will now be explained in more detail.    
 
2.1.1 Confidentiality 
The concept of information security defines confidentiality as a set of rules which ensures 
that transmitting information amongst communicating parties are not available to a different 
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party that aims to gain unauthorised access (O’Neill et al., 2003). These set of rules must 
meet this requirement when communicating parties need to exchange data in any networked 
systems and thus ensure that only the expected party is receiving the information. Meaning 
that security of transmitting information is guaranteed against eavesdroppers, as disclosure of 
data breaches the confidentiality of the transmitting information (Nakamur, Hada & Neyama, 
2002; Geer, 2003). For example, when making online purchases, a customer should provide 
his credit card details in the merchant’s website. The merchant then sends this information to 
the transaction-processing network. In this case, confidentiality is achieved when data is 
transmitted in an encrypted format so no unauthorised party or individual can gain access to 
the transmitting information. One of the approaches that provide confidentiality between 
communicating parties is the use of a dedicated private line or a Virtual Private Network 
(VPN) (Rao et al., 2004).    
 
2.1.2 Integrity  
Integrity of information is achieved when accuracy and consistency of data is assured during 
its transmission. This means, transmitting information should not be modified or changed in 
an unauthorised manner during its transmission (Nakamur, Hada & Neyama, 2002; Geer, 
2003). Since preventing unauthorised tampering of information in an un-trusted network (e.g. 
Internet) is impossible, it is essential to detect the tampering once it occurs. Having the 
knowledge to detect any data modifications during its transmission fulfils the integrity 
requirements. Digital signatures are one of the methods used in information security to satisfy 
the integrity requirements of information (O’Neill et al., 2003). 
 
2.1.3 Non-repudiation 
Non-repudiation of the message refers to ensuring the sender and the receiver of the message 
are the parties who are claiming to have sent and received the message. In this case, neither 
the sender nor the receiver can deny sending and receiving the message. The integrity and 
confidentiality of the message will be thrown into question when there is any doubt about the 
sender or the receiver of the message. Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and digital signatures 
are the techniques that are used to ensure that non-repudiation requirements are met 
(Nakamur, Hada & Neyama, 2002; Geer, 2003). 
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2.1.4 Authentication 
Authentication is the act of identity establishment (Geer, 2003) to provide secure data 
accesses to those that have suitable proof of identity (Nakamur, Hada & Neyama, 2002). In 
other words, accessing information is only possible for parties who present suitable proof of 
identity. For example, when a person goes to a bank to withdrawn money, he introduces 
himself to the cashier by saying his full name (e.g. David Francis). He is in fact claiming to 
be David Francis. The cashier should verify his claim by asking for a photo Identification 
(ID) and checking the information against David’s claim. If the provided ID matches David’s 
claim, then the cashier authenticates David that he is who he is claiming to be.  There are 
several methods available for authentication process such as PKI, smart cards, dongles, 
passwords, biometrics, etc.  Having more than one type of authentication (two-factor 
authentication) provides stronger authentication. Each of the mentioned authentication 
methods follows the idea of having either a hardware-based or software-based authentication 
token that is in the possession of an entity and is authenticated.   
 
2.1.5 Authorisation 
After the authentication of an entity, its privileges should be determined and the particular 
resources/services that the entity is permitted and not permitted to access and perform (e.g. 
view, delete, run, read and write) should be decided. This determination of an authenticated 
entity’s privileges is called authorisation (Yang, 2002; Nakamur, Hada & Neyama, 2002; 
Geer, 2003). Having passed the authentication process and being authenticated does not 
necessarily mean that the entity is also authorised. The authorisation process is managed by 
an administrator that configures the policies and procedures for access controls to determine 
which resources and services are available for which authenticated users and under what 
conditions. Role-based access controls and simple file permissions in Windows and other 
Operating Systems (OS) are very common to use as an authorisation process (O’Neill et al., 
2003). 
 
2.1.6 Availability 
The term availability in information systems entails that all resources and services that have a 
role in computing systems should be available when required. This means the computer 
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systems, the communication channel and other participating resources must be functioning 
correctly. If not, the resources become useless and companies face financial crisis if the 
required resources are not available (O’Neill et al., 2003). Some businesses should provide 
high availability since their resources must remain available 24/7 to provide critical services 
to customers. This availability should remain active even in the case of hardware failure, 
system update or power failure.  
 
2.1.7 Privacy 
Data privacy can be considered as an additional mechanism to data confidentiality. While 
data confidentiality prevents eavesdroppers to gain unauthorised access to transmitting data, 
data privacy is concerned about the privacy rights of the subject of the data. This means that 
in data transmission, although strong encryption mechanisms are in place, there might be a 
back door available for intruders while data are being stored in a database. Data privacy 
assures that data is protected at all times (O’Neill et al., 2003).   
 
This section described the core principles of information security that also plays an essential 
role in online payments. In the following section we will discuss the concept of electronic 
payments in order to better understand the key issues of this payment method.  This will be 
followed by a consideration about the role of cellular phones in e-payments that is discussed 
in section 2.3.  
 
2.2 E-payment  
Electronic payment (e-payment) refers to the use of electronic means for making a payment 
from the payer (customer) to the payee (merchant). With e-payment systems the purpose of 
real payment scenarios is implemented in a virtual world. Due to the widespread use of 
Internet, e-payments have become very popular (Tsiakis & Sthephanides, 2005). 
The e-payment system consists of at least four participating parties. They are payer, payee, an 
issuer and an acquirer. The issuer and the acquirer are considered as third parties in whom the 
issuer processes the payer’s transaction (e.g. customer’s bank) and the acquirer processes the 
payee’s transactions (e.g. merchant’s bank).  “Cash-like” and “cheque-like” e-payments 
systems are two models of e-payment systems which have been identified by Asokan, Janson, 
Steiner and Waidner (1997). The “Cash-like” model is similar to the real cash payment 
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scenario where both payer and payee exchange money directly and without the involvement 
of their banks. However, in the cheque-like model, both payer and payee do need to have an 
issuer (bank account) either in the same bank or in different banks. Therefore, their banks are 
involved in order to process their transaction.     
 
In the “cash-like” model, when a person intends to make an online purchase, before making 
the online payment over the Internet, he withdraws the money from his bank account. Then 
when he makes the online payment, he uses the money that has been withdrawn previously 
and sends it to the payee. The payee’s acquirer then deposits and settles the money from the 
issuer (Asokan et al., 1997) 
 
In the “cheque-like” model, the payee needs to have a bank account as well as a debit or a 
credit card in order to make online payments. A debit card can be described as an electronic 
readable card which stores the unique payment credentials of the payer and deposits the 
available money from the payer bank account. A credit card stores the same information, but 
when a payer decides to make a payment, he has to borrow the money from the issuer (credit 
company), which provided the credit card and should pay the money back to the same 
company later. The summary of the credit card e-payment system is as follows (Turban et al., 
2004). After completion of the online payment form by the payer (customer), the page is 
transmitted to the payee (merchant). Then the acquirer receives the payer’s credit card 
information as well as the payee’s identification number. In order to approve the payer’s 
credit card information, the acquirer sends the information to the payer’s credit card issuer. 
Consequently, the payer’s credit card company responds back to the acquirer’s request stating 
whether or not the credit card information is approved. The card issuer then sends the result 
of this process all the way back to the payer (customer) to update him/her of his/her card 
statements. Figure 2 shows the money flow in the credit/debit card e-payment system.        
 
The payer’s credit card information can be entered in three different methods (Wright, 2002). 
Similar to the above mentioned method, the payer’s credit card information can be entered 
into the online form that is provided by the payee. In this case, the payee receives the payer’s 
credit card information and stores it in its database. 
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Figure 2: Money Flow in Credit/debit Card-based E-payment Systems 
(Asokan et al., 1997) 
 
In this method, hackers may gain unauthorised access to the merchant’s database where the 
customers’ credentials are stored, as was the case in 2007, when attackers hacked into the 
“TK Maxx” database and stole the details of 45.7 million debit and credit cards (BBC News, 
2007).   
 
The second method of entering the payment card details is to complete the form that is 
provided by a payment service provider. The payment service provider’s role is to provide e-
payment services for payees (merchants) and is not the merchant itself. PayPal is a good 
example of the e-payment service provider. In this method, the payer’s credentials are not 
available to payees and accordingly are not stored in the merchants’ database like in the first 
method.  
 
Using a Secure Electronic Transaction (SET) is the third method that a payer can follow to 
enter his card details. This method facilitates the process where the payer’s card details are 
encrypted by its issuer’s public key. Then the encrypted card details are sent to the payee 
(merchant) who in turn sends it to the acquirer. Since the card details are encrypted, the 
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merchant cannot read the information. Subsequently, the merchant cannot store those details 
in its database.  
 
PayPal is an example of an e-payment system provider that has become very popular in 
recent years (PayPal, 2013; Kauffman et al., 2013). Users register with PayPal and provide an 
email address to be able to use the e-payment system. Either to pay or to receive money, both 
payers (customers) and payees (merchants) must have an account with PayPal. In order to 
send money, a payer should complete a form which requires his credit/debit card or his bank 
account details as well as the amount of the money which needs to be transferred. The payer 
is also required to provide the email address of the recipient in order to specify where the 
money is reaching to. The recipient receives the transferred amount as well as the 
confirmation email if it is a registered user of PayPal. In this case, the recipient should login 
to his account in order to find the money. However, if the recipient is not registered with 
PayPal, he will have to register and create an account in order to receive the money. 
Registered users of PayPal are able to withdraw money either by requesting PayPal to deposit 
the required amount into their bank accounts or by asking PayPal to send them a cheque. 
Users are also able to transfer the available money from their accounts to the accounts of 
other PayPal users (Jones, 2001; Guadamuz, 2003).  
 
The payer’s credit/debit card details as well as their bank account information are not 
available to payees and PayPal is the only party who can view and process the payer’s 
credentials (PayPal, 2013). This method provides privacy protection for payers from 
distributed payees and encourages them to use such e-payment service.    
 
The major concerns regarding the security of user credentials in e-payment systems are the 
communication channel which transfers the payment credentials as well as the database that 
stores the credentials (Hsieh, 2001; Wright, 2002). Indeed, security has always been the 
major concern of all involved parties in an e-payment system especially to customers. For 
this reason, some of the customers prefer to be unknown to merchants, which prevent 
merchants from building a record of their customers’ purchases.      
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2.3 Cellular Phones for E- payments 
This section discusses the idea of using cellular phones in e-payments. The discussion is 
based on identity attributes and describes the related work that has been developed in the 
mobile identity management industry.  
 
The popularity of the Internet and other high-speed data networks in combination with the 
attractiveness of smart phones have increased the interest of companies to invest in the 
concept of mobile wallet (Mjolsnes & Rong, 2001; Boly et al., 1994). CWI Amsterdam was 
one of the first companies in Europe which carried out two distinct projects to combine 
digital cash and mobile telephones. The first project investigated mobile device 
authentication, while the other was based on Chaum’s online digital payment protocols 
(Chaum, 1985). The aim of both projects was to use Global System for Mobile 
Communication (GSM) (Rannenberg, 2004) to act as an electronic wallet for payers in order 
to connect to the bank and payee. Subsequently, this idea was extended to another scheme, 
which was part of the European CAFÉ e-commerce project (Boly et al., 1994). The goal of 
this extended work was to propose the concept of wallets with observers (Chaum, 1985) in 
order to enable credentials and off-line digital cash to be used in commercial settings.      
             
Although the results of the European CAFÉ project were never implemented in combination 
with cellular networks, electronic wallet technology was developed as an outcome of this 
project. The developed electronic wallet technology had the potential to perform the 
transactions based on a short-range infrared link that could directly connect to wallets held by 
individuals as well as connecting to compliant cash registers. However, the transaction could 
also be performed over the Internet to other SPs. During the off-line transaction, an observer 
that is trusted by the credential issuer protects the credential issuer’s interests. The observer 
also uses the credentials on behalf of the issuer and controls copying of the credentials. An 
off-line transaction is carried out when the payer (credential holder) and the payee (credential 
verifier) are not connected to any supplementary services. In this scenario, the service is 
trusted by the payer. While the result of European CAFÉ project did not demonstrate the 
ability of electronic wallets to perform transactions in combination with GSM networks, it 
was a significant step towards improving the mobile wallet technology.  
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Valista (Hennsey, 2003) is another company that follows the mobile wallet approach and 
introduces a new service which supports secure payments, user identity verification and 
personalization. Their system works based on a provider-centric model in which a hosted 
server such as Identity Provider (IdP) acts as a central database for storing customers’ wallet 
information and can be accessed from the user’s mobile device. Valista wallet service meets 
the requirements of main security standards such as Visa Mobile 3-D Secure and 
MasterCard’s Secure Payment Application (SPA). The fast acceptance of second generation 
mobile communication systems made an enormous influence on increasing the essence of 
mobile identity services which led to the rapid development of mobile commerce (m-
commerce) services (Jendricke et al., 2002; Rannenberg, 2004). The two main factors that 
have a direct effect on the growth of m-commerce services are usability and trust. For this 
reason, several approaches have been proposed in order to enhance usability in mobile 
devices (Dix et al., 2000). On the other hand, confidentiality, integrity, user control and 
minimal disclosure of the sensitive data are the key issues in the perception of trust on mobile 
devices. GSM-based IdM (Rannenberg, 2004) is one of the approaches that use SIM and the 
GSM infrastructure as the fundamental platform. This approach has several benefits, however 
the number of managed identity attributes is very restricted since they are only related to the 
GSM infrastructure and the SIM hardware.           
 
2.4 NFC & NFC Ecosystem  
This section describes the functions of adding contact-less card features to mobile phones in 
order to produce an intelligent device that enables us to make payments with. The intelligent 
device is called an NFC mobile phone (Francis et al, 2010). We thus describe the roles of the 
parties involved in an NFC transaction so that the responsibilities of each party are clarified. 
 
A. NFC Transmission Classification 
 
Based on the ISO/IEC 18092 NFC IP-1 and ISO/IEC 14443 contactless smart card standards, 
in an NFC transmission, there are three different modes of operation namely read/write, peer-
to-peer, and card emulation (NFC Forum, 2013; Desai & Shajan, 2012).  
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 The read/write mode enables the NFC device to read the NFC forum mandated tag 
types (i.e. a tag embedded in a smart poster). This mode of operation on the RF 
interface is supported by the ISO 14443 and FeliCa schemes. 
 
 According to the NFCIP-1 and LLCP standards, the peer-to-peer mode of operation 
enables two NFC devices to communicate directly for transferring information such 
as an SMS, contact numbers, etc. The NFCIP-1 that allows the initiator – target 
model, requires the target and the initiator to be defined before the communication 
initiates. The connection decision is made by the application that operates in the 
application layer only once the initial handshake is completed. In this mode, both the 
mobile device and the tag are in the active mode enabling data to be sent over a half-
duplex channel which means when one device is transmitting data, the other waits 
until the transmission is finished and then starts to transmit data (Desai & Shajan, 
2012). 
 
 The card emulation mode provides a similar kind of environment as a traditional 
smart card for the NFC device. Additionally, this approach eliminates the need for 
changing the current infrastructure.   
   
B. Ecosystem  
 
As defined by the Smart Card Alliance Mobile and NFC (2012), an NFC payment ecosystem 
consists of all the involved parties in the transaction process in order to provide the required 
services. This can be from a mobile device, merchant’s POS terminal, and mobile network 
operator to trusted service manager and acquirer that is responsible for clearing and settling 
payments.    
 
When different functions of a mobile phone combine with the functions of contact-less cards, 
the results of this combination will have a greater significance than just the importance of 
adding two devices together. This significance defines the NFC-enabled mobile phone which 
can connect with another NFC-enabled device (i.e. PDA, tablets, etc.) in a short range 
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communication channel (Hang et al., 2010). NFC technology enables users to benefit from 
new and countless services on a daily basis where they can pay for their food, buy a cinema 
ticket by scanning their phone on a movie poster and much more. This newly developed 
intelligent device is proposed as an all-in-one personal device that can be personalized and 
used in a highly interactive environment (Madlmayr et al., 2008). Figure 3 demonstrates the 
concept of the NFC mobile phone (NFC Forum, 2008).  
 
 
Figure 3: The Concept of NFC Mobile Phone (NFC Forum, 2008) 
 
The success of the NFC mobile ecosystem is based on the relationships between the involved 
parties, where those relationships have to be clearly defined (Kadambi et al., 2009). The 
present contactless ecosystem models functionalities can be extended by a well-defined NFC 
ecosystem which improves the number of functionalities that an involved party can provide. 
Table 1 describes the key functionalities of NFC ecosystem (NFC Forum, 2008).  
 
Since several components are required in an NFC payment service, different business sectors 
are also needed to control their part of involvement within the NFC ecosystem. All business 
parties have realized that, in order to provide NFC payment services to consumers, all parties 
have to collaborate and it is not possible to provide the service only by a single firm. 
Although the standardization of NFC has been started from the technical point of view 
(Schamberger et al., 2013), the adoption of NFC has been slower than expected. Not having a 
clear structure and slow development of NFC ecosystem among participating industries are 
the main reasons for the slow take-off of this technology. 
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Table 1: Key Functionalities of NFC Ecosystem 
 
Key functionalities 
 
Description 
 
Service provisioning 
It provides authentication and remote user management due to 
network availability. Also users can subscribe and personalize 
their contactless cards 
 
Mobile network provisioning 
It offers user authentication and user care for data connectivity 
as well as ensuring that the network infrastructure is 
maintained to enable users to receive data connectivity service 
 
Trusted Service Manager (TSM) 
Delivers a communication platform between Service 
Providers (SPs) and NFC mobile phones where SPs provide 
multi-application management functionalities to NFC enabled 
mobile phone through this platform 
 
Additionally, a business model that could benefit all participants has not yet been sustained. 
Figure 4 illustrates the generic model for the NFC payment ecosystem that is proposed by the 
Mobey forum (2011) in which the SE issuer is the MNO. In some cases such as the Mobey 
forum’s model, one player can have more than one role. This makes the ecosystem more 
flexible in terms of manageability, control, ownership and personalization of NFC 
transactions.    
 
 
Figure 4: NFC Ecosystem - UICC as SE (Mobey Forum, 2011) 
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2.4.1 Security in NFC Ecosystem   
The cooperation between the involved parties plays an important role when it comes to 
security in an NFC payment ecosystem. A secure, tamper resistant component, such as SE is 
required to store confidential payment assets for transaction execution. The responsibilities 
and access rights of each involved party must be clearly defined in order to ensure secure 
storage and transmission of sensitive customers’ information. Therefore, managing the SE as 
a crucial component in an NFC payment ecosystem has become the main concern of 
researchers.  
 
In order for the operating system to handle the above mentioned issues, it should be able to 
manage and personalize a number of applications that several SPs preferably provide Over-
The-Air (OTA). Although some solutions are currently available and researchers are 
proposing new models for defining the ownership and control of the SE in the NFC payment 
ecosystem, however this may still result in a business advantage as there is a lack of finalized 
procedures/standards for all companies to follow. In spite of the location of SE (either in a 
mobile device or a cloud environment) in the context of NFC transactions, SE provides 
protection storage for transaction assets such as keys, transaction application code and 
transaction data.  Universal Integrated Circuit Card (UICC) is one of the most reliable 
components to act as an SE in the NFC architecture.  It is removable, provides the same 
security as a smartcard, can run multiple applications issued by multiple providers, it is 
compliant with all smart card standards and supports GSM and Universal Mobile 
Telecommunications System (UMTS) networks. According to Global System for Mobile 
Communications Association (GSMA) guidelines, UICC is the most appropriate type of SE 
in NFC mobile transactions (Bender et al., 2011). We will provide a detailed discussion of the 
SE and its different architectures in section 2.5 of this chapter.  
 
2.4.2 Stakeholders 
To understand the business dynamics of the ecosystems discussed in this chapter, this section 
defines the roles of involved parties in the NFC ecosystem (Stolplan, 2011; Madlmayr et al, 
2008; NFC Forum, 2008). The complete scenario cannot be performed without roles; 
however one single player may assume more than one role in the process.  
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Consumer: The party who is considered as the end user in an NFC ecosystem. Basically, the 
consumer is the user of the service who registers his credit card details with the service 
provider. He is responsible for initiating payment requests and agreements.  
 
Merchant: Is considered as the consumer matching part. The merchant offers products and 
services to consumers and decides which payment options the consumer can use to make a 
payment. 
 
Secure Element issuer (SEI): Is the party that issues the SE in NFC ecosystem. It is also 
controlling the SE in which it decides how the storage of an SE should be used. SE issuer has 
a crucial role as it is in charge of the SE keys. In our case, the SEI is the MNO, as shall be 
described later in this thesis.  
 
Secure Element provider: The SE provider is the manufacturer of the SE. It has a direct 
relationship with SE issuer which is the MNO in our case.  
 
Service Provider (SP): Is the party that issues the payment application and deploys data 
element to the consumer. SP is also responsible for managing the payment application which 
is stored on the SE. Examples of SPs include transport operators with ticketing applications, 
financial institutions, retailers with loyalty applications, etc.  
. 
Application Issuer (AI): Provides the application which implements and fulfils the business 
requirements of smart cards SPs. It can guarantee secure interoperability between the card 
and the card-acceptance device. Sometimes the SP is the application issuer.   
 
Mobile Network Operator (MNO): Is one of the highly active participants in the NFC 
ecosystem that is responsible for providing the GSM network for data transmission purposes. 
It also deals with life cycle management of the NFC ecosystem as well as data provisioning 
Over-The-Air (OTA). In our proposed ecosystem scenarios (chapter 4) the MNO is the SE 
issuer because the UICC is the SE. 
 
Trusted Service Manager (TSM): The role of the TSM is to integrate several SEs and SPs. 
Depending on the ecosystem architecture, an SP may decide to increase the services that it 
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offers by participating in new mode of operation. This conflict is solved by the TSM since it 
offers a trusted platform that can solve the inefficiency and complexity of multiple 
agreements. 
 
Acquirer: The role of the acquirer is handling financial payments by clearing and settling 
transactions through financial institutions. 
 
Over-The-Air (OTA) Provider: Is a secure service which provides data transfer between the 
SE and the back-offline database. The database can be in the form of a cloud which can be 
managed by the SP (SP is the cloud owner).  
 
At present, SP and SE issuers are facing many unknown constraints in their current 
operations. This indicates that none of the involved parties in an NFC ecosystem can 
influence the service environment individually. Therefore, cooperation is required among 
unknown parties in order to build a clear partnership to deliver NFC payments. Rather than 
cooperation, a clear logistical framework is also required to define rules and procedures for 
the involved parties to follow. This approach avoids the negotiations between parties 
therefore they do not need to describe every detail of each interaction. This also makes the 
previous unknown partners understand the application execution procedures and their 
management. Not having a standardized and transparent ecosystem model with unclear 
procedures will not succeed and will result in an unsatisfactory business model which is not 
able to provide valuable services for consumers.  Figure 5 demonstrates a business ecosystem 
model for NFC payments that is proposed by Stolplan (2011). This model suggests using a 
TSM as a backbone for integrating different SPs and SEIs. However this is the view of 
Stolpan towards managing the payment ecosystem and it may not be of interest to other 
involved parties.  
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Figure 5: Stakeholders Roles in an NFC Environment 
 
Since the SE plays a crucial role in NFC payments, in the following section we will provide a 
broad discussion on SE in the payment ecosystem, evaluate different SE architectures within 
a mobile device, describe the SE lifecycle and consider the SE management issues.    
2.5 Secure Element (SE)  
Having to ensure secure NFC payments is a necessity which is supposed to be provided by a 
security controller, normally in the form of an SE (Mayes & Markantonakis, 2008). The SE is 
intended as an attack resistant microcontroller, rather like the chip found in a good quality 
smart card.  In addition, the SE includes a combination of hardware, software, interfaces and 
protocols embedded in a mobile handset that enables secure storage (Choudhary & Rissiko, 
2006; Francis et al., 2010). Selected by the user during card emulation mode, the SE provides 
a secure area for the execution of the applications and protection of the payment assets (e.g. 
payment data, keys, and the payment application code) (Association, 2007; Choudhary & 
Rissiko, 2006; Francis et al., 2010).  
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Besides being used for payment applications, the SE can also be involved in the 
authentication process and can be used for storing applications not related to payments, which 
nonetheless require security mechanisms. However since the SE is essential in NFC 
transactions and ownership/control of it may yield commercial or strategic advantage, various 
solutions have been prompted which will be discussed later on in this chapter. Although 
different secure element alternatives are currently analysed by the NFC stakeholders, we 
describe the four main types in this section. First classified by their ability of being 
removable from the handset or not, they are then categorized by the following criteria: 
security, reusability and standardization progress. 
 
Baseband processor and embedded hardware alternatives which are non-removable secure 
element based alternatives are outlined first. This will be followed by removable secure 
element based alternatives: Secure Memory Card (SMC) and Universal Integrated Circuit 
Card (UICC) (Alpar et al., 2012).   
 
2.5.1 Baseband Processor 
The baseband processor, one of the most important components in a cell phone, handles cell 
phone connectivity and manages application operation. Providing a high level of security, the 
SE can be hosted by the secure memory of the baseband. Thus, the handset architecture does 
not have to be modified. Moreover, such a SE alternative exempts the user from having to 
insert an additional hardware into his/her cell phone to use security services providing by the 
secure element. However, as soon as the cell phone is lost, broken or exchanged, the SE must 
be changed, precluding it from being reusable in another handset (Reveilhac & Pasquet, 
2009).  
2.5.2 Embedded Hardware  
 
In the embedded hardware case, the SE is a smartcard soldered onto the mobile phone and 
cannot be removed. Thus, the level of security provided by the SE is as high as the one 
supported by a smartcard. Nevertheless, this chip, embedded onto the mobile phone during 
manufacturing stage, must be personalized after the device is delivered to the end user 
(EMVCo, 2007). This implies the design of a new secured personalization process and 
indirectly an increase of the cell phone’s price for customer. Soldered onto the handset, the 
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SE chip can’t be used in another cell phone. It has to be replaced and personalized every time 
the user changes his/her handset. Although the SE is compliant with all the smartcard 
standards (EMV, Java card, etc.), the communication between the NFC controller and this 
dedicated hardware is not standardized yet, only proprietary protocols can be used up to now. 
Figure 6 illustrates the SE alternatives.  
 
 
Figure 6: SE Alternatives (Reveilhac & Pasquet, 2009) 
 
2.5.3 Secure Memory Card (SMC) 
A removable SMC is made up of memory, embedded smartcard element and smartcard 
controller. In other words, it is a combination of a memory card (e.g. MMC, SD, etc.) and a 
smartcard (Choudhary, B. 2006). Thereby, a SMC provides the same high level of security as 
a smartcard and is compliant with most of the main standard, interfaces and environment for 
smartcards (e.g. EMV, Global Platform, ISOc 7816, Javacard, etc.).  
 
Removable and having a large capacity memory, the SMC can host a large number of 
applications in it and does not need to be reissued when the customer buys a new cell phone. 
The SMC can be inserted in any device supporting NFC technology and is not limited to 
mobile devices. However, up to now, the communication between the SMC and the NFC 
controller have not been standardized yet and only a few number of such a chip are currently 
available (e.g. in September 2008, only one NFC-enabled cell phone supports SMC).  
 
Chapter 2: Literature Review     
Pardis Pourghomi   30 
 
2.5.4 Universal Integrated Circuit Card (UICC)  
A Universal Integrated Circuit Card (UICC) is a removable smartcard inserted in a handset. 
Initially thought to replace the SIM card, the UICC gives access to GSM as well as to UMTS 
network. As a smartcard, it is compliant with all smartcard standards, is as secure as a 
smartcard and can host multiple application issued by multiple application providers. 
Consequently, UICC can host GSM/UMTS applications such as SIM and (U)SIM 
applications as well as non-telecom applications such as payment applications, loyalty, 
ticketing, e-passport, etc. (Guaus, J. 2008; Mobey Forum, 2009). Originally designed for 
mobile networks, the use of UICC as SE, unlike the SMC alternative, is at that time limited to 
mobile terminal utilization. Since 2007, the standardization of protocols allowing the use of 
UICC as the secure element is on track. In October 2007, the European Telecommunications 
Standard Institute (ETSI) approved the Single Wire Protocol (SWP) as a standard defining 
the physical layer as well as the data link between the UICC and the contactless frontend 
(CLF) (embedded onto the NFC controller). A few months later, in February 2008, this first 
standard was completed with the ETSI’s approval of the Host Controller Interface (HCI). 
This interface, one of the most important for NFC, is the software layer that runs on top of the 
SWP. It defines specific commands to create gates, pipes and registries, allowing CLF and 
UICC to communicate together. Table 2 evaluates the SE alternatives discussed above 
(Reveilhac & Pasquet, 2009).  
 
Table 2: SE Alternatives Evaluation  
 
2.6 SE Lifecycle  
As noted by Madlmayr, Langer and Scharinger (2008), the lifecycle of an SE contains 
initialization, activation, application upload and deactivation. The explanations of these steps 
are described in what follows.   
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The Initialization of an SE can be completed by different SEIs such as credit card 
companies, Mobile Network Operator (MNO), financial institution or retailers. The SEI can 
also act as a platform provider. If the SE does not contain any applications when issued, that 
means there is no platform manager assigned to that SE. A platform manager cannot deal 
with SE applications without having different certifications (i.e. Visa PayWave certification). 
These certifications are provided by the SP.  
 
In most cases, the assignment of platform managers is dependent on the installation of the 
first application. Any party that installs the first application on the SE will be assigned as a 
first platform manager.  However, the SE can also be managed by other AIs. The SE can be 
issued by pre-installed applications that can be provided by SP, which means the SE is 
already under the control of SP as its platform manager.  
 
The Activation process takes place when the SE is inserted into the phone.  The SE then 
signs in to the NFC controller and it sends a confirmation message to the platform manager in 
order to inform the platform manager of the successful insertion of the SE in the phone. The 
platform manager then sends a confirmation message to the mobile phone in order to activate 
the SE. The platform manager is the only party that has the authority to hold the SE keys for 
data configuration purposes. The NFC controller’s identifier is also stored in the SE to inform 
SE in case if it was inserted into another phone.  
 
During phase 1 of the Applications Upload process, the SP (in this case also the AI) contacts 
the MNO, the only party who is in charge of the Mobile Station International ISDN Number 
(MSISDN). The only way to classify the external party for an OTA transaction with the NFC 
phone is the MSISDN.      
 
In phase 2, the MNO forwards the SP request to the platform manager (s) in charge of the SE. 
If there is no SE in the phone, the MNO will inform the SP concerning this issue.  
In this case the application upload process terminates. However, if the platform manager is 
positive with the request, it will send an offer directly to the SP to upload its application.  
In the next phase, the SP selects one platform manager amongst others (if more than one 
platform manager exists) to load data to the security domain area which is under the control 
of the same platform manager.  
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The application data passes through a secure channel to reach the security domain for 
application personalization purposes. If the handset is logged in to the network, the SP has no 
problems in terms of alteration and deletion of data stored in the security domain.   
Having security domains ensures the privacy of each security domain in a way that different 
SPs will only have access to their own space within a specific security domain.   
 
The Deactivation procedures are also managed by the platform manager where it can 
deactivate the SE, OTA in the case of theft or loss. If the SE is installed in a new device, then 
the activation process should be renewed and the platform manager is the only party that 
should confirm the activation process to enable the SE to be used for contactless transactions.  
 
The above description is dependent on the multi-host interface implementation that is not 
standardized yet. Accordingly, a control instance is required in order to control the SEs 
within the handset. Currently, there is only one control instance for the whole phone and not 
individual control instances for individual SEs.  
 
The control instance is responsible for establishing a direct communication between the NFC 
controller and the SIM through the SWP (GSM Association, 2011).  It also deals with the 
communication between the NFC phone and MNO and routes the communication.  While 
SEs only act as a tamper-resistant data containers this communication channel is required to 
establish data channels and also to send short messages.  
 
2.7 SE Management Issues  
Although mobile devices are increasingly becoming a tool for ID recording, however not 
having standardized procedures for managing an SE has raised several legal questions and 
uncertainties for companies aiming to use mobile devices for IDs (Coskun et. al.; Madlmayr 
et al., 2008). Since critical transaction data are stored on the SE, managing and controlling 
the SE also has several issues with NFC technology. For instance, in the case of identity 
checks and payment technology options, users’ choices cannot be dependent on the handsets 
they buy. Thus, most probably the MNO will decide which services the customers can use in 
identity checks and payment services (Madlmayr et al., 2008; Benyo et al, 2007). There are 
still several legal questions concerning the ownership and control of an SE such as: which 
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party has the authority to decide what services customers can access? Which party is 
responsible when customer authentication fails? Having different SE owners in service 
operation results in potential failure transfer responsibility to other involved parties. The rest 
of this section provides broad discussion on SE management issues.           
 
2.7.1 Traditional Card Issuance and Management 
In the traditional issuance process of contact and contactless cards, the card environment and 
the services loaded onto them are well specified and known in advance. The whole technical 
and logistical process is strictly controlled. Usually, it is not possible or even necessary to 
manage card content throughout the card’s lifecycle. After the card is distributed, the SP 
typically loses any control over it.  
 
In today’s multi-application environment, the applications and their SPs are known to each 
other: card management and all commercial issues are contractually regulated well in 
advance. The stored applications and SPs involved are usually static, and will not change 
during the card’s life cycle. Technically the cards do allow content download after issuance, 
but this is rarely done. Examples of contact and contactless services on traditional cards are 
those provided by public transportation companies, or banks with diverse payment methods.   
 
2.7.2 Card Issuance – Complexity of the Mobile NFC Ecosystem 
The service environment which runs the NFC payment operation deals with a number of 
complex issues which need to be clear before service operation. For instance, several SPs 
may decide to place their applications on the SE in mobile handsets. The SE is an external 
condition for all SPs. This means that the technical constraints of the SE cannot be 
compromised. Having multiple card issuers can also raise issues such as card personalisation 
and ownership as well as access privileges to user information. The mobility of customers 
also makes the service environment more complex as customers may wish to use the services 
in different countries. In this case, the SPs should widen their infrastructure in order to 
provide global services. However, international companies may prefer to follow standardized 
procedures for application deployment and payment operation to avoid following new 
payment procedures in every particular market. Furthermore, customers may decide to add 
and/or delete the services which they receive from their SPs.  Having specific requirements in 
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each service application does not solve the problem when it comes to application installation 
and deployment since they all should share the same SE in a mobile device (Benyo et al., 
2007).    
 
In the mobile NFC world, there are many constraints unknown to either SPs or SE issuers in 
their current operations. The NFC ecosystem presents a new way of doing business in which 
no-one can substantially influence the service environment, and cooperation is necessary 
between even unknown partners. A transparent logistical model and a technical solution are 
needed that can ensure uniform procedures for the parties involved. This makes it 
unnecessary to negotiate and describe the details of each and every interaction, and allow 
even previously unknown business partners to seamlessly realize the procedures for 
application deployment and management. Without such an approach the NFC ecosystem will 
not prevail, resulting in an unsatisfactory business model that is unable to provide user-
friendly, valuable services for customers.  
 
2.7.3 Need for Interoperability 
Industries working with NFC technology are striving to achieve technical standards and 
interoperability at the basic, underlying technology level (Widmann et al., 2012; Kanniaine, 
2010). At least the same level of interoperability needs to be achieved on the more complex 
application level too, where it is still missing. The present environment with proprietary 
service applications, unique logistical solutions do not provide the right conditions. For 
services and applications there are many independent players involved. Their decisions are 
primarily driven by considerations that are not NFC specific, therefore they only accept 
transparent, financially sound solutions.  
 
2.7.4 Service Distribution 
There are several players involved in the NFC value chain, however their roles and the form 
of their cooperation are poorly defined (Widmann et al., 2012). This means distributing any 
NFC service application requires special, individual agreements between the partners 
involved. With relationships ill-defined, SPs face new logistical challenges every time their 
application is loaded onto their users’ SEs.    
Chapter 2: Literature Review     
Pardis Pourghomi   35 
 
This section evaluated the role of SE from different perspectives; in the next, we will 
continue by considering the integration of roles within ecosystem players and discuss the SE 
issuance process.  
 
2.8 Stakeholder Positions along the MFS Value Chain  
Mobile Financial Services (MFS) or mobile commerce is referred to as a wireless technology 
which enables the electronic transmission of data into the customer mobile device 
irrespective of the location of the actual mobile device (Lee et al., 2012; Tiwari et al., 2007).  
The MFS Value chain may consist of a number of technology stakeholders with several 
responsibilities. For instance, the bank may decide to be the SEI and fully control the SE. In 
this case, the bank is able to process the transaction data through the SE in which it issues. 
Moreover, the bank is capable of allowing different AIs to use the SE functionalities while it 
can decide not to do this. In another scenario, the bank may decide to be the AI. In this case, 
the bank is only able to manage the particular keys of its own application and is unable to 
control the root keys of the SE. Additionally, the bank is the business-to-business (B2B) 
partner of the SEI (Kanniainen, 2010). Furthermore, the bank may decide to employ a TSM 
to manage its services in a trusted manner; this makes the TSM a partner with the SEI, SEV 
and AI as it should collaborate with them in order to manage the bank’s services. On the 
other hand, TSM may choose to operate as a SEV and/or a SEI at once (or vice versa, a SEV 
and/or SEI as TSM). In this case, the TSM will have full access and control over the SE and 
can create the root keys, manage the SE throughout its lifecycle, and possibly allow different 
AIs to use the storage space of the SE. Having different roles in a MFS value chain may raise 
several issues from the consumer point of view. For example, the TSMs, AIs and SEIs should 
come up with an agreement regarding establishing the rules or customer care as consumers 
might be unsure which party to call in case if there is an issue with the service operation. This 
can be an important issue particularly when AIs, TSMs, and SEIs are separate legal parties.        
 
In general, in the MFS value chain, a bank or a financial institution can be the AI, SEI and 
AI, or SEI, AI and TSM at once. Having common characteristics and possibly overlapping of 
the responsibilities amongst the stakeholders in the MFS value chain has made ecosystem set-
up quite complicated. However, there is a good potential for ecosystem participants to 
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integrate their motivations and perspectives into a consistent service offerings (Kanniainen, 
2010; Lee et al., 2012; Tiwari et al., 2007).  
        
2.8.1 SE Keys as Crucial Pivot 
The employments and conditions of NFC contactless payments for managing all SEs are 
normally based on the GlobalPlatform smart card standards. For instance, the standardization 
of UICC, eSE or Secure uSD Card, and Trusted Mobile Base (TMB) is still in progress. Since 
the international employment of NFC payments models, processes, protocols and 
infrastructure can be shared amongst technology stakeholders, investors have constantly got 
involved in order to provide different solutions for service offerings. Figure 7 demonstrates 
an outline of a common NFC payment application issuance model (Kanniainen, 2010). 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Key Provisioning Process to Secure Elements 
(Kanniainen, 2010) 
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2.8.2 SE Issuance Process, Ownership and Personalization 
The existing processes for card issuance in NFC payments are completely different from the 
former method. In the former method, the card is personalized during its production process; 
in this case, the card manufacturer matches the verified name and the existing address before 
their production is ordered. However, in the existing method the card is left blank during the 
production process and is personalized when a customer buys it from the MNO.         
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Conceptual Combination of Payment and SE Issuance Processes 
(Kanniainen, 2010) 
 
It is essential to identify and define the processes in which the respective stakeholders employ 
in order to verify the identity of clients for securing their ownership and relationship with 
every single customer. Also, it is necessary to continue the mobile payment business even if 
any process requires a change or an improvement. In other words, any process change should 
not have a negative impact on this on-going business.  As a conceptual draft, the SE issuance 
process could take the form shown in Figure 8.  
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2.9 Proposed Models 
The following models are the major proposed solutions to the existing issues of managing 
NFC payment ecosystems discussed up to now in this thesis.  
 
2.9.1 The StoLPaN-NFC Mobile Services Standards Consortium  
The StoLPan experts proposed a new logistical and technical model that fulfils the following 
criteria (Ahson & Ilyas, 2012; Benyo et al., 2007; Stolplan, 2011):  
 
 Open relationship between SPs, SE issuers and users 
 Technical transparency for SPs 
 Service homogeneity for users 
Basic Requirement: 
 
The first basic requirement for this goal is to provide technical compatibility between the 
services and the hosting environments.  
 
There will be numerous players involved in the dynamic post issuance and remote 
personalization process. It cannot be expected that all parties know each other or have 
established commercial relationships. The multi-application mobile environment establishes 
the requirement that the technical model supporting the dynamic post issuance procedure for 
NFC services should be capable of detecting any and all environment specifics, and should 
eventually hide any technical incompatibility from the players involved.   
 
Summary of the Model:    
 
One single logistical process can be created – covering, loading, personalization and life 
cycle management of applications – that is technologically agnostic and supports all SE 
types, even multiple ones, in communication devices. The process also ensures that both the 
user and the SP need not rely on third party services, unless they prefer to outsource certain 
activities.  
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In this environment the user can enjoy the services of multiple SPs, and can decide which SP 
and services to use. The process describes a homogenous system which supports SE issuers 
such as Mobile Operators (MO) in promoting their services to SPs, facilitating growth and 
improving business conditions. This homogenous system also improves business conditions 
for SPs by achieving technical compatibility with platforms of various SE issuers. The result 
is free access to the customer base of multiple SE issuers, and improved economics of 
developing NFC services. 
 
2.9.2 GlobalPlatform SE Management Approaches  
The approaches proposed by GlobalPlatform Mobile Task-Force concentrates around two 
major architectures: without aggregation versus with aggregation (Stolplan, 2011; Ahson & 
Ilyas, 2012). 
 
Architecture without aggregation: In this model, as only one SE can be used to process the 
transaction, the customer should select the correct SE. For example, Customer Relationship 
Management (CRM) or customer support services can be managed directly by the SEI 
instead of being managed by SPs. Therefore for all applications which are being downloaded 
into the SE, the SEI is the responsible entity for controlling and managing them. 
 
Architecture with aggregation: In this architecture, SPs can directly manage their respective 
CRM and customer support service and they can arrange their own application through all 
types of SEs. In this model, all SEs can perform a contactless transaction in any point of time. 
That means all present SEs can be active within a single mobile phone. Therefore, a 
collection of all the services will appear on user's mobile phone where the end-user does not 
know where those services are hosted from. 
 
2.9.3 The Collaborative Model, f.ex. French Payez Mobile Project  
This model recommends using the UICC or SIM as a SE to enable large number of SPs to co-
operate as well as provide their services. In this model, the SE should be shared between 
multiple parties that are involved in the whole process. A multi-service provider ecosystem 
and customer convenience are the main goals of this kind of environment (Benyo, 2007). 
This model provides several benefits with regard to consistent service provisioning. It is user 
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friendly, enables easy access for SPs to mass markets and has the potential to introduce clear 
business rules (Mobey Forum, 2008; Benyo, 2007). 
. 
Another big advantage of this model is having the SE within the SIM that brings more 
flexibility into the ecosystem. For example, a bank does not need to directly invest in SEs 
where the common hardware space is shared between multiple parties. It should also be 
mentioned that the SIMs should be replaced by UICCs to be served as SE for NFC services. 
GSMA is strongly supporting this model as it has a very good market potential from the 
operator's point of view, as the handset will have faster performance with the MNO than 
without. This model also provides potential for joint business efforts aimed at the end-user 
(Mobey Forum, 2008; Benyo et al., 2007; Benyo, 2007). 
 
Banks and MNOs should agree on their role in the payments value chain because the business 
model needs to be defined between them. MNOs should leverage their infrastructure to 
enable the bank to deliver the actual payment services. However, there is still no conclusion 
for industry-level business model agreement. 
 
The biggest challenge of this model might be the need for strong dependencies between 
banks and operator business processes. For a successful process, a necessary number of 
business partners i.e. MNOs, FIs and merchants should make a positive decision based on 
their own business cases. If a bank be is a SP then it has to have a commercial agreement 
with every single MNO to be able to deliver the service to customers, which can then be a 
direct delivery or through TSMs (Mobey Forum, 2009). 
 
2.9.4 The “Joint Venture” Model, f.ex. Barclays and Orange 
This model introduces a new joint venture between the FI and the MNO. The solution may 
work on a basis of exclusivity or it may be open for competition to join later. SIM/UICC 
cards that are shared by the FI and the MNO are used to offer services to their customers. 
Business partners will have equal cooperation and the theoretical model might be co-
ownership of the UICC (Mobey Forum, 2008; Mobey Forum, 2009).  
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This model allows business partners to agree on their rights and management tasks to run the 
system with cooperation. Familiar business partners in a specific market can implement this 
model easily because they will have fewer problems with regards to ownership issues. 
The clear disadvantage of this model is that it is a "Wall garden" approach, which does not 
allow either the bank or the MNO to offer the same services to their clients. The other 
obvious challenge is interoperability if the market begins with multiple wall gardens as well 
as different implementations (Bouwman et al., 2008). 
 
2.9.5 The SP-driven Model, f.ex. Rabobank in the Netherlands 
There are several SE alternatives and several implementation options in this model (Waris et 
al., 2006; Mobey Forum, 2009). The SE does not need to be shared by different parties as the 
SP serves as the SEI. In some cases the SP can be the TSM or it may use an external TSM. 
The following alternatives are available, all slightly different from the model’s perspective: 
 
Banks issuing mini secure digital cards to their customers: In this option, the bank owns 
everything and it also can serve as the TSM. Therefore, there is no need for other SPs and all 
of them are excluded from the same SE. Many handsets are in the market that support secure 
digital cards but there is a need only for one secure digital card which should not be swapped 
by customers to use different applications. They should accept and only use the applications 
that their bank is offering to them. From the bank's point of view, there is no need for B2B 
agreements but it would be advisable for the bank to open up some space in the secure digital 
card for other SPs. This model does not have interoperability issues as the owner of the SE is 
one entity (bank) - of course if the bank does not open up its SE - but there is a potential for 
having another SE in the handset in the form of UICC issued by the operator. 
 
Using a non-removable SE integrated into the phone hardware: In this case, the SE is stored 
in a handset as a separate hardware or it should be stored as a part of embedded chip. This 
model definitively requires a TSM to manage the keys for the handset-based SE. 
 
SIM / UlCC: This model suggests a Mobile Virtual Network Operator (MVNO) to be 
owned/launched by the bank itself. So the bank should distribute the UICC card to its 
customers, which include payment and ID applications. The obvious disadvantage of this 
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model is that the bank should invest on the entire business area which bankers are rarely 
familiar with. However, in today's market there are MVNOs available that are offering their 
services for a reasonable price, so purchasing their services will be a decent option. 
 
Banks issuing "Stickers" that can be attached to mobile phones: This option can be 
temporarily used until the other business models are mature enough to be implemented and 
used within societies. In this model, there is no connection between the sticker and the 
handset's components but apparently this can be developed through Bluetooth. There are no 
challenges such as interoperability, management, ownership, personalization, etc. in this 
model and that is a worthy excuse for bankers to invest in this model to issue stickers to their 
clients. 
 
Having discussed the above models, it is important to mention that the industry has not come 
to the conclusion to widely implement these NFC payment ecosystems since the benefits of 
all players have not been met by their standards. For this reason there is still a lack of a 
standard procedure for stakeholders to follow while delivering the NFC payment service.   
 
In the following sections of this chapter, we will describe the concept of cloud computing and 
continue by considering the advantages which it brings to the existing issues in NFC payment 
ecosystem models. In addition, a detailed discussion about the ways in which cloud 
computing changes the use of SE in NFC transactions will be provided in chapter 4.   
 
2.10 Cloud Computing  
The idea of using cloud computing within an NFC ecosystem introduces a new layer towards 
managing stakeholders that are involved in the whole NFC ecosystem. First, we briefly 
describe the main characteristics of cloud before we discuss our idea.  
 
The primary concept of cloud computing is to use other IT technologies in order to provide a 
single service. The majority of IT technologies that are being used in cloud computing are 
already being used independently in other computing services. However, in a cloud, some of 
the capabilities of those technologies are selected in order to run the service environment.    
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The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) defines cloud as below (Brian et 
al., 2008; Mell & Grance, 2009): 
 
“Cloud computing is a model for enabling convenient, on-demand network access to a 
shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, 
applications, services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal 
management effort or service provider interaction”  
 
To further clarify the NIST definition, cloud computing improves the network accessibility of 
ready to use resources by providing fast and easy network access. Thus, it enables the cloud 
provider to combine the available computing resources into a single host in order to serve all 
users. Furthermore, rapid provisioning facilitates the rapid matching of required resources at 
a specific time in which those resources are needed to operate. In addition, it provides 
constant computing power in case of increased needs, whereas rapid release of assigned 
resources helps keep the resources active at all times as they might be required for other 
operations in a different place (Mell & Grance, 2009; Brian et al., 2008).  
 
2.10.1 Cloud Key Characteristics  
The cloud characteristics can be described in what follows (Subashini & Kavitha 2011).   
 
Broad Network Access: There is no need to access the cloud environment only with 
personal computers. Users can also use their smartphones, tablets, PDAs to access the cloud 
service environment. This feature of cloud computing allows broad network access from 
several devices as well as standardized interfaces.    
 
On-demand Self-service: Depending on the cloud provider, users can either purchase or use 
a particular space of the cloud service free of charge. This means customers can purchase and 
use the service without having to deal with the cloud provider’s personnel. From the 
provider’s point of view, this feature of cloud computing reduces the budget required for 
employing personnel to deal with service offerings.   
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Resource Sharing: Cloud resources can be grouped using virtualization techniques. The 
resource grouping facilitates the possibility of several customers using a single resource. In 
other words, users can simultaneously use a shared cloud resource according to the service 
they require. Resource assignment and releasing procedures are carried out dynamically 
instead of physically assigning and releasing resources to multiple customers. Moreover, the 
physical location of resources is not known to customers apart from when customers need to 
limit their resource to meet legal requirements.     
 
Rapid Elasticity: According to customers’ demand requirements, cloud computing can 
match the required resources to provide flexible services. Dynamic use of the cloud service 
by customers has made service provisioning time and cost effective for cloud providers since 
it has raised the adoption of cloud services according to customers’ demands. Thus, this 
dynamic automated system improves the power usage in the system as it prevents the 
operation of unused resources.     
 
Measured Service: Cloud computing measures the operations of its resources in order to 
ensure effective computing is in place. Cloud technology can be configured in such a way as 
to report information like the number of resources being used at a certain point, the user of a 
specific resource, resource efficiency (e.g. data transfer) and so on. In addition, customers can 
use a service called “pay-per-use” which enables them to pay for the particular and each 
service which they receive. For instance, customers can pay for the number of hours that they 
use the system or they can pay for the volumes of data transfer.   
 
2.10.2 Cloud Service Models  
Cloud models can be categorized as follows (Buya et al., 2009; Mell & Grance, 2009):  
 
Software-as-a-Service (SaaS): In this model, the application’s services are delivered from 
the cloud provider to the customer. The cloud provider is responsible for managing the 
infrastructure, operating systems, and applications. Therefore the customer has certain control 
over the resources as well as particular application configuration settings. Moreover, 
customers are not aware of the services which run on top of the cloud infrastructure.   
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Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS): This model enables the cloud provider to deliver its 
platforms and operations to the customer. The customer’s application needs to be developed 
and run on the cloud provider’s infrastructure. Since customers do not have full control over 
the provider’s infrastructure, they cannot access infrastructure components such as network, 
servers, operating systems and platforms. However, they have full control on their own 
running applications as well as certain application configuration settings.    
 
Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS): This model enables the cloud provider to deliver 
infrastructure resources such as processing power, raw data, and network capacity to the 
customer. In addition, this model enables customers to install their own applications and 
operating systems on the cloud provider’s infrastructure. This feature of IaaS provides more 
flexibility for customers compared to previous models. Yet, customers can only control their 
own operating systems and applications and they still cannot manage the cloud provider’s 
underlying infrastructure.    
 
2.10.3 Cloud Deployment Models  
As Mell & Grance (2009) state, the deployment of cloud models can take place by 
considering the owner of the cloud infrastructure, the responsible team who manages the 
cloud infrastructure, the infrastructure’s location, and the people who can access the cloud 
services. Different cloud deployment models are described in what follows (Leaveitt, 2009; 
Mell & Grance, 2009):   
 
Public clouds: Represents the cloud environment which can be used by everybody since it 
provides large scale services to general public. However, the cloud provider has the full 
control over the cloud environment and it manages the activities which are carried out within 
the service. Thus, both the software and hardware infrastructure are located on the provider’s 
premises. The main issue regarding public cloud deployment model is the users who do not 
have a contractual agreement as an organizational employee or a third party contractor. In 
this case, the user is considered as untrusted.  
 
Private clouds: These denote the cloud environment in which a single organization is 
responsible for operating the service. An organization may have a contractual agreement with 
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a third party which provides the cloud or it can be a cloud provider itself. In the first case, 
since there is a contractual agreement between the organization and the third party, the third 
party is considered as trusted. Thus, the organization will have full control over the cloud 
which is also being managed by the trusted third party.   
 
Community clouds: Represents a community that is part of an organization. This model has 
almost the same characteristics as private clouds-in which the internal community is 
considered as trusted.   
 
Hybrid clouds: This model includes the three above mentioned clouds models in one. 
Moreover, it represents the characteristics of public, private and community cloud 
deployment models and therefore it deals with both trusted and untrusted users. The trusted 
users are allowed to manage and control the cloud infrastructure whereas the untrusted users 
do not have such permission. The users of private and community clouds can monitor and 
manage the flow of data through the connected gateways in each division within the hybrid 
cloud. However, public cloud users do not have the permission to monitor and manage data 
flow as well as their resources. The location of hybrid clouds can be in an organisation or in a 
trusted third party site.        
 
Still, there are some schemes which cloud providers offer that do not fall into the described 
deployment models. As an example, Amazon offers a model in which public cloud users are 
able to connect to private cloud services and resources. In this case, Amazon defines specific 
controls and access rights in order to manage the connectivity of public cloud users to private 
cloud resources. However, those exclusive Amazon defined procedures do not fall into the 
general cloud deployment models (Bugiotti et al, 2012).  
 
2.10.4 Cloud Security Issues  
According to Zissis & Lekkas (2012) it is not possible to define the entire cloud operations 
and services by using a single label. This is because the cloud’s management, ownership, 
location, and access right permissions must be explicitly described. The model in which a 
cloud service is deployed may specify different terms in order to name a phase. For example 
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the words internal and external clouds are sometimes used to refer to private and public 
clouds.    
 
The locations in which a cloud provider places the required security perimeters for running 
the system, normally specifies the services that they offer to customers. A firewall is one of 
those security mechanisms, which is used to partition networks in the cloud environment. 
While it is necessary to specify whether the cloud service is public or private (external or 
internal), describing the location of security perimeters may not be essential any longer since 
those perimeters (e.g. network firewall) were used to define the location of an asset to be 
protected. However, this type of separation is considered as an out of date model since cloud 
providers have expanded their offerings towards globalizing their services, hence the number 
of clients and contractors have increased (Kandukuri et al., 2009).     
 
In cloud computing, the trust among users and providers has decreased since the service 
provisioning has been expanded into international scale which involves huge volume of data 
transfer. This has forced cloud providers to define strict access rights procedures in order to 
increase the system security as well as to raise the trust among both users and the service 
provider.  
 
2.11 The Role of Cloud Computing within NFC Ecosystem  
Having several parties involved in the NFC ecosystem with a lack of standards to define their 
roles and accesses to NFC components and applications, means that companies are 
increasingly considering using the cloud environment as a single entity to make things easier 
(Alliance, 2011). Moreover, cloud-based payment solution can help the adaption of NFC as 
they only require downloadable applications for both retailers and customers. However, it 
might bring more openness towards the security of customer’s credentials (e.g. bank account 
details), but in terms of flexibility and manageability, it makes the whole process much 
clearer and easier to handle (Losup et al., 2011).  
 
Cloud computing introduces a new method of storing payment credentials which improves 
the manageability of the NFC ecosystem. Rather than having all the sensitive information in 
the NFC handset, the cloud can store this information and transmit it when required. When a 
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client scans his NFC phone on the merchant’s POS terminal, encrypted payment credentials 
are taken out from a virtual SE that is stored in the cloud and transfers to the SE that is stored 
in the NFC handset. The purpose of having a SE in an NFC handset is to provide temporary 
storage in order to store authentication assets. Once payment credentials reached the NFC 
phone, they are again pulled out to get transmitted to the merchant’s terminal in order to 
perform the transaction. In this scenario, the communication between merchant’s terminal 
and NFC phone is established through an NFC link. The cloud solution enables the client to 
manage transaction data by using a cloud-based payment application that is subscribed by 
both client and merchant. The payment application is accessible via a mobile phone using 
either email or a mobile browser and the transaction report can be in the form of a Short 
Message Service (SMS), email or just a sound. Examples of this approach include PayPal and 
PayCloud Mobile Wallet (PayPal, 2013; Alliance, 2011). Although in this approach, most of 
the focus has been towards vendor gift cards, the cloud-based approach is also feasible in 
open payment systems.  
 
Development of this approach can be easy for vendors as they are not required to install new 
POS terminals. Thus, this approach gives the opportunity to vendors to better differentiate 
and customize applications. Another advantage that this solution offers to vendors is that, in 
the case of operating a different payment type, the solution might be lower costs for the 
vendor. Moreover, clients are already familiar with this type of payment methods (i.e. 
PayPal).  
 
As cloud-based NFC payments might be treated as card-not-present in some cases, it is more 
likely that the transaction fees will be higher than the normal card payments. Furthermore, in 
order to execute a transaction, a connection is required to the cloud. Executing a transaction 
may not be possible if this connectivity is somehow interrupted. In addition, some security 
issues may arise from using email and SMS that can be the sign of a transaction notification. 
As the current payment infrastructure is not leveraged, there might be a possibility that a 
vendor should install a non-standard application in order to process a payment. Replacement 
of current POS terminals with NFC terminals may be required, as the POS has to be capable 
of communicating with an NFC enabled phone. The transaction execution performance 
depends on the network connection speed, data capacity and the way that wallet’s data are 
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accessed.  Last but not least, both client and vendor have to sign up with the cloud service 
provider to use its services (Kounelis et al, 2012; Alliance, 2011; Ko et al., 2011).    
 
2.11.1 Fujitsu Cloud-based Data Transfer Service Project 
One of the companies which established the use of NFC through cloud computing is Fujitsu. 
It developed a platform technology that automatically downloads runs and erases applications 
in a required time and place. The main focus is on data transfer and not payment systems. 
However, this platform can be used as an initial start for developing cloud-based payment 
platforms.  
 
The Fujitsu system has the following three characteristics:  
 
1. The system is the combination of a cloud-based communication platform and an 
application runtime environment. 
2. Application and data transmission are automatically performed from the cloud. 
3. Applications are launched and run on a device (PC, laptop or smart-phone) and are 
deleted when they are not required anymore.   
With the use of NFC technology, devices are connected so applications and data can be 
transferred between them. Then the applications can be downloaded and fitted to size for 
which ever device that they are asked to be downloaded to for easy observation.  For 
example, a user attends a conference. Once entered in the conference venue, the relevant 
presentation apps and materials will automatically download to the user’s device from the 
cloud and once the conference finishes, that information will automatically be erased from 
the device. This technology also uses Global Positioning System (GPS) to find the user 
location for downloading necessary data and apps from the cloud. This approach improves 
the user operational efficiency by reducing the time for setting up apps and transfer data.  
 
2.11.2 Cloud-based NFC Payments in Austria  
A1, a mobile network operator in Austria, announced in 2011 that McDonald’s and Merkur 
supermarket have signed a contract with A1 to test the development of PayBox NFC mobile 
payment service (NFC World, 2012a).  A1 is a subsidiary of the Telekom Austria group 
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which holds the full Austrian banking license. The PayBox service does not require a 
Personal Identification Number (PIN) and allows a payment of up to €25. The service does 
not use MasterCard PayPass or Visa PayWave and does not support Europay, MasterCard 
and Visa (EMV) chip and pin technology.  As an alternative, Paybox processes the payments 
in a cloud environment and suppliers use a small PayBox NFC unit rather than contactless 
point of sale terminals for handling mobile payments. To be able to use this service, clients 
should have an account with PayBox and designate that account to handle the mobile 
payment services’ financial issues. Consequently, every time a client uses the PayBox 
services a certain amount of money will be deducted from his account.  The following steps 
describe the process of PayBox cloud-based NFC mobile payments (NFC World, 2012a): 
 
1. The client’s mobile phone number and account number are joined together in the back 
office and the clients download the payment application to their mobile phone. 
2. There is no need for other identifying data such as clients’ bank account details and 
mobile phone numbers to be downloaded with the application. 
3. PayBox deducts payments a few days later than the actual payment day from the 
designated bank account. 
4. The daily purchase limit is €50 and all the transmitted data is encrypted. Thus, the 
debit from the bank account can be for multiple transactions. 
5. Clients receive a confirmation text message for each payment they make, which takes 
half a second to process. 
 
2.11.3 NFC Cloud Payment Security   
This section highlights the vulnerabilities of NFC cloud payments and addresses possible 
exploits from Cyber-attacks.  
 
A. Wireless Threats  
 
There are a number of possible attacks over a public wireless network such as NFC. One of 
the most well-known attacks is typically called Man-In-The-Middle where the attacker (Eve) 
establishes connections with both genuine sender (Alice) and recipient (Bob). Nonetheless, 
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neither Alice nor Bob are aware of the existence of Eve who controls the entire conversation 
while making Alive and Bob believe that they are communicating directly.  
 
Impersonating a wireless legitimate access point, i.e. a public Wi-Fi hot spot such as an 
airport first class lounge, through a configured computer enables the attacker to access client 
connections and take advantage of the sensitive data being transmitted to/from the access 
point (Biba, E, 2005; TheShmooGroup, 2008). Along with routing the traffic to a legitimate 
access point, a computer can also monitor the communication channel simultaneously. 
Additionally, authentic domains of particular Websites such as banks can be mapped to the IP 
address of a malicious Website in order to take advantage of clients’ credentials. This is due 
to the provision of gateway services and DNS settings by the computer to the connecting 
clients. Similarly, setting up a fake base station to pose as a legitimate user, can also be a 
possibility (Meyer & Wetze, 2004).  
  
 
 
Figure 9: The Lifecycle of a Mobile Ticket (Kounelis et al., 2012) 
1. The cloud service is requested to issue the tickets. 2. The ticket is purchased through the 
user’s mobile device. 3. Ticket verification. 4. Admittance to the venue. 
 
When users are filled with radio interfaces, their mobile devices demand for connectivity 
potentials. The radio interfaces can include Bluetooth, NFC, Wi-Fi, 2G/GSM, 3G/UMTS, 4G 
and GPRS technologies. For instance, a mobile device may use a 3G connection to access the 
Internet and exchange data; it may then handover to the available Wi-Fi connection. A 
number of mobile network operators such as Orange UK allow automatic hand over from 3G 
to Wi-Fi through a built-in Orange Wi-Fi application. From the security viewpoint, the 
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automatic method of connection hand over exposes a new vulnerability at the point of the 
actual hand over from 3G to Wi-Fi. Typically, this can be the case when 3G connections have 
a better quality of service outside a building than a Wi-Fi connection. So as the user goes into 
the building the hand over takes place where the Wi-Fi takes over as carrying the data 
packets.    
 
In order to ensure that an adequate level of security is in place within the mobile cloud, the 
modern cryptographic properties must be utilised in the cloud (data storage), mobile devices 
and POS terminals. This approach minimizes the generalized security risks as the cloud 
providers can only see encrypted data while in transmission. However, it seems that the cloud 
providers are not yet ready to take the new challenge by implementing such system. This can 
be caused by the lack high-level authority to enforce regulations for cloud service providers 
to implement encryption on the client side rather than collecting unencrypted data from them.   
 
B. Citizen’s Threats 
 
The user may find itself under a number of security threats throughout the purchasing 
process; the security threats are described in what follows.  
 
1) Attacks while Purchasing and Using the Ticket 
 
The attacker may steal the user’s ticket during the purchasing process. This can be done 
through different types of attacks:  
 
 The connection between the cloud and the mobile device can be eavesdropped and 
consequently the attacker may get a copy of the ticket that can be used before the 
legitimate user uses it.  
 
 The displayed information on the mobile device itself can be eavesdropped or 
recorded while in use in public mobile locations.  
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 The attacker may intercept the connection between the mobile device and the cloud 
(Man-In-The-Middle). In this case, the attacker will have the capability of tricking the 
user that the transaction is unsuccessful while using the ticket for his own benefit.   
 
2) Attacks during the Verification of the Ticket 
 
When the mobile device is shown at the venue inspector system, it is an indication that the 
ticket and the mobile device are verified by the venue system. Nonetheless, there are yet a 
number of possible threats that should be addressed.  The verification system may become 
unavailable as a result of a denial of service attack. Using a cloud server for implementing the 
verification mechanisms can be an effective and secure solution as it provides scalability and 
avoids losing the system because of high demand in a short period of time.     
 
In the case of radio jamming attack and the failure of the verification system, there would be 
no way for ticket verification and therefore clients would not be permitted to enter the venue. 
Consequently, having a human inspector becomes a need as this would be the only alternative 
to verify the validity of the tickets shown by clients. However, this approach would have its 
own consequences that may lead to many false positive and false negative results.  
 
In order to prevent the jamming attacks, it would be ideal to have mobile device radio 
hardware for scanning the environment to identify new radio frequency growing threats; such 
threat may include ‘fake’ GSM base station. The protocol scan that occurs in the background 
would notify the mobile device in the case of a malicious action such as jamming or denial of 
service attacks.  
 
3) Potential Countermeasures 
 
Several countermeasures can be in place to reduce and/or eliminate the described above 
threats. Moreover, secure communication must be in place to ensure the confidentiality of the 
exchanged messages in the communication channel. Additionally, in order to avoid false 
impersonation, mutual authentication should take place amongst all involved parties in the 
whole process; this would also guarantee data integrity.  
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2.12 Related Work  
In this section we describe the most popular and recent cloud-based mobile payments which 
have been developed by well-known companies.  
 
A. Google Wallet  
 
One of the major companies which operates the concept of mobile wallet is Google. They 
named this service as "Google Wallet" (Google, 2013; Ronald et al., 2013). The 
communication between the mobile phone and the POS is carried out through NFC 
technology that transmits the payment details to merchant's POS. Customer credentials are 
not stored in the mobile phone; rather, they are stored online. Google Wallet takes the form of 
an application stored on the customer's mobile phone. The customer will have an account 
with Google Wallet which includes the relevant registered credit/debit cards. Accordingly, 
the Google Wallet device has a chip /SE which stores encrypted payment card information. 
Linked credit or debit card credentials are not stored on the SE; rather, the virtual prepaid 
credit/debit card which is created during the setup is stored on the SE. The transaction then 
operates through the virtual prepaid credit/debit card that transfers funds from the Google 
Wallet into the merchant's POS when the customer taps his phone on the POS.  
 
B. MasterPass  
 
"MasterPass" (Mastercard, 2013; Bodhani, 2013) is a service which has been developed by 
MasterCard as an extended version of PayPass Wallet Services (NFC World, 2013) and 
provides a digital wallet service for secure and convenient online shopping. In MasterPass, 
delivery information and transaction data are stored in a central and secure location. The 
latest MasterPass provides the following services (NFC World, 2013):  
 
 MasterPass checkout services: This service enables the vendor’s payment acceptance 
in a consistent way irrespective of the client’s location. This means vendors have the 
ability to accept a payment without having to know where the client is. For instance, 
when the client is in store, he can use this service since it supports NFC, Quick 
Response (QR) codes, tags, and mobile devices to pay for products at a vendor’s POS. 
Thus, in online shopping scenarios, the client can use this service to pay for a product 
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without having to enter the card and delivery details every time he intends to make a 
purchase.     
 
 MasterPass-connected wallets: Vendors, financial institutions, and partners are able 
to provide their own wallets using this service. The client’s card information, address 
books, etc. can be saved in a secure cloud provided by a party they trust. Thus, clients 
can use other credit and debit cards in addition to their MasterCard’s cards.    
 
 MasterPass value added services: The purpose of this service is to improve the 
client’s shopping experience before, during and after checkout. Value added services 
include account balances, offers, loyalty programs, and real-time alerts.   
 
C. Bell ID Solution 
 
In June 2013 (NFC World, 2013b; SecureIDNews, 2013), Bell ID proposed a new platform 
which enables card issuers to store certificates, keys and NFC credentials in a cloud 
environment instead of in mobile devices’ SE. This approach equips application issuers with 
sufficient level of control to manage their credentials without being in need to share the 
access rights with a third party. During the transaction process, the clients’ credentials are 
pulled out from the cloud (remote secure element) which then generates commands for the 
payment and sends it to the merchant’s POS terminal through the mobile device. Their 
approach also allows pre-authorisation of payments that improves the flexibility of payments 
for customers in the sense that they can make payments even when the cloud server is offline 
or the connection between the device and the cloud is not properly established. Furthermore, 
Bell ID ‘SE in the cloud’ approach also enables the instant fraud detection, meaning that the 
payment application is blocked when necessary.   
Having published the general benefits and use of their service, we argue that this approach 
was initially proposed by us in December 2012 (Pourghoumi, P. and Ghinea, G (2012) 
‘Managing NFC Payments Applications through Cloud Computing’ in Proceedings of the 7th 
International Conference for Internet Technology and Secured Transactions (ICITST-2012), 
London, UK.  IEEE, 2012, pp. 772–777).  
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D. Chen et al.’s Protocol 
 
This section briefly describes the NFC payment system based on GSM that has been 
proposed by Chen, Hancke, Mayes, Lien and Chiu (2010). The assumptions and requirements 
for their approach for mobile payments system are first described followed by a summary of 
their payment protocol.  
 
Their proposed protocol meets the number of requirements. Firstly, all the involved parties 
are considered to be under the control of the same Mobile Operator (MO). Secondly, user’s 
phone contains a SE that is embedded in the SIM (UICC). Thirdly, user’s phone and 
merchant’s POS device are both NFC-enabled. Furthermore, their approach assumes that the 
user fully trusts the MO and follows the present GSM security mechanisms (Brookson, c., 
1994; Eberspaecher et al., 2008). Moreover, the communication between the Payment 
Gateway (PG) and the merchant’s POS is assumed secure since it passes over a secure 
network. The PG is also considered as the sub-system of MO that should act as a Visitor 
Location Register (VLR). This is because in step 7 the PG should receive the confidential 
triplets from VLR. Therefore, the main role of the PG in their approach is based on the 
actions related to the payment and user authentication. Their proposed protocol that runs over 
the GSM network as well as the payment data flows are detailed in the above figure.  
 
Their proposed protocol includes five entities: HLR/Billing Centre, VLR, Payment Gateway, 
Merchant NFC POS and Customer NFC phone/SIM. Moreover, their proposed protocol 
consists four phases:  
 
1. Initial Setup: There are some fundamentals to encounter before starting the key stages of 
the payment process (see the “initial state” in Figure 10).  
 
Their proposed protocol includes five entities: HLR/Billing Centre, VLR, Payment Gateway, 
Merchant NFC POS and Customer NFC phone/SIM. Moreover, their proposed protocol 
consists four phases:  
 
2.  Price Visual Checking: The first 4 steps contain the initial goods scanning, the price 
displaying and the visual confirmation at both the merchant’s POS and the customer’s phone. 
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3. Triple Authentication: When the customer views the Payment Information (PI) on his/her 
NFC phone and agrees to proceed with the transaction (step 4), the triple authentication 
begins its execution. The payment processes are enclosed in this section whereby the backend 
system, merchant’s POS and the customer’s phone authenticate the other two payment 
participants for protecting the following transaction processes.  
 
4. Transaction Execution: Takes place after the successful authentication. In this step, the 
system performs further transaction checking and deduction, using the transaction 
information.   
 
A: Analysis  
The security analysis of the protocol that has also been carried out by Chen et al. (2010) 
shows that the protocol is secure in the following scenarios:   
 
1. Customer is dishonest or has altered the phone, and is aiming to break the protocol rules 
for personal e.g. customer account impersonation and/or credit modification. 
 
2. The merchant is dishonest and has access to an altered device, and s/he is trying to modify 
the PI in order to deceive the backend system or customer to take financial advantage.  
 
However, we argue that due to the presence of several entities, and considering the number of 
interactions passed through different stages of this protocol, flexibility remains as a concern 
with respect to both service providers and customers. Moreover, a further layer of security 
could have been added by introducing PIN authentication by the user. Additionally, mutual 
authentication of the SIM and the MNO should be in place for improved security by adding 
freshness by the mobile device in order to resist replay attack. There is also no use of digital 
signatures with the transaction messages for data integrity and non-repudiation purposes. 
 
In summary, their proposed protocol includes an easy method for integrating the 
technological benefits of NFC to the existing GSM networks as well as deployed POS 
systems.  
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Figure 10: GSM Authentication and Encryption (Chen et al., 2010)  
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2.13 Summary and Discussion   
This chapter provided background information in the area of electronic and mobile payments. 
Several approaches towards managing SE services were discussed, which in turn highlighted 
the complexity of the NFC payment ecosystem as well as dissatisfaction of involved parties 
with the current proposed models.  
 
The literature indicates that the flexibility, manageability, personalization, ownership and 
control of the payment ecosystem depend largely on the relationships and agreements which 
ecosystem’s players establish. This has resulted in increased private contracts/agreements for 
service provisioning between players since they all have not come to community standardized 
procedures in order to clearly define the responsibilities and control permissions of each 
party.  
 
On the other hand, industry-leading companies such as Google and MasterCard have 
introduced their own method of mobile payment using the cloud environment as the centre 
where all customer credentials are stored. Although this approach provides flexibility, we 
believe that at the same time it is largely dependent on the speed of the Internet network and 
it yet does not improve the existing Internet security risks. This is the cause which forced the 
service providers to offer their cloud-based payment services only for monetary transactions. 
 
The issue of selecting the most secure and flexible approach towards managing the payment 
ecosystem is still the main concern of industry stakeholders. Consequently, our focus in this 
thesis is to propose real-time and secure NFC payment ecosystem models that provide 
security and flexibility to both customers and service providers. Therefore we will start off by 
proposing cloud-based NFC payment scenarios, which improve the complexities of existing 
ecosystem models. This will be followed by designing secure transaction protocols to show 
the reliability and validity of our proposed models. A security analysis of designed protocols 
is then provided to discuss the confidentiality, integrity and availability of sensitive data (i.e. 
payment details) across different communication channels between the involved parties.           
 
Having described the challenges of NFC payment application management within the SE 
environment as well as putting forward the idea of using cloud computing for managing NFC 
payment ecosystem, motivate us to introduce new ecosystem payment protocols in a way that 
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satisfies both clients and service providers. The next chapter describes the methodology we 
used to conduct this research. In addition, it discusses the way in which the research aim and 
objectives are linked with the selected research methodology.  
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Chapter 3 - Research Design and Approach 
 
3. Overview 
In the first chapter of this thesis, the aim and objectives of this research were introduced. This 
chapter explains the methodology which is used in order to accomplish the aim and 
objectives of this research. Recognizing the relation between our work and the methodology 
used is the main goal of this chapter and will be discussed once we introduce the research 
design and approach. Design Science Research (DSR) is selected as our methodology in this 
thesis that is discussed from different viewpoints in detail in order to justify its adoption with 
our research.   
 
3.1 Research 
Kuhn (1996) describes research as an activity which helps to understand a phenomenon. A 
phenomenon consists of entities’ behaviours which interests the researcher. A phenomenon or 
at least some part of it might be created in IS rather than arising naturally. The meaning of 
understanding is to have the knowledge to predict some aspects of a phenomenon’s 
behaviour. To this end, the set of activities considered by the research community as 
“appropriate” to provide understanding is called research methods. Furthermore, Gregg, 
Kulkarni, and Vinzé (2001) define research as an approach which promotes understanding 
and knowledge enhancement. However, research is also described as a process which 
systematically tries to resolve a problem, find an answer to a question, or a better 
understanding of a phenomenon (Hevner and Chatterjee, 2010). Although research might 
take several forms, knowledge enhancement is the main objective of a research. Research 
methodology is an important part of a research since it describes the process of a research-
related work. It also ensures the validity and rigour of the conducted research. Methodology 
is defined as “a body of method, rules, and postulates employed by a discipline” (Webster 
Dictionary, 2013). There are many available methods in different fields trying to enhance the 
current knowledge and this is because there are various areas of research in each field.          
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3.1.1 Research Perspectives  
A set of basic beliefs for guiding the activities of a researcher during the research process is 
called a “paradigm” (Guba & Lincoln, 1994; Mingers, 2001). A research can be separated 
into three different paradigms in Information Systems (IS) and computing (Chua, 1986; Klein 
& Myers, 1999; Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991; Vaishnavi & Kuechler, 2009). These 
paradigms are:  
 
 The Design Science Research (DSR)  approach: Construction and evaluation of 
artefacts are carried out in order to describe and improve system aspects.     
 Positivist Research: Assumptions and hypotheses of a research investigation are 
supported by collected data.  
 Interpretive Research: Does not include assumptions and hypotheses prior to an 
investigation. Instead, data collection is used to extract knowledge.    
To view the research paradigms in the world of research, four philosophical theories are used 
(Guba & Lincoln, 1994; Mingers, 2001; Vaishnavi & Kuechler, 2009):    
 
 The theory of existence (Ontology): Explains the reality of a subject or entity by 
considering the fundamentality and reality of that subject. It requires distinguishing 
between the reality and unreality of the subject.    
 The theory of knowledge (Epistemology): Studies the nature of a valid or true 
theoretical knowledge. It asks questions such as what knowledge is and how it can be 
obtained. To what extent can a given subject be known?        
 The theory of reasoning and inference (Methodology): Examines the relevance of a 
theory and practice. This investigation helps to identify a desirable approach in order 
to generate the best knowledge in a satisfactory manner.   
 The theory of value and value judgement (Axiology or Ethics): Describes to what 
degree a given subject has a value. Or is the subject considered as right at all?  
A summary of the above four paradigms’ viewpoints are described in table 3.  
 
Referring to table 3, the perspective that will be adopted in this thesis is that of design, since 
we first considered the reality and fundamentality (Ontology) of our research subject that is 
the emerging area of mobile payments, which is becoming a reality in our lives. We then 
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explored the existing knowledge in this area, which have also been proposed/developed to 
examine the validity (Epistemology) of this new method of payment. 
 
Table 3: Philosophical Assumptions of Research Approaches (Vaishnavi & Kuechler, 
2009) 
Research Perspectives 
Basic Belief Positivist Interpretive Design 
Ontology  A single reality. 
Knowable, probabilistic  
Multiple realities, 
socially constructed 
Multiple, contextually 
situated alternative world-
states. Socio-technologically 
enabled 
Epistemology Objective; dispassionate. 
detached, observer of 
truth  
Subjective; knowledge 
and values emerge from 
the researcher-
participant interaction  
Knowledge through making: 
objectively constrained 
construction within a 
context. Iterative 
circumscription reveals 
meaning 
Methodology  Observation; quantitative, 
statistical  
Participation; 
qualitative. 
Hermeneutical, 
dialectical  
Developmental: measure 
artefactual impacts on the 
composite system  
Axiology  Truth: universal and 
beautiful; prediction  
Understanding: situation 
and description  
Control; creation; progress; 
understanding   
 
Moreover, we measured the relevancy of the theory and practice (Methodology) to identify 
the desirable approach in order to design and develop our mobile payment model. Having 
designed our models and their respective protocols, we subsequently carried out a detail 
security analysis in order to describe to what degree our proposed protocols have a value 
(Axiology).    
3.2 Design 
Hevner and Chatterjee (2010) generally describe design as group of instructions for making 
things. However, it is not the thing itself. The way we design computer system models before 
and during the building process gives us the insight of the overall system and the initial plan. 
However, since the initial plan is not complete, having an overview of the building process’ 
Chapter 3: Research Design and Approach  
Pardis Pourghomi   64 
 
plan does not provide the actual details of components and relevant running system. The 
designed model is important for developers because it can be used as a communication tool 
between technical and non-technical domain developers. It also helps them to understand 
how the system is built by providing the abstractions of the system’s model.  
 
Hevner and Chatterjee (2010) also point out that there is a significant difference between 
building a large physical system and building a large-scale software system. For example, the 
processes involved in constructing a building are not involved in IS design. In order to 
construct a building, a detailed planning is required before the construction process begins. 
Otherwise, the issues that are not figured out in the initial steps of the construction process 
will potentially cause large delays and create severe financial consequences. The way in 
which planning differs in the IS design process is that it does not require as much time and 
cost as constructing a building does. This means that depending on the size of the project, we 
can assemble software systems in minutes and discard unwanted results. When looking at the 
processes of the software design, we realize that this step requires major cost. To avoid large 
up-front costs, Evans (2003) recommends performing small planning before the actual 
implementation and breaking down the design process into a series of smaller discrete design 
steps.  
 
This approach is called a hands-on approach and is one in which developers can learn more 
about the issues as they go along. Moreover, the goal of software-based system development 
may change several times during its design and development process. This makes software-
based system development very challenging. Indeed, sometimes the final goal of the process 
is itself unpredictable. Also, during the development process, certain new features that were 
not part of the project may be added as developers gain more experience in the problem 
domain. Moreover, there might be a need to alter a system’s runtime constraints, and new 
platforms and hardware may be introduced to the development process in order to enhance 
the adoptability of design. In this context, Hevner and Chatterjee (2010) discuss that in the 
system design stage, the main objective is to make precise decisions when selecting different 
options which places restrictions to utility and resources. Moreover, Gregg, Kulkarni, and 
Vinzé (2001) suggest that the research aim should be achieved based on the obtained 
knowledge and experiences during the system development process.   
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To summarise, developing software artefacts to resolve human difficulties are the main issue 
that is dealt with in IS design. Artefacts are considered to have a number of mechanisms such 
as constructs, models - abstractions, methods - algorithms and practices, and instantiations - 
implemented and prototype systems (Hevner & Chatterjee, 2010). Design research is not the 
only method that deals with building artefacts, artefacts are also being designed and 
developed as a part of professional design.  Although design and development of artefacts are 
involved in both design research and professional research, however there is a difference 
between these two approaches. Henver and Chatterjee (2010) state that in design research, an 
identification of a contribution to knowledge and strong results are provided whereas 
professional design provides an application of the existing knowledge to improve business 
issues. Yet the gained knowledge can be very useful even if the research does not provide 
satisfactory results.       
 
3.3 Overview of Design Science Research 
 
Vaishnavi and Kuechler (2009) describe Design Science Research (DSR) as set of analytical 
techniques and perspectives used to carry out research in the area of IS and computing. They 
discuss that the performance analysis and the utility of designed artefacts are involved in the 
DSR process in order to recognize, describe, and improve the performance of IS aspects.  
 
The principle of design science research is certainly a problem solving paradigm (Hevner et 
al., 2004)  that addresses the so-called wicked problems by producing novel artefacts (March 
& Storey, 2008; Pries-Heje & Baskerville, 2008). In fact, the purpose of design-science 
research is to provide novel, innovative, and purposeful scientific artefacts that are designed, 
developed, and evaluated effectively. In design science research, the word “purposeful” 
specifies that these artefacts should deliver individuals and societies with useful services 
since they are supposed to improve current practices, or to propose better solutions (Kuechler 
& Vaishnavi, 2008)  and thus  address unsolved problems (Hevner et al., 2004). Moreover, 
providing additional improvements to real-world phenomenon is what artefacts aim to 
achieve (March & Storey, 2008; Iivari, 2007; Purao, 2002). As a result, organisations may 
prefer to use these artefacts in their businesses in order to change the ways in which they 
provide services.    
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As described in the previous section of this chapter, design is the invention, plan, and 
development of a certain thing. The design activity itself can be divided into two categories: 
“natural science” and “science of artificial”. The knowledge that describes the interaction 
between objects or phenomena refers to natural science, while science of artificial refers to 
knowledge which is about designed artificial objects phenomena that are supposed to meet 
particular goals.     
 
Furthermore, a general overview of DSR process has been proposed by Hevner and 
Chatterjee (2010) which define three design cycles. The adoption of the research environment 
with research activity is done in the relevance cycle. Rigour cycle connects the knowledge 
base and the process of design research. The Design cycle provides the iterations while 
developing artefacts, as well as the evaluation. Figure 11 illustrates the cycle of design 
science research.  
 
 
 
Figure 11: The Cycle of Design Science Research 
(Hevner & Chatterjee, 2010) 
 
Five general steps have been proposed by Hevner and Chatterjee (2010) in accordance to 
these cycles. Each of these five steps follows the same general idea for the DSR process and 
will now be presented: 
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1. Construct a Conceptual Framework refers to problem identification and solving 
motivation of the problem. The requirements for artefact’s development are defined as the 
problem.  Hevner and Chatterjee (2010) explain that the objectives of this step are to increase 
the motivation of the researcher, interest of the audience to follow the solution as well as to 
accept the results. They also discuss that this step improves the communication that is carried 
out between researchers for understanding the problem.        
 
2. The purpose of the Develop System Architecture is to develop a unique architecture design, 
for extensibility and modularity. In addition, the functionalities of system components and 
their relationships should also be defined in this stage.  
 
3. Analyse and Design the System phase deals with designing database/knowledge base plan 
and procedures to perform system functions. Moreover, different solutions can be developed 
in this phase; nonetheless only one solution is normally selected.   
 
4. In the Build the (Prototype) System stage, the researcher should study the concepts, 
frameworks and design through the system building process. The researcher should also gain 
an insight on the subject of the problem as well as the complexity of the system. 
  
5. In Observe and Evaluate the System step, the researcher should observe the use of the 
system by case studies and field studies, evaluate the system through laboratory or field 
experiments, develop new models based on the observation and experimentation of the 
system’s usage, and consolidate learned experiences.     
 
3.4 Design Science Research Methodology 
 
The DSR methodology is considered as an interactive model since each stage can be revisited 
at any time during the process. The interactivity of this model makes it especially appropriate 
for software development as design requirements can be modified continuously and outcomes 
of each stage (Figure 12) may need a revisit to a previous stage in order to be changed and 
improved (Vaishnavi and Kuechler, 2009).     
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Figure 12: The General Methodology of DSR 
(Vaishnavi & Kuechler, 2009) 
 
The processes of DSR cycle stages are demonstrated in the above figure where “knowing is 
making”. A detailed description of each stage is explained in what follows (Vaishnavi & 
Kuechler, 2009):   
 
Awareness of Problem: Multiple sources have direct influence on this stage. Either there 
should be new industrial developments or developments in a reference discipline. Further 
research in the same field can also provide a prospect for the researcher to develop new 
findings in order to demonstrate them as a formal or informal proposal.  
 
Suggestion: Basically the suggestion phase is a creative point in the process in which 
different functionalities are designed based on a new configuration of novel or existing 
elements. The outcome of this stage is a tentative design which has a close connection with 
the proposal and comes immediately after the proposal.                 
Development: In this stage, the tentative design is implemented and the outcome is an 
artefact. Different implementation techniques are required based on the type of the artefact 
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which a researcher expects to develop. The originality is not in the building of the artefact 
since it is mainly in the design.   
 
Evaluation: The evaluation of the artefact takes place after the artefact is constructed. The 
evaluation should be based on the specific criteria that are normally implicit and regularly 
made clear in the proposal (Awareness of Problem phase).   
 
Conclusion: The final efforts of a research are presented in this stage. The research findings 
are considered as good enough when they are satisfactory. The results are also considered as 
satisfactory even when there are deviations in the artefact’s behaviour from the hypothetical 
predictions. In this stage, the findings of the research are combined and written up. The 
knowledge that has been learned and applied or behaviour that can be frequently invoked 
during the research process are regularly considered as firm facts. However, the gained 
knowledge is considered as loose ends if it is not applied to the research and the 
uncharacteristic behaviour that should be explained more may serve as the subject of further 
research.           
3.4.1 The Outputs of Design Science Research 
Based on DSR results, Vaishnavi and Kuechler (2009) proposed the above five outputs that 
describe the levels and types of the knowledge, explained in Table 4 (Hevner et al. 2004; 
March & Smith, 1995).     
Table 4: The Outputs of Design Science Research   
 
Output Description 
Constructs  The conceptual vocabulary of a domain.  
Models A set of propositions or statements expressing relationships between constructs. 
Methods A set of steps used to perform a task (how-to-knowledge).  
Instantiations The operationalization of constructs, models and methods. 
Better theories Artefact construction as analogous to experimental natural science.  
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3.4.2 Why Design Science Research? 
The aim of our research is to explore the problems with existing NFC transaction ecosystem 
models, design three novel transaction authentication protocols based on our proposed 
transaction architectures, and to carry out detailed security analysis of the proposed protocols. 
The overall aim of DSR model meets the requirements of this thesis’ aim. Hevner, March, 
Park, and Ram (2004) explain that if the research in information systems and computing aims 
to transform an existing organisational or social related situation into a more desirable one by 
using novel artefacts, then it is considered as a DSR model. Since this thesis aims to explore 
novel and secure cloud-based NFC transaction authentication protocols, we argue that our 
research is highly consistent with DSR model. In the next section, we continue by describing 
our research steps according to the DSR process model proposed by Vaishnavi and Kuechler 
(2009).   
 
3.5 Developing Designed Cloud-based NFC Payment Scenarios Based on 
DSR  
After describing the DSR model, we now aim to design scenarios for cloud-based NFC 
transaction approaches that are most appropriate for mobile payments. Therefore, three 
potential approaches are explored throughout the DSR cycle, namely direct communication 
between the MNO and the merchant, merchant’s authentication with single MNO and 
merchant’s authentication with multiple MNOs.  
 
The following sub-sections describe the way in which our proposed models are organised in 
accordance to the design science process. The aim and objectives of this research are 
associated to the previously discussed five stages proposed by Vaishnavi and Kuechler 
(2009). Each step represents a description of the way in which the payments models are 
designed and evaluated. However, the descriptions are brief since the space is limited in this 
chapter and thus a detailed description of each model is provided in the latter chapters. In the 
following three chapters (4,5 and 6) we will look more closely at each model, its respective 
protocol and discuss their importance to the process step. The below table illustrates a 
summary of the four iterations and their correspondence to each objective in this thesis.   
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Table 5: DSR Iterations and Research Objectives 
 
DSR Iterations Research Objectives 
Iteration One:  Library Research Objective 1: To consider the existing NFC 
transaction models in order to understand the 
limitations which have been raised regarding the 
adoption of this technology.  
 
Iteration Two: Initial Design Requirements 
(Ecosystem/Model design) 
 
Objective 2: To develop a payment model based 
on the results and limitations obtained from 
consideration of the existing models and to 
propose ecosystem architectures so as to indicate 
the new frameworks.   
 
Iteration Three: Protocol Design Objective 3: To design and evaluate novel secure 
NFC transaction authentication protocols based 
on our proposed transaction architectures.  
 
Iteration Four: Security Analysis and 
Validation   
Objective 4: To carry out detail security analysis 
based on the proposed protocols in order to 
justify their utility and value.      
 
3.5.1DSR Iteration One:  Library Research (Targets Objective 1)  
In order to following this iteration, a complete study of the literature was undertaken to 
understand the current deployed NFC transaction ecosystems as well as the existing SE 
management models.  Indeed, this iteration was very challenging given the fact that there was 
not much academic relevant literature available regarding current deployed transaction 
models. 
 
A. NFC Framework for the Literature Review  
 
As shown in Figure 13 (Aydin, 2013 & Ozdenizci et al., 2010a), NFC theory and 
development, NFC infrastructure, NFC applications and services as well as NFC ecosystem 
are the four main categories which are distinguished in the NFC literature (Aydin, 2013; 
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Ozdenizci et al., 2010a). As this framework indicates, the primary level of the given 
framework is NFC theory and development. The papers that are written based on this area 
discuss the NFC development and applications, targeting behavioural issues which aim to 
provide theory justification instead of designing/developing artefacts.  In below figure, in 
italics, we have pointed out where the work covered in this thesis lies.  
 
According to this framework, NFC infrastructure and NFC applications and services are 
categorized as intermediate levels. There are three main factors which consider the NFC 
infrastructure. These factors are network and communication issues, hardware issues 
considering antennae, readers, tags and NFC chip; and security and privacy issues that deal 
mainly with designing and developing artefacts rather than focusing on behavioural issues. 
Since we are designing secure transaction authentication protocols based on our cloud-based 
NFC ecosystem scenarios, according to this framework our research falls into the NFC 
infrastructure category. NFC applications and service layer deals with application 
implementation, prototype development as well as artefact design evaluation which can be 
testing, field studies, experimental, etc.  Normally, NFC operation modes have direct 
influence during NFC application investigation. The operation modes include read/write, card 
emulation and peer-to-peer modes.  
 
Figure 13: NFC Framework Classification 
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As the highest level of the NFC research framework, the NFC ecosystem stands above all 
other levels in the framework. This area has also its own issues in which can be further 
investigated. There are three main categories which examine the NFC ecosystem. These 
categories are NFC economics and strategy, NFC business models and processes and NFC 
stakeholders. The first two categories are more involved in business requirements, analysis 
and managerial side of the technology while the third category focuses on structure and 
culture which deals with social aspects of the NFC technology. These aspects can be named 
as characteristics, roles, and stakeholder capabilities which include technology adoption, user 
acceptance, manageability and control, reliability and usability. Additionally, stakeholders 
can be the MNO, service providers, etc. depending on the ecosystem architecture. We argue 
that our research also falls into this category since it defines new roles and access permissions 
for our designed ecosystem players. Our proposed protocols are based on novel ecosystem 
architectures which improve manageability and control of the transaction ecosystem to 
provide secure and flexible service.      
 
We selected the identified criteria based on NFC transaction ecosystems and SE management 
models which needed to be considered: (1) architecture, (2) security, (3) flexibility, (4) access 
rights, and (5) ownership. After establishing these criteria, we utilised them to study different 
NFC transaction ecosystems along with SE management concerns. Retrospectively, we found 
out that although the existing models are implemented and are operating securely in a few 
countries, ideas such as cloud computing can be taken into consideration in order to improve 
the existing complexities in NFC ecosystems.  
 
In order for us to investigate the gap in this research and design novel payment models, we 
studied the present NFC and mobile payment related works. As a result, in some cases we 
found that the existing issues concerning the deployment of this technology is the result of 
the previous proposed models. For instance, as, when we were considering Chen’s mobile 
transaction authentication protocol (Chen et al., 2010), we noticed number of security flaws 
that have the potential to be fulfilled through integrating with our new cloud-based NFC 
transaction scenario. Therefore, we wanted to expand by conducting a new protocol design 
that focused on these issues. Table 6 provides a brief overview of the library research 
iteration. This evaluation enabled us to start the iteration two of our DSR research. 
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Table 6: DSR Iteration One (Library Research) 
 
Problem Studying different approaches for managing NFC payment ecosystems.  
Suggestion  To identify and define:  
1. Clear access permissions to the involved ecosystem players.  
2.  A novel NFC payment architectures which improve the existing issues such as 
security and controlling clients’ credentials.  
Outputs  Model: Using a unique cloud-based architecture for NFC payment ecosystem.  
Construct: Security criteria (e.g. authentication, authorisation), manageability and 
flexibility.   
Method: Consideration of initial NFC payment ecosystem models.  
Evaluation  The evaluation of the existing NFC payment ecosystems is required.  
Conclusion  To design new NFC payment architectures in order to fulfil the existing issues.  
 
3.5.2 DSR Iteration Two: Initial Design Requirements (Ecosystem/Model 
design) 
This iteration targets the second objective of this research. In order for us to design and 
propose novel NFC payment ecosystem scenarios, we had to study existing business payment 
models to design our payment ecosystem architectures as a complementary model based on 
the main ecosystem players such as MNO, financial institution and the NFC phone holder 
(customer) to reduce the number of involved participants and consequently decrease the 
payment’s complex issues in transaction operation. This method of considering 
communication interactions between ecosystem players resulted in designing novel NFC 
payment models.   
 
Having reached this point of the research, we understood that authentication mechanisms also 
play a crucial role among the interactions that takes place between involved entities in 
payment ecosystem architectures. Therefore, we designed our payment ecosystem scenarios 
so that they fulfil possible security implications which might have arisen if we would not 
have considered transaction authentication protocols. As a result, we started analysing several 
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cloud-based NFC transaction architectures and scenarios. In this stage, we noticed that there 
is an important principle such as configuration requirements that needs to be considered. In 
fact, while analysing a number of design requirements based on the variety of ecosystem 
architectures, we realised that different security requirements typically need to have different 
architectures to be in place. Examples of these architecture and configuration requirements 
involve different authentication protocols that are based on the interactions relevant to their 
payment ecosystem models. Table 7 illustrates the second iteration.   
 
Table 7: DSR Iteration Two (Initial Design Requirements) 
 
Problem Selecting secure and flexible payment scenarios for cloud-based NFC payments.  
Suggestion  Analyse different possible scenario architectures in order to design ours.  
Outputs  Model: Improved selection scenarios (based on cloud technology).  
Construct: Security, authentication and flexibility criteria.   
Method:  Analysing existing cloud-based payment architectures (e.g. Google wallet 
and MasterPass).   
Evaluation  The configuration limitations and preferences of the design should be considered.  
Conclusion  To finalize the design requirements of our protocols.  
 
3.5.3 DSR Iteration Three: Protocol Design 
This iteration targets the third objective of this research. As mentioned in the previous 
subsection, each ecosystem architecture involves configuring a number of fundamentals on 
their desired authentication protocol. These major configuration requirements reflect on the 
initial selected criteria of the ecosystem architecture. The process of designing secure 
transaction authentication protocols was based on the initial designed transaction scenarios 
which are discussed in chapter 4 and 5 of this thesis. For designing ecosystem scenarios as 
well as transaction authentication protocols, the configuration requirements are (1) 
architecture, (2) security, (3) flexibility, (4) access rights, and (5) ownership. We derived 
these configuration requirements based on the existing issues on NFC payment models which 
are the results of our comprehensive coverage of literature in this area.     
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After reaching this stage in which we recognised the protocol design requirements in the 
conducted design science research, we started to design our transaction authentication 
protocols. Table 8 illustrates the third iteration.  
 
Table 8: DSR Iteration Three (Protocol Design) 
 
Problem Selecting payment ecosystem configurations for designing transaction authentication 
protocols.  
Suggestion  Matching the initially designed ecosystem architectures to the required 
configurations for designing the protocols.   
Outputs  Model: propose novel transaction authentication protocols based on initially 
designed ecosystem architectures.  
Construct: security, authentication and flexibility criteria.  
Method: analysing the initially proposed ecosystem architectures against the 
configuration requirements for the protocols.  
Evaluation  The transaction protocols are designed and fitted into our ecosystem scenarios.  
Conclusion  The security analysis of such ecosystem scenarios with their respective protocols is 
required.   
 
 
3.5.4 DSR Iteration Four: Security Analysis and Validation (Targets 
Objective 4)  
Once successfully conducted the first three iteration of design science research, we moved to 
the stage in which we believed that the developed ecosystem scenarios and their respective 
protocols can be analysed from the security point of view to verify their utility and value. At 
that point, a security analysis of each proposed scenario with its respective protocol was 
carried out against multiple attack scenarios. The attack scenarios are designed based two 
aspects. Firstly, the possibilities of involved entities (e.g. customer, merchant and service 
provider) being dishonest and therefore not executing appropriately is discussed. In other 
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words, we sketched multiple scenarios where a buyer or a seller is dishonest and then 
analysed their success probability. This includes: (1) POS terminal impersonation as a 
customer, (2) POS terminal impersonation as MNO, (3) dishonest customer, (4) dishonest 
shop, (5) user interaction, and (6) disclosure of relevant information (more details in sections 
4.6; 5.5; 6.2). Secondly, a broad analysis is provided considering the security of the 
exchanged messages in different stages based on the science of cryptography that ensures 
secure encryption (i.e. using MAC keys), transaction security, Non-repudiation of transaction 
messages (i.e. using digital signatures), new set of keys for every transaction (i.e. to avoid 
replay attacks).   
 
The results of the security analysis indicate that the three novel transaction authentication 
protocols which were designed based on the initially proposed cloud-based NFC payment 
architectures can be used to facilitate new methods of managing the NFC transaction 
operation. Our proposed scenarios and their respective protocols provide three different 
approaches to tackle the problem of managing cloud-based NFC transaction ecosystems. 
These approaches are (1) direct communication between the MNO and the merchant, (2) 
merchant’s authentication with single MNO, and (3) merchant’s authentication with multiple 
MNOs. Since there are three entities (MNO, merchant and client) involved in every 
transaction, we designed and analysed three protocols which fulfil all three possible 
interaction scenarios.  Each of these scenarios is described in more detail in chapter 4, 5 and 6 
respectively. Furthermore, the security analyses of the proposed protocols are provided 
accordingly. Table 8 illustrates the fourth iteration.  
 
Having analysed the proposed protocols from the security (cryptography) viewpoint, in order 
for us to ensure the protocols are further analysed to a sufficient extent, supplementary 
evaluation was carried out by conducting interviews with two different experts as part of this 
research. One of the experts was a senior security consultant in a telecom company and the 
other was a professor of information security specializing in smart cards. 
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Table 9: DSR Iteration Four (Security Analysis and Validation) 
 
Problem Ensuring the security and validity of proposed architectures and their respective 
protocols.   
Suggestion  Analysing the proposed transaction authentication protocols from the security point 
of view. 
Outputs  Model: Develop security analysis against multiple attack scenarios.  
Construct: Security, validity, reliability of the proposed cloud-based NFC 
transaction authentication protocols/architectures.  
Method: Cryptographic analysis of the proposed protocols as well as conducting 
effective expert interviews  
Evaluation  The protocols are secure against all attack scenarios.  
Conclusion  The results are satisfactory.  
 
Our strategy for handling this complexity is to carry out verification by interactive theorem 
proving; thereby shifting the complexity to the human who guides the theorem prover 
(Matsuo et al., 2010). The interview process consisted of the following three questions:   
 
1. What are the strengths of the protocol? 
2. What are the weaknesses of the protocol?   
3.  What would be the implications of the protocol implementation?  
 
3.6 Summary  
This chapter described our approach towards conducting this research. It started off by 
introducing research, design and related research perspectives. The research presented in this 
thesis is about building artefacts (cloud-based NFC transaction authentication protocols) and 
providing complementary security evaluations in order to define range of NFC payment 
models.  Our goal is to help technology stakeholders to select the most reliable payment 
model and accelerate the adoption of NFC mobile payments. Therefore, we are dealing with 
an artificial science (information systems and computing) rather than a natural science. For 
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this reason, we selected the design science research methodology for this research. 
Furthermore, we described our selected methodology and provided its background 
information. DSR was linked to our protocols design, with the five steps process identified by 
Vaishnavi and Kuechler, (2009). This research aims to produce artefacts in the form of 
payment protocols in order to help mobile payment stakeholders to select the best-suited 
payment method. In the context of information systems and computing, the aim of DSR is to 
develop an artefact in order to improve/change the existing organisational and industrial 
situation (Hevner et al., 2004).  Therefore, the aim of this research is highly consistent with 
the aim of DSR methodology. 
 
In the following chapters we will continue by presenting the proposed models and their 
respective protocols continued by their security analyses that are conducted as part of this 
research.    
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Chapter 4 - First NFC Transaction Authentication Protocol:  
Direct Communication between the MNO and Merchant 
 
 
4. Overview  
This chapter targets objective 2 of our research. It describes our approach towards cloud-
based NFC transactions and introduces our proposed model that is called “NFC Cloud 
Wallet”. We introduce a new model for data storage in the SE in which the main SE is 
considered to be part of the cloud where all the customers’ confidential information are 
stored; and another type of secure tamper-resistant chip is considered to be stored in the NFC 
phone to provide temporary storage and handle authentication mechanisms. Moreover, a 
novel secure NFC transaction protocol is designed based on the proposed model and its 
execution process is described in detail. Lastly, a security analysis of the proposed protocol is 
carried out in order to justify the reliability and validity of our protocol in the security 
domain.   
 
4.1 The Concept of Mobile Wallet  
Recently, mobile wallet and mobile payment concepts have increased the attention of 
researchers and it seems that users have found it easy and convenient to pay with their mobile 
phones (Fisher & Guha, 2013). Up to now, people seem to accept that the future is in mobile 
devices but the problem has just begun for industrial stakeholders. There are several 
unanswered questions regarding the method(s) which a mobile payment process should 
follow in order to be deployed in a satisfactory manner. One of the main concerns of 
stakeholders is bringing the idea of cloud computing into the concept of NFC payments. Is 
there a need for cloud? Would NFC do the job on its own? It seems that they are not quite 
sure about the right solution as well as the right-to-go market strategy for mobile payments 
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(Lehdonvirta et al., 2009). Thus, there is not much agreement in the minds of mobile wallet 
stakeholders. PayPal, Telefonica/O2, and Best Buy have announced wallets that are using 
cloud technology and are accordingly classified as cloud wallets (Yarbrough & Taylor, 
2012). Additionally, Google, ISIS and Visa have developed solutions that use NFC as the 
main technology and are also called wallets (Google Wallet, 2013; Schamberger et al., 2013; 
Visa, 2013). 
 
The question that remains unanswered is which technology will finally get accepted by 
consumers and merchants? Answering this question requires some time, as what consumers 
prefer may not benefit the merchants and vice-versa. Therefore, at present, many 
advertisements and trials are in place in an attempt to make up the minds of both stakeholders 
and consumers as to what solution will ultimately be adopted. To start discussing possible 
solutions, it is best to consider both NFC and cloud payments first. 
 
4.1.1 NFC Wallet 
For NFC wallet payments, a special chip is required to be stored in the phone. There is also a 
need for a mobile application (app) to enable the consumer to login to the app in order to use 
it and make a payment. When logging to the app, the consumer should enter a password to 
confirm his identity. Once logged in to the app, the consumer can use the app and scan his 
phone on a nearby POS terminal to send the payment request to the merchant. From the 
consumer and merchant point of view, this is the same procedure as EMV PIN payments. The 
main benefit that this method of payment has for consumers is the convenience that it brings 
in busy environments such as train stations. For example, consumers can quickly scan their 
phones on the merchant POS terminal and top up their travel cards. 
 
In many cases, the focus of NFC wallets are to improve the loyalty experience of consumers 
by allowing them to integrate different applications into one single app and have the auto 
redeem at the merchant terminal. This provides a much easier method for consumers 
compared to traditional cutting out coupons. 
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4.1.2 Cloud Wallet 
Similar to the NFC wallet, a mobile application is required for cloud wallet. By registering 
the required information (e.g. credit card details) to service providers, consumers can use 
their phones for one click check outs in e-commerce. The registered information of the 
consumer is saved in an offline database, but the SP enables the consumer to use his 
information from the offline database when he aims to make a payment. Consumers pay 
money into their cloud accounts (prepaid account) from their bank and when they use their 
phones to make a payment, the required funds are withdrawn from their cloud wallet. Cloud 
wallet is an improvement to the existing Telefonica and PayPal services since, from the 
merchant’s point of view, in a POS retail situation, consumers can simply enter a password 
on their app when making a payment and that password confirms the consumer's identity in 
addition to completing the transaction process. Although the NFC wallet is more practical 
than the cloud wallet solution, the latter solution sounds more interesting to merchants as they 
are not required to make an investment in order to update their POS terminals for making 
them compatible with NFC devices. 
 
4.2 Data Stored in Cloud  
There are two main components in an NFC enabled handset: the SE and NFC controller. As 
mentioned earlier in section 2.5 of this thesis, the SE is responsible for providing secure 
storage for sensitive data while the NFC controller enables short-range data transmission. 
Although the number of NFC handsets is increasing in the market, NFC payments are not 
widely adopted yet. The main reason for this is the existing issues with managing and 
controlling access to the SE (Kranz et al., 2013). At present, operation of NFC payments 
requires the participation of both card issuers and SE owners that should be established 
through a defined relationship. In the concept of cloud-based NFC payments, the ecosystem 
architecture is designed in a different way in which the main SE is stored in the cloud (virtual 
SE) and the NFC controller stays in the handset in order to provide a limited and temporary 
space for authentication assets to deal with authentication processes between the NFC phone 
and the POS terminal.  This approach is beneficial in terms of controlling the SE (card issuer 
access the SE easily). In this case, client credentials are stored in the virtual SE rather than 
being stored locally in the NFC handset. When a client scans his/her NFC phone on the POS 
terminal to make a payment, transaction credentials are transmitted from the virtual SE to the 
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NFC handset and from there to the POS terminal. The NFC controller is responsible for 
handling the authentication between the NFC phone and the POS terminal. The newer version 
of Google Wallet which was launched in August 2012 (Google, 2013) is based on this 
approach; however, it is not widely implemented yet. Google has provided a central cloud 
environment where clients’ payment credentials are kept. Thus, clients are able to link 
different credit cards with their mobile wallet service. For example Google Wallet customers 
can add their Visa, MasterCard, American Express and Discover cards to their mobile wallet 
service. This increases the flexibility compared to the previously discussed model where data 
is stored in the SE that is installed in the NFC handset. The Google Wallet solution also 
defines a proxy card in the handset to enable the transaction at the POS terminal; nonetheless 
customer payment credentials are still stored in the virtual SE located in the cloud. Storing 
client credentials in the cloud has some advantages and disadvantages which are discussed 
below.         
 
From a portability point of view, a wallet service can be available on any device which the 
user is authenticated to. Moreover, data transmission method from the NFC phone to the POS 
terminal can be through a variety of methods such as an NFC link. Having customer 
credentials in the cloud thus makes it easier for cardholders and financial institutions to get 
their card into the wallet. As the SE does not exist in the phone architecture anymore, there is 
no third party in control of the SE, those by improving the security, flexibility and 
manageability of the service. One of the main challenges of this solution is data security, 
which has always been the main concern of people and technology providers. In this 
approach, the mobile phone has a key role in data communication as it becomes a conduit for 
data passing from the cloud to reach the POS terminal. Not having a proper security design 
on the phone may result in data leakage. On the other hand, an internet connection (WiFi or 
3G/4G) is required in order to deliver data from the cloud to the phone to be used at the POS 
terminal. Connection speed thus definitely has a major impact on the overall service, as slow 
connectivity or unavailability of Internet connection prevents the service operation. 
Therefore, properly designed solutions must be in place to ensure transaction data are 
available at the POS terminal. (e.g. transaction data can be stored on the phone in advance of 
the payment).   
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4.2.1 The Concept of NFC Cloud Wallet   
Although the use of the SE as a main secure component in an NFC mobile phone was a good 
start for development of this technology, however once it got to the real stage of its global 
implementation, the ecosystem players faced many problems (Curran et al., 2012). We 
believe bringing the cloud infrastructure into the NFC business helps to overcome many of 
the current problems. Additionally, a cloud-based approach offers several advantages over 
the use of SE as a single secure component in terms of managing sensitive data for an NFC 
transaction.  Moreover, according to the speed of the present generation mobile data services 
(Agar, 2013; Pailles et al., 2010), it seems an NFC cloud-based approach needs another 2 to 3 
years to become commercially feasible. 
 
The NFC cloud-based approach introduces a new method of storing, managing and accessing 
sensitive transaction data by storing customers’ payment data in the cloud (referred to as a 
virtual SE) rather than the mobile phone. When a transaction is carried out, the required data 
is pulled out from a remote virtual SE which is stored within the cloud environment and 
pushed into the mobile phone’s SE in an encrypted format. The mobile phone’s SE provides 
temporary storage and authentication assets for the transaction to take place. After reaching 
the SE in an NFC phone, data are again pulled out from the handset and reach the vendor’s 
terminal. In addition, the communication between the cloud provider and the vendor’s 
terminal is established through an NFC link. The cloud-based transaction method provides 
the “card present” payment, since the NFC phone’s SE only deals with the authentication 
between the handset and the POS terminal. This solution enables the NFC phone to be linked 
to multiple virtual SEs (stored in the cloud) that allows any user to access its own SE in order 
to modify the information (e.g. to add/delete applications).  
 
In the NFC cloud-based approach, the phone’s SE can only be responsible for user/device 
authentication and not for storing data. This solution increases the cost efficiency compared 
to the current costs that SE makes for a company. In addition, the NFC controller chips will 
be smaller and cheaper as they would not have to support all functionalities. Furthermore, the 
concept of the SE can be completely avoided by replacing it with the concept of a trusted 
zone that can be created within the processor of a mobile phone. Moreover, the storage 
capacity of the SE should be large enough in order to store user applications with unknown 
sizes. Since the user may wish to add more applications to his NFC phone, this issue brings a 
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limitation for existing solutions as each SE supports a certain storage capacity. The other 
issue with the SE is that, companies have to meet the requirements of organisations such as 
EMVco (EMVCo, 2007) to provide high level security in order to store the card's data. This 
approach makes the SE expensive for the companies, while the cloud-based approach reduces 
this cost. 
 
Since users’ critical information is stored in the cloud, they do not need to be concerned 
about their mobile wallets any longer. In order for the users to change their mobile wallet 
information, they can easily use the virtual SE (stored in the cloud) to access the information 
they require online via a web browser. This approach improves SP services as they are no 
longer required to develop different applications for different types of mobile phones. 
Additionally, it reduces the risk of a third party to get unauthorized access while the phone is 
being shipped to a new user or for repairing purposes. This is because there is no SE which 
contains the user’s confidential information in the NFC phone as that information is now 
stored in a cloud environment and not in the handset itself. Moreover, the NFC cloud-based 
approach makes the business simpler for companies in terms of the integration of SE card 
provisioning. It would be much easier for businesses to implement NFC services without 
having to perform card provisioning for every single SE. An NFC phone user will be able to 
access an unlimited number of applications as they are stored within a cloud secure server 
and not in a physical SE. In terms of flexibility, all users would be able to access all their 
applications from all their devices (e.g. phones, tablets or laptops) since the applications are 
stored in a cloud environment that provides a secure storage space. Moreover, fraud detection 
would be instant as the system fully runs in an online mode. 
 
The acceptance of the NFC cloud-based transaction method is dependent on having the 
ability to implement strong authentication mechanisms as well as on conducting transactions 
quickly enough in order to increase the performance. Reassuringly, the processing times are 
far quicker in this approach because the main SE is stored in a cloud where there is more 
computing power available, in contrast with a stored SE on a mobile device. However, more 
time is required for data requests to reach the cloud server and return back to the POS 
terminal.  
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To summarise, the NFC cloud-based solution offers potentially infinite computing services 
and extensive capabilities in terms of storage, networking of shared devices and computing. 
The solution provides broad capabilities to enable the use of different platforms bringing the 
user into ubiquitous computing. The different virtual and physical needs of clients makes the 
cloud-based NFC a flexible technology. Therefore the technology should be capable of 
providing the infrastructure necessary in order to enable the consumers to manage their 
resources in the most effective way.  
 
4.3 NFC Cloud Wallet Model 
This model proposes the idea of using cloud computing to manage NFC payment 
applications. This result in a flexible and secure management process, concurrently easing the 
application personalization and ownership for both customers and service providers to this 
end, the proposed NFC cloud wallet architecture provides easy management of multiple users 
and delivers personalized contents to each user. It supports intelligent profiling functions by 
managing customized information relevant to each user in certain environments, which 
updates the service offers and user profiles dynamically. Depending on the MNO’s network 
reception, deployment of this service takes around one minute and deployments can be scaled 
to any number of users. 
 
The idea of this approach is that every time the customer makes a purchase, the payment 
application which contains the customer's credentials is downloaded into the phone’s SE 
from the cloud and, after the transaction, it is deleted from the device and the cloud will 
update itself to keep a correct record of the customer's account balance. Figure 14 illustrates 
the steps that should be undertaken to complete the transaction process. The execution of the 
model is described in what follows: 
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Figure 14: NFC Cloud Wallet 
 
1. The customer scans his/her NFC phone on the merchant’s POS terminal to make a 
payment. 
2. The payment application is downloaded from the virtual SE into the customer's phone SE. 
3. The merchant’s POS terminal communicates with the cloud provider to check whether the 
customer has enough credit or not. 
4. The cloud provider transfers the requested information to the merchant’s POS terminal. 
5. Based on the information transferred to the merchant, the merchant informs the cloud to 
either authorize the transaction or reject the customer request. 
6. If the customer has sufficient amount of money in his account to make the purchase, the 
merchant sends the payment information to the cloud and the finance department (a sub-
system of the cloud) updates the customer's balance - if the customer's request is authorized, 
the amount of purchase will be withdrawn from his account otherwise the customer's account 
will remain with the same balance. 
 
As an addition to this model, we suggest that when the NFC enabled phone sends a request to 
its cloud provider to get permission to make a payment (step 1), the cloud provider sends a 
SMS requesting a PIN number to identify the user of the phone - this is how the cloud 
provider ensures the legitimacy of the phone user. For verification purposes, the customer 
sends the PIN back to the cloud provider as an SMS. 
 
To extend this model, There are two possible ways to follow this approach: Firstly, the 
financial institution can be the cloud owner from which the payment application can be 
downloaded from/into the customer's mobile device; the MNO can be linked to the financial 
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institution (that is the cloud owner in this case) or it can stand as a separate party. Secondly, 
the financial institution could have a contract with a third party company such as PayPal that 
has its own cloud infrastructure (whilst the MNO can be linked with them, it also can stand as 
a separate party) or the financial institution uses another company's cloud service such as 
IBM, Microsoft, etc. (the MNO can be linked with either financial institution, cloud provider 
or it can stand as a separate party). 
 
This approach provides a comprehensive leadership of the cloud provider towards managing 
and controlling the customer’s information and allows the phone’s SE to deal with 
authentication mechanisms rather than storing and managing the required transaction 
information. Additionally, in the cloud-based payment architecture the processes of assigning 
different service profiles to multi-clients are performed in a flexible routine while it provides 
fast and easy delivery of personalized profiles to every client. The personalized profiles can 
also be dynamically updated or customized for particular clients’ requests through managing 
the content of each client’s profile in the cloud in addition to its associated NFC tag. The 
mobile network coverage of the carrier certainly has an impact on the download speed of 
applications as well as the whole process. In the case of excellent mobile network coverage, 
the download time/process will be less than when the network coverage is poor.   
 
4.3.1 Ecosystem Scenarios  
In this section, we propose two ecosystem scenarios and discuss the assumptions we made in 
order to design our protocol. The proposed ecosystem scenarios are listed below.  
 
1. Direct Link between the POS and the MNO 
2. Unlinked POS and MNO (Vendor trusts MNO) 
 
In this chapter, a secure transaction authentication protocol is designed based on the first 
ecosystem scenario in which the merchant and the MNO have a direct communication 
channel. Subsequently, a security analysis of the proposed protocol is provided in order to 
justify the reliability and validity of the protocol from the security perspective. The second 
scenario however will be looked at in the next chapter.  
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4.3.2 Direct Link between the MNO and Merchant 
We propose an extension to NFC Cloud Wallet model. Since there are multiple options 
applicable to this model, we design our ecosystem model based on the following 
assumptions: 
 
 The SE is part of the SIM;  
 The cloud is part of the MNO; 
 The MNO manages the SE/SIM (SE in the form of UICC); 
 Banks, etc. are part of the MNO; 
 
Figure 15 demonstrates the ecosystem scenario in which the merchant and the MNO have 
direct communication. 
 
Figure 15: Direct communication between POS and MNO 
 
These assumptions are appropriate regarding NFC execution process and its ecosystem 
architecture. For instance, in the SIM/UICC architecture proposed in SP-driven model 
launched by Robabank in Netherlands (see section 2.9.5), they suggest that the MNO to be 
owned by the bank itself in order to improve the complexities of the ownership and access 
right permissions in the payment ecosystem architecture.  However, this could be done vice-
versa. i.e. the MNO could be the owner of the bank. Our fourth assumption in the first 
ecosystem scenario is also based on this model in which we assume the bank is part of the 
MNO or the bank is securely linked with the MNO. Thus, in chapter 5 and 6 we use this 
assumption in order to design two more transaction authentication protocols based on the 
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second ecosystem scenario mentioned in section 4.3.1. As discussed in chapter 2 previously, 
the SE is in the form of a UICC therefore, the SE is part of the SIM and the MNO manages 
the SIM accordingly (assumptions 1 and 3). In assumption 2, the MNO manages the cloud 
infrastructure and it is the only party that has full access and permission to manage 
confidential data stored in the cloud. For example, Verzion – a mobile network carrier based 
in the US – has recently (Verizon, 2013; Schneiderman, 2011) entered the cloud market and 
offers a broad range of cloud services to its customers. Moreover, AT&T – another US based 
mobile network carrier – is also providing cloud storage for its customers (AT&T, 2013; 
Marston et al., 2011). In our scenario, since the MNO is the owner of the cloud, it fully 
manages the SIM in terms of monitoring the GSM network and controlling the cloud's data. 
From the financial institution’s point of view, it only deals with the MNO, as it is the only 
party that has full control over the SIM and the cloud.  
 
Since GSM is still a widely used network as a mobile standard and our cellular calls are 
mostly based on GSM, we use the existing features of this technology in our model. The 
following section describes the GSM authentication process.  
 
4.4 GSM Authentication  
When a mobile device signs into a network, the MNO first authenticates the device 
(specifically the SIM). The authentication stage verifies the identity and validity of the SIM 
and ensures that the subscriber has authorized access to the network. The Authentication 
Centre (AuC) of the MNO is responsible for authenticating each SIM that attempts to connect 
to the GSM core network through Mobile Switching Centre (MSC). The AuC stores two 
encryption algorithms A3 and A8 (Kiselev & Tokareva, 2012), as well as a list of all 
subscribers identity along with corresponding secret key Ki. This key is also stored in the 
SIM. The AuC first generates a random number known as R. This R is used to generate two 
responses, signed response S and key Kc as shown in figure 16, where S = EKi (R) using the 
A3 algorithm and Kc = EKi (R) using the A8 algorithm (ETSI, 1996).  
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Figure 16: Generation of Kc and S from R 
 
The triplet (R, S, Kc) is known as the Authentication triplet generated by the AuC. The AuC 
sends this triplet to the MSC. On receiving a triplet from the AuC,the  MSC sends R (the first 
part of the triplet) to the mobile device. The SIM of the mobile device computes the response 
S from R, as Ki is already stored in the SIM. The mobile device transmits S to the MSC. If 
this S matches the S in the triplet (which it should in case of a valid SIM), then the mobile is 
authenticated. Kc is used for communication encryption between the mobile station and the 
MNO. Having described the GSM authentication, in the following section we propose our 
protocol, which has been inspired from Chen et al. protocol (Section 2.12 - C).  
 
4.5 The Proposed Protocol  
Our proposal is based on the cloud architecture where the cloud is being managed by the 
MNO. The cloud and the banking sector are the subsystems of the MNO in our proposal, in 
addition to the existing subsystems of an MNO. We assume that the communication is secure 
between various subsystems of the MNO. The shop POS terminal, registered with one or 
more MNOs, shares an MNO specific secret key Kp with the corresponding MNO. This key 
is issued once a shop is registered with the MNO. The bank details of the merchant are also 
registered with the MNO for monetary transactions. The communication between the 
merchant’s POS terminal and the mobile device is wireless using NFC peer-to-peer mode 
technology (section 2.4.1-B). The mobile device has a valid SIM. We used the existing 
feature of GSM network for mutual authentication. A recent study by Chen, Hancke, Mayes, 
Lien and Chiu (2010) proposed a mechanism for GSM authentication in an NFC 
environment. We tailored their model according to our requirement in our proposed 
architecture. The detailed execution of our protocol is described in Figure 17. 
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The proposed protocol executes in three different phases: Authentication, Keys generation 
and Transaction. The protocol initiates when the customer places his cell phone for the 
payment after agreeing to the total price displayed on the shop POS terminal. The details of 
these phases are described in what follows: 
 
4.5.1 Phase 1: Authentication 
Step 1: As soon as the user places his mobile device, the NFC link between the mobile 
device and the shop POS terminal is established. The shop POS terminal sends an ID Request 
message to the mobile device. 
 
Steps 2-3: The mobile device sends TMSI, LAI as its ID. On receipt of the information from 
the mobile device, the shop POS terminal determines the user's mobile network. The network 
code is available in LAI in the form of Mobile Country Code (MCC) and Mobile Network 
Code (MNC). An MNC is used in combination with MCC (also known as a ‘MCC/MNC 
tuple’) to uniquely identify a mobile phone operator/carrier (Technical Specification Group 
Core Network, 1999).  
 
Steps 4-5: The shop POS terminal sends TMSI, LAI, and Shop ID to respective MNO for 
customer authentication and shop identification. 
 
Step 5.1: In case of incorrect TMSI, a declined message is sent. 
 
Step 6: In case of correct identification, the MNO generates one set of authentication triplet 
(R, S, Kc) and sends R to mobile device through shop POS terminal (as described in section 
4.4).  
 
Steps 7-8: SIM computes Kc from R as explained in Section 4.4. The SIM generates a 
random number Rs and concatenates with R, encrypts with key Kc and sends it to the MNO 
through shop POS terminal. 
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Figure 17: The Proposed Protocol 
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Steps 9-10: The MNO checks the validity of the SIM (or mobile device). It receives Ekc 
(R||Rs) from the mobile device and decrypts the message by Kc, the key it already has in 
authentication triplet. The MNO compares the R in the authentication triplet with the R in the 
response. In case they do not match, a ‘Stop’ message is sent to the mobile device and the 
protocol execution is stopped. If both R are same, then the mobile is authenticated for a valid 
SIM. In this case, the MNO swaps R and Rs, encrypts with Kc and sends it to mobile device. 
 
Steps 11-12: This step authenticates the MNO to the mobile device. The mobile device 
receives the response Ekc (Rs||R) and decrypts it with the key Kc already computed in Step 7. 
The mobile device compares both R and Rs. If both are same, then the MNO is authenticated 
and a ‘successful authentication’ message is sent to the MNO. 
 
4.5.2 Phase 2: Keys Generation and PIN Verification 
Steps 13-14: Kp is a shared secret between the MNO and the shop POS terminal. Kc is the 
shared secret between the MNO and the customer's mobile device (computed in step 7). 
There is no shared secret between the POS terminal and the mobile device till this stage. The 
MNO and mobile device compute a one-way hash function of Kc to generate Kc1, the key that 
will be used for MAC calculation. The MNO then computes Kc2 from Kc1 using a one-way 
hash function and sends it to shop POS terminal by encrypting it with Kp. The mobile device 
also computes Kc2 as it already has Kc1. Kc2 is the encryption key between MNO, shop POS 
terminal and the customer's mobile device. 
 
Steps 15-17: The shop POS terminal sends the Total Price (TP) and the Receipt Number 
encrypted with Kc2. The user's mobile device decrypts the information and displays it to the 
user. If he agrees, he enters the PIN. The PIN is an additional layer of security and adds trust 
between the user and the shopkeeper. A PIN binds a user with his mobile device, so the 
shopkeeper is to believe that the user is the legitimate owner of the mobile device. Moreover, 
the user feels more secure as no one else can use his mobile device for transaction without his 
consent. PIN is stored in a secure location in the SIM. The SIM compares both PINs and if 
both are same, the user is authenticated as the legitimate user of the mobile device. 
Otherwise, the protocol is stopped. 
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4.5.3 Phase 3: Transaction 
Step 18: The customer's cell phone generates two messages, PI and TRM, such that;  
 
PI= (Receipt No, Total Price, Time Stamp (TSU)) 
TRM= (PI, Rs, Transaction Counter) 
 
Step 19: TSU represents the exact time and date the transaction has been committed by the 
user. TC is a counter that is incremented after each transaction and is used to prevent replay 
attack. PI is encrypted with Kc2 so that it can be verified by the shop POS terminal. The user 
encrypts the TRM with Kc so that it cannot be modified by the shop terminal. The user 
computes MAC with Kc1 over the TRM using Encrypt-then-MAC approach for integrity 
protection. 
 
Steps 20-21: The POS terminal can decrypt only the PI encrypted with by Kc2 to check its 
correctness. The POS terminal does not need to verify the MAC (and it cannot do so), as it 
already knows the main contents of PI. The Shop POS terminal also verifies the TSU to be in 
a defined time window. If PI is correct, the POS terminal relays the encrypted TRM with 
corresponding MAC along with the TSU to the MNO. 
 
Step 22: On receipt of the message, the MNO checks the integrity of the message by 
verifying the MAC with Kc1. If the MAC is invalid, the transaction execution is stopped. In 
case of a valid MAC, the MNO decrypts the message. The MNO compares the Rs in the TRM 
with the Rs received earlier in the authentication phase. A correct match confirms that the 
user is the same who was earlier authenticated. It also verifies the TC and TSU. In case of 
successful verification, the MNO communicates with the concerned subsections for monetary 
transaction. The concerned subsections of the MNO check the credit limit of the user, and, if 
satisfied, execute the transaction. Once the transaction is executed, the MNO generates a 
Transaction Information (TI) message as: 
 
TI = (Transaction Serial Number, Amount, TSTr) 
 
Steps 23-25: The MNO encrypts TI with Kc2, digitally signs the message and sends it to the 
shop POS terminal. The POS terminal verifies the signature. A valid signature indicates a 
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correct TI. The POS also verifies the TI for the amount mentioned in the TI. In case of 
successful verification, the POS terminal appends the message it received from the MNO 
with the Shopping Details (SD) and corresponding digital signature. 
 
Step 26: The user verifies both signatures. It verifies the contents of TI and SD. 
 
4.6 Protocol Analysis  
In this section, we analyse our proposed model from multiple security aspects. This analysis 
encompasses the authentication and security of the messages among customer, shop POS 
terminal and the MNO. The analysis also includes multiple attack scenarios, such as a 
customer is dishonest and has intentions to pay less, or the shopkeeper is dishonest and has 
plans to receive more money. 
 
4.6.1 Mutual Authentication  
A mutual authentication between a customer and MNO occurs whenever the customer agrees 
to pay some amount. Since this authentication is performed through a shop’s POS terminal, 
we analyse our protocol from the perspective that the POS terminal has some malicious 
intentions. In this case, there can be the following two scenarios: 
 
POS Terminal Impersonation as a Customer  
 
We assume that the shop POS terminal is dishonest and keeps a record of all messages 
against a legitimate customer (referred to as ‘target customer’). The aim of the shopkeeper is 
to transfer money from the target customer without his/her consent. The shop POS terminal 
impersonates a target customer to the MNO by replaying message 4. In case the TMSI and 
LAI are valid at that time (the chances are higher if the message is replayed just after the 
legitimate transaction of the target customer), the MNO will send a random number R to the 
terminal. R is a 128 bit random number generated by the MNO so the chances for its 
repetition are almost negligible. The shopkeeper cannot compute a valid response in step 8 
for a different R, as the shop lacks Ki to compute Kc. Therefore, a shop cannot successfully 
impersonate as a customer by replaying old messages. 
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POS Terminal Impersonation as MNO  
 
In this scenario, we assume that the shop is dishonest and communicates with a target 
customer without establishing a communication link with the MNO. Again, we assume that 
the shop keeps a record of legitimate messages of the target customer. The shop sends 
message 1 (Request ID) to the target customer and gets its response in message 2. Since the 
shop does not communicate with MNO in this scenario, it does not send message 4 to the 
MNO. However, the shop replays the recorded R in message 6 to the target customer. The 
target customer believes that he has been correctly identified by the MNO and the R is 
actually generated the MNO. So the user computes a response and sends it in message 8 to 
the shop. Message 8 contains Rs encrypted with the Kc. The Rs is a random number generated 
by the SIM and is different in each transaction. So, message 8 will be different than the one 
already recorded with the shop. Since message 8 is different, the shop can neither replay 
message 10, as it will be different for this transaction, nor can it compute a valid message 10. 
This scenario is, again, not successful. 
 
4.6.2 Encryption and MAC Keys 
Separate keys are used for encryption and MAC calculation making the protocol more secure. 
Encrypt-then-MAC is an approach where the ciphertext is generated by encrypting the 
plaintext and then appending a MAC of the encrypted plaintext. This approach is 
cryptographically more secure than other approaches (Bellare & Namprempre 2000). Apart 
from the cryptographic advantage, the MAC can be verified without performing decryption. 
So, if the MAC is invalid for a message, the message is discarded without decryption. This 
results in computational efficiency. 
 
4.6.3 User Interaction 
The user interaction with the system is reduced to a single interaction making it a user-
friendly protocol. Moreover, the user feels more secure as the transaction is protected by PIN 
verification. There are chances that a user withdraws his mobile device from NFC terminal as 
a psychological move to enter PIN. This will break the NFC link, but, as the PIN is stored in 
the SIM, it does not require a NFC link for verification. Once the user PIN has been verified 
by the SIM, the user places his mobile device back on the NFC terminal and the protocol 
Chapter 4: Direct Communication between the MNO and Merchant 
Pardis Pourghomi   98 
 
resumes from the same point. There are chances that a dishonest user could withdraw his/her 
mobile device in order to enter the PIN, and then places it back on another mobile device for 
transaction. To counter this threat, Rs is transmitted by the mobile device in Transaction 
Request Message (message 19). Rs is generated by the SIM and is encrypted with Kc 
(message 7, 8), so it cannot be eavesdropped in the authentication phase. This ensures that the 
mobile device does not change. 
 
4.6.4 Disclosure of Relevant Information 
The protocol is designed considering disclosure of information on a need to know basis. For 
example, TC is a counter that increments after each successful transaction. The record of the 
TC is kept by both, the user and the MNO. Shop POS terminal does not need to know the TC. 
In our proposed protocol, the TC is not exposed to POS terminal as it is a part of the TRM. 
Similarly, the MNO does not need to know the shopping details of the customer. Therefore, 
only the total amount is transmitted to the MNO for transaction. 
 
4.6.5 Transaction Security 
The transaction phase of the protocol requires maximum security. The TRM message is 
initiated by the customer rather than the shop terminal in order to satisfy the customer. The 
integrity of the TRM message is protected by the MAC so any alteration in this message is 
not possible. Message 19 is designed in such a way that the first half of the message 
containing encrypted PI is for the shop’s POS terminal, which can decrypt and check the 
authenticity of the payment information. The remaining half of the message, containing 
encrypted TRM and corresponding MAC can neither be decrypted nor altered by the shop’s 
POS terminal. The POS terminal relays the remaining half to the MNO along with the Time 
Stamp. Hence, the transaction information generated by the customer is relayed to the MNO 
without any alteration. In this phase, there can be a scenario where a dishonest customer has 
an intention of paying less than the actual amount. Accordingly, the customer designs a 
malicious TRM message (TRM´) consisting of PI´ (an illegitimate payment information, PI´ 
< PI). The dishonest customer then forms message 19 as: 
 
PI=Receipt Number, Total Price, Time Stamp TSU 
TRM´=PI´, Rs, Transaction Counter (TC) 
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It may be noted that the PI is legitimate whereas the TRM´ consists of amended PI (PI´). The 
dishonest customer forms message 19 as: 
 
Message 19 =Ekc2 (PI), EKc (TRM´), MACKc1 (TRM´) 
 
The first half of the message, consisting of encrypted PI, is legitimate and the shop can verify 
it. However, the malicious part cannot be decrypted by the shop, so the shop cannot 
determine that the remaining part contains amended price information. The shop forms 
message 21 as PI is verified. The MNO executes the transaction with an amended price and 
forms message 23 and digitally signs it. Message 23 contains the information about the 
amount deducted from the customer. Once this message is received by the shop terminal, the 
shop detects that the deducted amount is not the same as required. Hence, a dishonest 
customer with the intention to pay a lesser amount does not succeed in our proposed design. 
 
4.6.6 New Set of Keys for every Transaction 
The keys are generated from a random number R (generated by the MNO), which acts as a 
seed for all keys. As R is fresh for every transaction, therefore the keys are also new in each 
transaction. 
 
4.6.7 Non-repudiation of Transaction Messages 
The transaction result messages (message 23, message 25) are digitally signed. In case of any 
dispute about the payment, the MNO is to honour message 23 as it contains the MNO's 
digital signature. The shopping detail is also digitally signed by the shop POS terminal so the 
shop has to honour the prices mentioned in this message. Therefore the customer is 
completely secured in transaction. 
 
4.6.8 Securing Long Term Secret 
Kp is the long term secret between the MNO and shop POS terminal. In our protocol, Kp is 
used with the least exposure (only once). The security policy of the MNO can define the 
update of this key after a defined interval. 
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The above proposed transaction protocol provides secure communication channels to the 
communicating parties. The proposed protocol is based on the NFC Cloud Wallet model for 
secure cloud-based NFC transaction authentication. The operations performed by the vendor's 
reader, an NFC enabled phone and the cloud provider (the MNO) are provided, with such 
operations being possible thanks to the current state of technology, as most of these measures 
are already implemented to support other mechanisms.  
 
4.7 Expert Review Evaluation  
As a motivating and challenging problem, cryptographic protocols should be designed in a 
way to support even worst-case assumptions. These assumptions may still provide the 
opportunity for adversaries to eavesdropped and/or modify the transmitting messages inside 
the communication channel. Moreover, the cryptographic techniques may not themselves 
provide complete security since a number of attacks can be conducted to break such 
properties. Man-In-The-Middle attack is one of such attacks that enables the attacker to take 
control over the message execution sessions with impersonation techniques. Furthermore, 
replay (playback) attacks are also possible where the attacker records the previous messages 
and retransmit them. Another type of an attack is called reflection attack where the adversary 
sends back the initiated message to the originator; and type flaw attack where the intruder 
substitutes different messages into a protocol – for example an attacker can alter the name 
with a key.  
 
Normally, these attacks are simply overlooked, as it is problematic for humans, even by a 
detailed review of simple protocols, to control all the complex ways that different protocol 
sessions could be interleaved together, with possible interferences coming from an adversary. 
What is needed are methods to speed up the development and analysis of cryptographic 
protocols. Moreover, if these methods are to be used to certify protocols, then they must be 
mathematically precise, so that exact statements are possible about the scope and significance 
of the analysis results. This role can be filled by analysing the technical properties of the 
protocol against multiple attack scenarios in order to assure that the protocol satisfies the 
given objectives.   
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4.7.1 Scenario Evaluation  
The scenario is designed based on the following four assumptions:  
 
1) The SE is part of the SIM;  
2) The cloud is part of the MNO; 
3) The MNO manages the SE/SIM (SE in the form of UICC); 
4) Banks, etc. are part of the MNO; 
As one of the challenging issues of deploying NFC transactions in a global scale is yet the 
collaboration of involved entities, proposing a cloud-based approach can be beneficial in a 
number of ways. This approach reduces the number of involved entities such as trusted 
service manager which mainly acts as a trusted third party for service providers, network 
operators, SIM manufacturers and financial institutions. In the proposed scenario, having 
assumed that the cloud takes the responsibility of managing the clients credential reduces the 
complexity of such collaboration which normally result in different parties claiming 
advanced access rights and ownerships of that critical information. This has also been the 
main difficulty towards standardisation of NFC payment ecosystem.  
 
The first assumption is practically feasible as most NFC payment providers use this approach. 
However, the service provider may not necessarily be the network operator. In the proposed 
scenario, it is stated that since the SE is part of the SIM the MNO manages the SE (first and 
third assumptions). This can be an effective approach if MNOs are willing to provide such 
services apart from their network operation responsibilities. The second assumption 
highlights the ownership of the cloud which is under the control of the MNO. Again, this 
approach is feasible and is already employed by a number of MNOs such as Verizon and AT 
&T towards providing additional services but NFC payments that can be further considered.  
 
The critical part of the designed scenario is the fourth assumption where the financial 
institution is integrated with the MNO. This approach has not been deployed yet; nonetheless 
it can be an interesting area to be looked at. Moreover, the integration is not clearly discussed 
in the sense that how the access rights are defined and established so that remains as an 
interesting area for future research.          
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Designed scenario as a whole introduces a novel and interesting insight towards NFC 
payments particularly where the proven cloud, GSM and NFC technologies are in action.    
4.7.2 Protocol Evaluation  
In order to evaluate the proposed protocol, the security of the cryptographic primitives must 
be reviewed according to their cryptographic definitions.  
 
A) Strength and Weaknesses  
 
The logic of the proposed protocol is based on the initially designed scenario where multiple 
parties are involved in the protocol execution. The properties used to design the protocol are 
based on the operation of GSM, NFC and cloud technologies.  
 
Proposing an additional step for mutual authentication of the SIM and the MNO (steps 1 to 
12) over the GSM network provides further security as non-repudiation is ensured. In 
particular, this provides proof of the integrity and origin of data so that neither the SIM nor 
the MNO can deny sending and receiving messages and those messages cannot be accessed 
and modified by a malicious third party. Furthermore, security of the protocol is improved 
against Man-In-The-Middle and phishing attacks. Despite the advantages of adding the extra 
step for mutual authentication purposes, this approach can increase the execution time of the 
messages when it comes to measuring the performance features.    
 
Generation of Kc and Kc1as a shared key between the MNO and the SIM in step 13 makes the 
communication secure whilst it crosses over the merchant which is not permitted to access 
the message content. However, step 14 suggests generating of a new key Kc2 which is shared 
between all entities as all parties have to have a form of secure communication amongst them 
that still must be inaccessible by a third party. As an additional security step, adding PIN 
verification (step 17) is not necessary as now days most contactless credit cards do not 
require a PIN which again improves the performance and is indeed a huge security concern 
for users.   
 
The use of timestamp (TSU) in step 21 keeps track of the creation and modification of the 
exchanged message which means that no entity, not even the sender of the message can 
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modify it once it has been generated provided that the integrity of the timestamp is never 
compromised. Moreover, the transaction counter which is included in TRM improves the 
security in a way that it is incremented after each transaction in order to prevent replay 
attacks so the message cannot be fraudulently repeated and/or delayed in transmission.      
 
B) Implementation  
  
With respect to implementation issues, firstly the integration of the MNO and the financial 
institution should be clarified in order to define suitable ownership and access right 
properties. Moreover, since the protocol uses the GSM network the performance of its 
execution is highly dependable on the strength of the GSM signals as this may cause delays 
while transaction details are exchanged. From the merchants’ viewpoints, POS terminals 
must be upgraded to support NFC technology which requires significant investment.  
 
4.8 Summary  
In this chapter, we discussed an alternative method of using cloud computing in NFC 
transactions which provides security, flexibility and improves the manageability of 
applications in terms of personalization and ownership for both users and customers. 
Accordingly, we proposed the NFC Cloud Wallet model and described the interactions 
among the involved parties which are carried out in this model. Using this model, and 
inspired by Chen et al’s (2010) protocol we then proposed a novel protocol for NFC 
transactions.  The key fact of the proposed protocol’s scenario was the direct communication 
between the MNO and the merchant in which a shared secret was available to both parties 
(the first scenario of our ecosystem). In the next chapter, we target the second scenario and 
assume that there is no direct communication between the MNO and the merchant. 
Consequently, there won’t be a shared secret among them and therefore we will propose a 
new scenario as an extension to the NFC Cloud Wallet model, Chen et al (2010) protocol, 
and our first proposed protocol described in this chapter.  
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Chapter 5 - Second NFC Transaction Authentication Protocol: 
Merchant’s Authentication with Single MNO 
 
 
5. Overview  
This chapter provides an alternative approach based on the NFC Cloud Wallet model which 
was introduced earlier in chapter 4.  Additionally, a novel secure NFC transaction protocol is 
designed and its execution process is described in detail. Our first protocol was designed 
based on the direct communication channel that was established between the MNO and 
merchant through a shared secret; however the protocol which is proposed in this chapter 
does not support this scenario since it is based on an alternative approach in which the MNO 
and merchant have no direct communication channel and therefore all communications goes 
through the NFC phone. Furthermore, a security analysis of the proposed protocol is carried 
out in order to justify the reliability and validity of our protocol in the security domain.   
 
5.1 Unlinked POS and MNO (Vendor trusts MNO) 
In this scenario, we designed our ecosystem model based on the following assumptions:  
 
 The main SE (virtual SE) is part of cloud that is being managed by the MNO; 
 Another SE or any other form of a secure and tamper resistant component is in the 
mobile device used for authentication to merchant’s POS. As described in section 
2.5.4, SIM as SE is the best approach in this scenario. 
 The MNO manages the SE/SIM; 
 Banks, etc. have secure connections with the MNO;  
 Vendor trusts the MNO;  
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Figure 18 demonstrates the ecosystem scenario in which the POS and MNO communicate 
through an NFC phone.  
 
 
Figure 18: POS and MNO Communicating through NFC Phone 
 
The virtual SE can securely store personal data such as debit and credit card information, user 
identification number, loyalty program data, payment applications, PINs and networking 
contacts, among other information. However, the SE which is stored in the NFC phone 
consists of authentication data such as keys, certificates, protocols and cryptographic 
mechanisms. The SE is in the form of UICC (the SE part of the SIM), therefore the SIM only 
deals with the authentication of the handset to the MNO and the handset to vendor terminal; 
moreover, the main transaction data are stored in the virtual SE. During the whole process, 
the MNO manages the cloud environment and is the only party that has full access and 
permission to manage confidential data which is stored in the cloud. Since the MNO is the 
owner of the cloud, it fully manages the SIM in terms of monitoring the GSM network and 
controlling the cloud's data. The key assumption of this scenario which makes it different 
from the first scenario discussed in chapter 4 is the trusted relationship between the merchant 
and the MNO. This improves the complexity of the payment ecosystem since it reduces the 
interactions between involved parties.  
 
5.2 Proposed Model  
We proposed an extension to the previously proposed NFC Cloud Wallet model. Since there 
are multiple options applicable to this model, we designed our model based on the same 
assumptions described in section 5.1. The detailed analysis of this assumption is described in 
section 5.5. Below is the step by step description of the process as illustrated in Figure 19.    
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Figure 19: The MNO Communicates with the Vendor through the NFC Phone 
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Step 1) The customer selects a product - purchase request sent to the merchant’s terminal 
Step 2) The merchant’s POS terminal displays the price. 
Step 3) If the customer agrees with the price, s/he places his/her NFC phone on the vending 
machine. 
Step 4) The NFC link is established between the merchant POS terminal and the NFC-
enabled phone. 
Step 5) The customer requests a message from the MNO to use it in order to prove its 
legitimacy to the merchant. The customer also informs the MNO about the total price.  
Step 6) The MNO first authenticates the customer. After a successful authentication, if the 
MNO agrees with the price, it sends a digitally signed confirmation message to the NFC-
enabled phone (the customer).  
Step 7) The mobile device then relays the same message to the merchant’s POS terminal. 
Since vendor terminal trusts MNO, it trusts the digitally signed message.  
Step 8) The NFC enabled phone displays enter PIN to verify its legitimacy and its ownership 
of the cell-phone (additional security mechanism).  
Step 9) The merchant’s terminal sends its banking details in an encrypted form to the NFC 
enabled phone. This message can only be decrypted by the MNO.  
Step 10) The NFC enabled phone transfers the same banking details to the MNO.  
Step 11) The MNO performs the transaction.  
Step 12) The MNO sends a signed receipt to the merchant’s terminal through the NFC 
enabled phone.  
Step 13) The merchant’s terminal verifies the receipt.  
Step 14) If the verification is successful, the product is delivered and a success message 
displays on the NFC-enabled phone.  
 
The trusted relationship between the vendor and the MNO comes into play when the MNO 
sends a confirmation message to the vendor through the NFC enabled phone (steps 6 and 7). 
This digitally signed message confirms that the customer has enough credit for the 
transaction. 
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5.2.1 Scenario Analysis  
In this section, we carry out an analysis from a security point of view. Since this protocol is 
used for monetary transactions, it must be as secure as much as possible. We sketch multiple 
scenarios where a buyer or a seller is dishonest and then analyse their success probability. 
 
In the first scenario, we assume that a customer is dishonest and wants to purchase a product 
without payment. The dishonest customer can only be successful if he can successfully 
generate a signed receipt in step 12 of the protocol. Since this receipt is signed by the MNO, 
an illegitimate customer cannot generate a valid receipt. Moreover, the dishonest customer 
cannot replay the old receipt as the receipt contains time information. Therefore, this scenario 
is not successful. 
 
In another scenario, we assume that the customer is dishonest and just wants to extract the 
banking details of a vendor. The vendor provides his banking details after it receives a signed 
confirmation from the MNO. The banking details are encrypted so the customer cannot 
decrypt and understand this message. This message can only be decrypted by the MNO who 
needs the banking details for the transaction. So a dishonest customer is again unsuccessful. 
 
In the third scenario, the seller is dishonest and plans to extract more than the required 
amount from a customer. To perform this action, the seller alters the price information at 
transaction stage. However, the alteration is deducted in the signed receipt provided by the 
MNO after transaction. This receipt is provided to both, the customer and the seller. The 
customer detects any alteration in the price by the seller. So this scenario is also not 
successful. 
 
In the fourth scenario, the seller is dishonest and records all the legitimate messages of a 
customer. He plans to replay the recorded messages to the MNO in order to extract money 
from a customer in his absence. To do this, the dishonest seller intends to pose as a customer 
to the MNO. This impersonation is detected by the MNO in the initial steps of the model 
where the MNO authenticates a customer before proceeding to transaction. This scenario is, 
again, not successful. 
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5.3 Our Approach 
The general overview of the cloud-based NFC payments was described in chapter 4 where 
the NFC Cloud Wallet model was also proposed. We then proposed an extension to 
previously proposed NFC Cloud Wallet model and designed an NFC payment protocol which 
was based on a GSM network.  
 
This protocol was the improved version of Chen’s protocol (Chen et al., 2010) in which user 
interaction with the system was improved making it more user friendly. An additional layer 
of security was added by introducing PIN authentication by the user. Mutual authentication 
was improved by adding freshness by the mobile device in order to resist replay attack. We 
also added digital signatures with the transaction messages for data integrity and non-
repudiation. Since there were multiple options applicable to this model, we designed our 
protocol based on the following assumptions: 
 
 The SE is part of the SIM; 
 The cloud is part of the MNO; 
 The MNO manages the SE/SIM 
 Banks, etc. are linked to the MNO; 
 
The key aspect in this payment model was the connection between the merchant and the 
MNO, which makes it different from the protocol that we designed in chapter 4. The 
proposed protocol is designed based on the following assumptions: 
 
 The SE is part of SIM; 
 Cloud is part of the MNO; 
 The MNO manages the SE/SIM; 
 The financial institution(s) are linked with the MNO; 
 The merchant has no connection with the MNO; 
 The communication is carried over a single channel: MNO, mobile device and 
merchant;  
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5.4 The Proposed Protocol  
This section describes our proposed protocol for micropayments based on NFC and cloud 
architecture. The proposed protocol is based on a cloud architecture where the cloud is being 
managed by the MNO. The SE used in this protocol is divided into two sections: One, being a 
part of SIM, is used for authentication of a customer, whereas the other section, being a part 
of cloud, is used to store sensitive banking information of the customer. The customer has 
registered his credit/debit card details with the respective MNO. Since our protocol supports 
multiple accounts against a single customer, a customer can register more than one 
credit/debit card with the MNO. Each customer account is identified by a unique account ID, 
AccID. The AccID is intimated to a customer when he registers his debit/credit card with the 
MNO. The MNO stores these details in a cloud. The mobile device has a valid SIM and is 
connected to the respective MNO through the GSM network. The communication over the 
GSM network is encrypted as specified in the GSM standard. The mobile device is connected 
to the merchant’s terminal over an NFC link. The NFC link is not secure and can be 
eavesdropped. 
 
The shop has no link with the MNO however the shop trusts the MNO. A message digitally 
signed by the MNO is considered authentic and its contents are trusted by the shop. When 
dealing with the signed data, one has to distinguish between data authenticity and trust in the 
message contents. An authentic data may not be true. For example, a valid signature with the 
message ‘Sun revolves around the earth’ will prove the message as authentic but its contents 
are not true. We assume that the messages signed by the MNO are not only authentic but the 
contents are also considered trustworthy by the shop. For simplicity, we refer to a mobile 
device and SIM as a single unit ‘mobile device’. Ksign and Kver are the signing and verification 
keys respectively of MNO. Kpr and Kpub are the private and public keys respectively of the 
MNO. The protocol executes in three different phases, which shall now be described.   
 
5.4.1 Phase 1: Authentication 
This phase initiates once the customer agrees with the total price displayed on the shop 
terminal and places his cell phone on the shop NFC enabled point. An NFC link is 
established between the mobile device and the shop terminal.  
 
Chapter 5: Merchant’s Authentication with Single MNO 
Pardis Pourghomi   111 
 
 
 
Figure 20: The Proposed Payment Protocol 
 
 
Step 1: The mobile device sends TMSI, LAI as its ID to the shop terminal. The shop terminal 
determines the user’s mobile network from this information. The network code is available in 
LAI in the form of the Mobile Country Code (MCC) and the Mobile Network Code (MNC). 
An MNC is used in combination with the MCC (also known as a ‘MCC/MNC tuple’) to 
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uniquely identify a mobile phone operator/carrier (Technical Specification Group Core 
Network, 1999).  
 
Step 2: The shop terminal sends a message to the mobile device containing the Total Price 
(TP), a temporary shop ID (TSID), and Time Stamp (TSs) of current time. The TSID acts as one 
time ID of the shop and gets updated after each transaction. 
 
Step 3: The mobile device initiates a mutual authentication protocol with the MNO. It sends 
TMSI, LAI as its identifier. The MNO identifies its customer and generates an authentication 
triplet (R, S, Kc). 
 
Steps 4-5: The MNO sends R, a part of the authentication triplet, to the mobile device. The 
mobile device computes Kc from R as explained in section 4.4. The mobile device generates a 
random number Rs and concatenates with R, encrypts with key Kc and sends it to the MNO. 
The MNO decrypts the message using Kc, the key it already has in the authentication triplet. 
The MNO compares R in the authentication triplet with the R in the response. If both Rs are 
same, then the mobile is authenticated for a valid SIM. 
 
Step 6: After successful SIM (or mobile device) authentication, the MNO swaps R and Rs, 
encrypts with Kc and sends it to the mobile device. This step authenticates the MNO to the 
mobile device. The mobile device receives the response EKc (Rs||R) and decrypts it with the 
key Kc already computed in Step 4. The mobile device compares both R and Rs. If both are 
same, then the MNO is authenticated. After successful authentication, the user is asked by the 
mobile device to enter the PIN. The PIN is stored in the SIM at a secure location. The SIM 
compares both PINs and if both are same, the user is authenticated as the legitimate user of 
the mobile device. 
 
5.4.2 Phase 2: Financial Approval  
Step 7: After successful authentication, the customer selects the account AccID for payment. 
The mobile device forms a credit request message Cr-req for credit approval from the MNO as: 
 
Cr-req = TP||TSID||TSs||TMSI||AccID 
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The mobile device encrypts Cr-req with the key Kc (the encryption key used in GSM 
communication) and sends it to the MNO. The MNO receives the message, decrypts and 
communicates with the cloud for a credit check against the account ID AccID of the customer. 
 
Step 8: Once the credit is approved from the financial entities through cloud, an approval ID 
(AppID) is generated by the approving authority. AppID acts as in index to a table storing 
information about the amount to be credited, destination Shop ID, the time stamp and the 
customer ID (TMSI). This helps in resolving any disputes in future. The MNO forms a new 
string Cr-app indicating credit approval as: 
 
Cr-app = TP||TSID||TSs||TMSI||AppID 
 
The MNO encrypts the string Cr-app with the key Kc and computes the signature with the 
signing key Ksign over the plaintext. The encrypted Cr-app along with its signature is 
transmitted to the mobile device.  
 
The mobile device decrypts the message to get Cr-app. It compares the contents of Cr-app with 
the contents of Cr-req, as the only difference between both messages is that the AccID in the 
former is replaced by the AppID in the latter. It provides an assurance the Cr-app is generated 
by a legitimate authority. The mobile device, then, verifies the signature as the signature was 
computed over the plaintext. The signature provides data integrity, data origin authentication 
and non-repudiation of the Cr-app message. After successful verification, the mobile device 
forwards Cr-app to the shop along with the corresponding signature. 
 
Step 9: The shop terminal verifies the signature by the verification key Kver to detect any 
alteration. In case of an invalid signature, the shop discards the message. A valid signature 
provides data integrity and data origin authentication. In this case, the shop believes that the 
message is authentic and that the MNO has agreed to pay for the customer. This is like a 
three party contract where a middle party, trusted by both other parties, provides an assurance 
that the other party is willing to pay the price. 
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5.4.3 Phase 3: Transaction Execution 
Step 10: After successful authentication and message contents verification, the shop 
generates two keys K1 and K2 for data encryption and MAC calculation respectively. It forms 
a string (K1||K2) ⊕ AppID and encrypts it with the public key, Kpub, of the MNO. The shop 
encrypts its banking details with the key K1 and computes its MAC with the key K2. The 
banking details may include bank account title, account number, bank code, branch code etc. 
The MNO needs banking details in order to transfer the necessary amount from the customer 
account to the shop account. This detail is transmitted to the MNO through the mobile device 
but the latter cannot decrypt this information. This forms a virtual tunnel between the shop 
and the MNO through the mobile device.  
 
Once the MNO receives this message, it decrypts the first part to extract the K1 and K2. The 
role of AppID in this step is to bridge the authentication phase to the transaction execution 
phase. The MNO checks the validity of the MAC and, if successful, it decrypts the banking 
details. It forwards the banking details to the cloud for the monetary transaction. 
 
Steps 11-12: After a successful transaction, the MNO generates a transaction number TSN 
and corresponding time stamp TSt and forms a Transaction Message for mobile device TMm 
and Transaction Message for shop TMs as: 
 
TMm = TSN||TP||TSID||TMSI||TSt 
TMs = TMm || [Banking Details] 
 
The MNO encrypts TMm with the key Kc and computes the signature over the ciphertext. It 
sends an encrypted TMm and the corresponding signature to the mobile device. The mobile 
device first verifies the signature. In case of an invalid signature, the mobile device discards 
the message without decrypting it. Otherwise, it decrypts the message and verifies the 
contents. 
 
The MNO forms the Transaction Message for the shop TMs by appending shop Banking 
Details to the earlier formed TMm. It encrypts TMs with the key K1 and computes the 
signature over the ciphertext. The MNO sends the encrypted message along with its signature 
to the mobile device to further relay it to the shop. The mobile device can neither decrypt this 
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message as it does not possess K1, nor alter any contents as they are protected by the 
signature. The shop verifies the signature and if invalid, discards the message without 
decrypting the message. Otherwise, the shop decrypts the message and verifies its contents. 
The contents consist of important transaction information exchanged during the transaction. 
If the shop wants any clarification, it can approach the MNO quoting the Transaction Number 
TSN and Approval ID AppID received in step 9. 
 
5.5 Protocol Analysis  
In this section, we analyse this protocol from multiple perspectives. This analysis 
encompasses the authentication and security of the messages. We assume that the MNO is 
trustworthy, whereas the customer or the shop can be dishonest. We analyse multiple attack 
scenarios to ascertain the strength of our protocol.  
 
5.5.1 Dishonest Customer 
Scenario 1: A dishonest customer plans to buy some products with payment from someone 
else’s account. So, s/he sends a fake but valid ID (for example TMSI, LAI of a mobile of a 
target customer) in step 1 to the shop. The shop replies with step 2 providing information 
about the total price, its temporary ID and the time stamp. In step 3, the dishonest customer 
has two options in the authentication phase. Either he communicates with his legitimate 
MNO for authentication or with the target customer’s MNO. In the former case, the amount 
will be deducted from his account (which is what he is not willing to do) whereas, the amount 
will be deducted from the target customer’s account in the latter case. If he goes for the latter 
option, however, he fails the authentication process in step 5 as he lacks the legitimate Kc. 
Thus, someone else’s ID cannot be successfully used in this protocol. 
 
Scenario 2: A dishonest customer plans to buy goods without any payment. So, s/he provides 
his/her own banking details, rather than the shop banking details, to the MNO in step 10. In 
case of a successful transaction, the MNO deducts the amount from the customer account and 
pays back the amount to the customer (both accounts may be different to avoid detection). 
The transaction receipt is then transmitted to the shop as a proof of payment. To accomplish 
this attack, the dishonest customer blocks step 10, in which the shop banking details are 
transmitted to the MNO through the mobile device. The customer cannot alter this message 
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as it is encrypted with keys K1 and K2. Both these keys are encrypted with the public key Kpub 
of the MNO, so no other entity other than the MNO can get these keys. Therefore, rather than 
altering this information, the dishonest customer discards this message and designs his own 
message as: 
 
Ekpub [(K´1 || K´2) ⊕ AppID], E K´1 [Banking Details], 
MAC K´2 [Banking Details] 
 
Where the banking details are the customer’s banking details rather than the shop’s, the MNO 
has to rely on the information provided by the mobile device as the former does not share any 
secret with the shop prior to the execution of the protocol.  
 
The MNO performs transaction against the information provided by the mobile device. After 
the transaction execution, the MNO sends ‘receipts’ in messages 11 and 12. The mobile 
device blocks message 12 as this message contains the information of the bank that was used 
during the transaction. 
 
Since the customer’s banking details were used during transaction, the dishonest customer 
needs to replace the banking details in this massage with the shop’s banking details. The 
customer can decrypt the message in step 12 as it is now encrypted with the customer’s 
malicious key K´1.  S/he needs to change the banking details and encrypt with the shop 
generated key K1 in step 10. Since the customer lacks this key, he cannot generate a valid 
ciphertext. Moreover, the original message is protected by the digital signature. If the 
customer makes any alteration to change the banking details, it will void the signature. If the 
customer does not alter the message to maintain the validity of the signature, the shop can 
verify the signature but cannot decrypt the message (as it is encrypted with the customer’s 
malicious key K´1). In both cases, the shop cannot verify the transaction and a failure 
message is sent at the end. Hence, a dishonest customer is again unsuccessful. 
 
There may be another approach to accomplish the above attack where the dishonest customer 
plans to buy some goods without payment. The dishonest customer does not communicate 
with the MNO since it is not successful as described above; rather the customer impersonates 
the MNO to the shop in this scenario. The target of the customer is to send fake but 
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acceptable receipts to the shop at the end of the protocol by replaying old legitimate messages 
or fabricating new messages. Since the customer is not communicating with the MNO, his 
account cannot be debited. In the original protocol, the shop receives three messages from the 
mobile device, namely messages 1, 9 and 12. Message 1 originates from the mobile device, 
whereas message 9 and 12 are actually originated by the MNO but are relayed by the mobile 
device to the shop. A dishonest customer needs to design or replay the latter two messages in 
such a way that they are acceptable to the shop. Both messages are digitally signed by the 
MNO. These messages contain a Temporary Shop ID (TSID) and a Time Stamp (TSs). TSID is a 
random value generated by the shop every time at the start of the protocol. This value does 
not only serve as a shop ID during protocol, but also it adds freshness to the protocol 
messages. TSs is updated too in every protocol round, but it may be predictable to some 
extent. A combination of these two values, along with the digital signatures of the MNO, 
does not allow either replay or alteration of the messages. Hence the dishonest customer is 
again unsuccessful. 
 
Scenario 3: A dishonest customer plans to pay less than the required amount but intimates to 
the shop of full payment. To accomplish this attack, the mobile device sends TP´ in Credit 
Request message, Cr-req, in step 7 to MNO, where TP´ < TP. The mobile device receives 
Credit Approve message, Cr-app, in step 8 from the MNO confirming that the initially 
requested amount TP´ has been approved for transaction. However, the mobile device needs 
to intimate the shop in step 9 that the original amount, TP, is approved for transaction. Since 
the approved price is digitally signed, it cannot be amended by the mobile device. So, the 
actual price that is approved by the MNO is transmitted to the shop. Hence, this attack fails 
on the proposed protocol. 
 
5.5.2 Dishonest Shop 
Scenario 4: The shop is dishonest and plans to draw more than the required amount without 
intimation to the customer. The information about the amount to be transferred is intimated to 
the MNO by the mobile device in Credit Request message, Cr-req, in step 8. A mobile device 
cannot send more than the required price unless the device itself is compromised. Therefore, 
a shop cannot get more than the required amount in this protocol. 
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Scenario 5: The shop is dishonest and repudiates the receipt of transaction execution 
message in step 12. In this way, the shop does not deliver goods despite receiving the 
required amount. In such a scenario, the mobile device has the signed receipt from the MNO 
indicating a Transaction Serial Number TSN in step 11. The TSN is linked to the Approval ID 
AppID generated in step 8. Since both values are digitally signed by the MNO, the mobile 
device can approach the MNO regarding any dispute. 
 
5.5.3 Messages Security 
Apart from the above-mentioned scenarios, we also analyse our protocols from various other 
angles. The data over the GSM network is encrypted according to the GSM specification. The 
key Kc used for the data encryption is fresh in each round of transaction. The data over the 
NFC link in the Authentication and Approval phase (Step 1, 2 and 9) is sent unencrypted. 
This data, however does not contain any sensitive information. The Total Price may be 
considered sensitive information but it is also displayed on the shop terminal for visual 
information of the customer. The read range of the displayed price is much more than the 
range of the NFC link. Therefore, we graded the TP as not so sensitive information to be 
protected over NFC link. However, once the TP is transmitted over GSM network, it is 
encrypted with the key Kc. 
 
Information that is sent in unencrypted over the NFC link is the Credit Approval ID (AppID) 
in the (Cr-app) message (step 9). The AppID is a random string generated by the credit approval 
authority. From an attacker’s perspective, its only significance is its assurance that the 
customer has, at least, TP amount in his account. This assurance can also be achieved if a 
customer successfully pays for some goods. Therefore, AppID is also not sensitive information 
in this scenario. 
 
Role of Approval ID in Message 10: AppID acts as a bridge between the Financial Approval 
phase and the Transaction phase. It adds freshness to message 10, so it cannot be replayed in 
the future. AppID is XORed to avoid an increase in the message length. Any alternation in the 
first part of the message 10 (Ekpub [(K1||K2) ⊕ AppID]), results in invalid keys K´1 and K´2. 
This invalidates the MAC and hence detection. 
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Non-repudiation of Transaction Messages: Transaction Execution messages (Step 11, 12) 
are digitally signed by the MNO. In case of any dispute about payment, the MNO has to 
honour both messages. So both the customer and the shop are completely secured about the 
transaction. 
 
Disclosure of Relevant Information: Shop banking details represent sensitive information 
as they contains the bank account number etc. It is encrypted not only on the GSM link but 
also on the NFC link. This information is transmitted after the credit approval information is 
received by the shop. The banking detail is transmitted through the mobile device to the 
MNO, yet the former cannot decrypt this information. Since the mobile device does not need 
this information, it is not disclosed to the mobile device. Similarly, the account information 
of the customer is not communicated to the shop in the Cr-app message. 
 
New set of Keys for every transaction: The encryption key over GSM network, Kc, is 
generated from R. Since R is changed in each round of the transaction protocol, the Kc is also 
fresh. The encryption keys K1 and K2 are generated by the shop in each round. So both these 
keys are also fresh. 
 
Encryption and MAC Keys: Separate keys are used for encryption and MAC calculation 
making the protocol more secure. Encrypt-then-MAC is an approach where the ciphertext is 
generated by encrypting the plaintext and then appending a MAC of the encrypted plaintext. 
This approach is cryptographically more secure than other approaches (Bellare & 
Namprempre, 2000). Apart from cryptographic advantage, the MAC can be verified without 
performing decryption. So, if the MAC is invalid for a message, the message is discarded 
without decryption. This results in computational efficiency. 
 
5.6 Expert Review Evaluation  
This section describes the results of an interview conducted by secure protocol experts 
according to the proposed protocol.  
 
 
 
Chapter 5: Merchant’s Authentication with Single MNO 
Pardis Pourghomi   120 
 
5.6.1 Scenario Evaluation  
The scenario is designed based on the following six assumptions:  
 
1) The SE is part of SIM; 
2) Cloud is part of the MNO; 
3) The MNO manages the SE/SIM; 
4) The financial institution(s) are linked with the MNO; 
5) The merchant has no connection with the MNO; 
6) The communication is carried over a single channel: MNO, mobile device and 
merchant;  
The first four assumptions are similar to the first proposed scenario in chapter 4. 
However, unlike the first scenario, the merchant and MNO have no means of 
communication as all messages are exchanged over a single channel: MNO, SIM (mobile 
device) and merchant. In order to develop the most effective cloud-based NFC payment 
ecosystem it is important to design and develop alternative payment scenarios. 
Furthermore, the method of communication is entirely employable by the involved 
entities as they should agree on the overall payment architecture (lack of standardisation). 
Despite the positive aspects of designing alternative scenarios, the security of such 
scenarios is yet to be considered as the first priority; especially when there is no direct 
communication between the merchant and MNO so that in principle they are 
communicating through the SIM. This way, the SIM should not be aware of some of the 
message contents that are exchanging between the merchant and the MNO; therefore, 
particular cryptographic properties must be in use to ensure the security of the transaction 
data is met.  
5.6.2 Protocol Evaluation  
In order to evaluate the proposed protocol, the security of the cryptographic primitives must 
be reviewed according to their cryptographic definitions.  
 
A) Strength and Weaknesses  
 
Since the merchant and the MNO do not have a direct communication, the MNO digitally 
signs the messages that it sends to the merchant. The use of digital signature demonstrates the 
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authenticity of the messages while it gives the merchant the reason to believe that the 
message was created by the MNO. Accordingly, the above satisfies the assumption used for 
designing the protocol.  
 
Alike the first protocol, this protocol uses two-factor authentication (mutual authentication) 
for improved security between the SIM (client) and the MNO. In step 8, the protocol executes 
in way that once the client has decided to pay with one of his/her accounts, the MNO must 
either approve or reject the customer request. In case of an approval, the financial department 
of MNO (bank, etc.) should generate an approval ID (APPID) which is not essential. Instead, 
the, MNO can just use the previously client assigned ID in this step rather than executing a 
new line of code that also have drawbacks in the performance of the protocol execution. 
However, from the security viewpoint, the approval ID along with freshness adds an extra 
layer of security which prevents replay attacks.  
 
In the transaction execution phase (step 10), the merchant uses encrypt-then-MAC technique; 
the encryption key is K1 and the MAC key is K2. This is particularly secure since the attacker 
must retrieve both keys to access the message content. This is reasonably accepted since 
confidential information such as clients credentials are exchanged in this phase so that the 
performance aspects of this line of the protocol are not as critical as its security 
characteristics.   
 
In steps 11-12, since the SIM (mobile device) lacks the K1 while the MNO sends the 
transaction authorisation message to the shop, the SIM cannot decrypt the message to access 
the encrypted data. This is the way that the MNO ensures the message is only decrypted by 
the genuine recipient which in this case is the merchant - the same procedure applies to the 
merchant in general. When the MNO aims to communicate with the SIM, it encrypts the 
message with Kc (shared key between the MNO and SIM) so that the merchant or a potential 
malicious third party has no chance of decrypting the message.    
 
B) Implementation 
 
The proposed protocol is designed to support only a single MNO that may introduce some 
limitations. This potential approach would be beneficial for the stakeholders i.e. banks who 
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aim to cooperate with one MNO of their own choice since the proposed model does not 
develop a scenario in a global scale. For example, the MNO would only be able to offer its 
services in countries in which it operates. It would not be possible to use the mobile payment 
services offered by a particular MNO in a country that they do not operate. This is because 
the architecture does not allow the MNO to use the base station of another network carrier. 
Despite the limitations of this approach, most NFC payment architectures are still based on 
the operation of a single MNO as there has not been a standardised architecture for all the 
MNOs and banks to follow. Moreover, the performance measures of such protocol remain as 
the main concern when it comes to implementing such architecture.  
 
5.7 Summary  
In this chapter, we proposed a transaction protocol which provides a secure and trusted 
communication channel to the communication parties. The proposed protocol was based on 
the NFC Cloud Wallet model, the first proposed protocol described in chapter 4 and Chen et 
al.’s (2010) protocol for secure cloud-based NFC transactions. We considered a cloud-based 
approach for managing sensitive data to ensure the security of NFC transactions over the use 
of an SE within the cloud environment.  In addition, we described the detailed execution of 
the protocol and determined that our protocol performs reliably from the security point of 
view in the cloud-based NFC transaction architecture. The main advantage of this protocol is 
the elimination of a shared secret between the MNO and merchant, which reduces the number 
of exchanging messages among entities which therefore improves the security of the process. 
However, in this protocol, the merchant can only authenticate a single MNO. This might be 
the case for companies who are not looking to expand their collaboration on a larger scale. In 
the next chapter, we propose an alternative protocol based on the similar scenario used in this 
chapter, but we aim to improve the limitation that our second protocol provides by designing 
a transaction authentication protocol which enables the merchant to authenticate multiple 
MNOs.    
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Chapter 6 - Third NFC Transaction Authentication Protocol: 
Merchant’s Authentication with Multiple MNOs 
 
 
6. Overview  
Here we extend the proposed mobile transaction mechanisms described earlier in chapters 4 
and 5. Accordingly, in this chapter, we propose an extended version of the second proposed 
protocol that enables the merchant to authenticate multiple MNOs. The major contributions 
of our work in this chapter are:  
 
 The elimination of the requirement for a shared secret key between the merchant’s 
POS and the MNO, a prerequisite in the first proposed protocol.  
 
 The banking details or the shopping details are not disclosed to the BS. This is 
because the Base Station (BS) may belong to another MNO and therefore an un-
trusted party.  
This makes our work more practicable as a shop does not need to have itself registered with 
the MNO to perform mobile transaction. We partition the SE into two sections: one stored in 
the SIM for authentication of a customer and the other stored in the cloud to hold credit/debit 
card details of the customer. This helps in managing multiple cards for a single customer. The 
authentication of the customer by the MNO is based on a GSM authenticating mechanism 
with improved security features. Our protocol works on a similar pattern to that of ’PayPal’: 
the MNO, acting in the same way as PayPal, registers multiple banking cards against a user 
for monetary transactions. The user, then, selects a single card at the time of the payment.  
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6.1 The Proposed Protocol 
This section describes our proposed protocol for micropayments based on NFC and cloud 
architecture. The proposed protocol is based on a cloud architecture where the cloud elements 
are managed by the MTD (the MNO Transaction Department). The MTD, under control of 
the respective MNO, is a dedicated financial department that deals with NFC transactions of 
the customers. The SE used in this protocol is divided into two sections: one part, residing in 
the SIM, is used for authentication of a customer, whereas the other part, residing in the 
cloud, is used to store sensitive banking information of the customer. The customer registers 
his credit/debit card details with the MTD through respective MNO. Since our protocol 
supports multiple accounts for a single customer, a customer can register more than one 
credit/debit card with the MTD. Each account of a customer is identified by a unique account 
ID, AccID. The AccID is intimated to a customer when he registers his debit/credit card with 
the MTD, and this is stored in the SE of his SIM. The MTD stores these details in the cloud. 
The mobile device has a valid SIM and is connected to the respective MNO through the GSM 
network. Communication over the GSM network is encrypted as specified in GSM standard. 
The communication between different entities of the GSM network is considered to be 
secure. The MNO may be linked to the customer through its own Base Station or through a 
Base Station of some other network. In the latter case, the proposed protocol should not 
disclose any sensitive information to the Base Station. The mobile device is connected to the 
shop terminal over an NFC link; however the NFC link is not secure and can be 
eavesdropped. The shop does not use any link with the MNO for transactions. Nonetheless, 
the shop needs to trust the MNO so that a message digitally signed by the MNO is considered 
authentic and its contents are trusted by the shop. For simplicity, we refer to the mobile 
device and SIM as a single unit called the ‘Mobile Device (MD)’. Ksign; Kver are the signing 
and verification keys respectively of the MTD, whereas Kpr; Kpub are the private decryption 
and public encryption keys respectively of the MTD.  
 
The protocol executes in three different phases: customer identification and credit check, 
customer authentication, and transaction execution (Figure 21). 
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A. Customer Identification and Credit Check 
 
This phase is initiated once the customer agrees to pay the total price displayed on the shop 
terminal and places his/her cell phone on the shop NFC enabled point. An NFC link is 
established between the mobile device and the shop terminal. 
 
 
 
Figure 21: The Proposed Customer Authentication Protocol 
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Step 1: The mobile device sends payment Information PI request message to the shop 
terminal.  
 
Step 2: The shop terminal forms PI message containing Total Price (TP), a temporary shop 
ID (TSID), and a Time Stamp (TSs) and sends it to the mobile device. 
 
PI = TP||TSID||TSs 
 
The TSID acts as one time ID of the shop and gets updated after each transaction. 
 
Steps 3-4: Once the payment information is received from the shop, the application installed 
on the mobile device asks for PIN authentication from the user. This is for assurance that the 
customer is the legal owner of the mobile device. After a successful PIN verification, the 
mobile device needs credit approval from the respective MTD indicating that the customer 
has sufficient funds in his account to pay the required amount. This information does not 
need to be disclosed to BS or any other entity of GSM network other than the MTD. As 
assumed earlier, the communication over the GSM link in encrypted according to GSM 
standard, but BS decrypts all information. To avoid decryption at BS level, the mobile device 
generates two keys K1; K2 for encryption and MAC respectively. The mobile device forms a 
credit request message Crreq for credit approval from the MTD, namely, 
 
Crreq = PI||IMSI||AccID 
 
The Crreq message is encrypted with the key K1 and MAC is computed with the key K2 to 
provide data integrity. Both the keys, K1 and K2, are digitally signed with the public key of 
the MTD and the entire message is sent to the MTD. 
 
Step 5: On receipt of this message, the MTD first decrypts it with its private key Kpr to 
extract the encryption and MAC keys, K1 and K2. It verifies the MAC and if successful, 
decrypts the Crreq message. The MTD identifies the customer from IMSI in the Crreq and 
communicates it to the cloud for a credit check against the account ID of the customer. If the 
customer has sufficient funds in his mentioned account, the MTD requests a fresh 
authentication of the customer prior to proceed to any transaction process. 
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B. Customer Authentication  
 
Steps 6-11: The MTD sends an authentication request message to MSC/AuC. The MSC 
follows standard procedure to authenticate a customer as described in the GSM standard. In 
case of successful authentication, an authentication success message is sent to the MTD. 
 
Step 12: Once the customer is authenticated, an approval ID (AppID) is generated by the 
MTD. AppID acts as in index to a table storing information about the amount to be credited, 
the destination Shop ID, the time stamp and the customer ID (IMSI). This helps in resolving 
any disputes in future. The MTD forms a new string Crapp indicating credit approval, namely, 
 
Crapp = PI||TSa||AppID 
 
The MTD computes a signature with the signing key Ksign over the plaintext and encrypts the 
string Crapp with the key K1. The encrypted Crapp along with its signature is transmitted to the 
mobile device. Crapp cannot be decrypted by the BS as the BS lacks the encryption key K1. 
 
Steps 13-16: The mobile device decrypts the message with the encryption key K1 to obtain 
Crapp. It compares the PI contents in both Crreq and Crapp messages. Moreover, the approval 
time stamp, TSa, must be in a defined time window. 
 
The mobile device also verifies the signature which was computed over the plaintext. This 
provides data integrity, data origin authentication and non-repudiation of the Crapp message. 
After successful verification, the mobile device forwards Crapp to the shop along with the 
corresponding signature. 
 
The shop verifies the signature sing Kver to detect any alteration and compares the PI contents 
in the Crapp message to the one it initially sent in message 2. In the case of an invalid 
signature, the shop discards the message and rejects the payment. A successful verification 
indicates that the customer is legitimate and that the MTD has obtained agreement from the 
customer to pay. This is like a three party contract where a middle party, trusted by both other 
parties, provides an assurance that the other party is willing to pay the price. The shop now 
needs to send its banking details to the MTD for transaction. 
Chapter 6:  Merchant’s Authentication with Multiple MNOs 
Pardis Pourghomi   128 
 
 
The banking details may include bank account title, account number, bank code, branch code 
etc. The banking details are sensitive information and should not be disclosed to any entity 
other than the MTD, even the mobile device. The shop generates encryption and MAC keys, 
K3 and K4 to secure banking details. It encrypts the banking details with the key K3, and 
computes MAC over the ciphertext with the key K4. It also forms a string, Kinfo, containing 
the information about the keys as follows: 
 
Kinfo = (K3||K4) ⊕ AppID 
 
The role of AppID in this step is to bridge the authentication phase to the transaction execution 
phase. The shop encrypts the string Kinfo with the public key of the MTD Kpub and sends it to 
the MTD. This detail is transmitted to the MTD through the mobile device but the latter 
cannot decrypt this information. This forms a virtual tunnel between the shop and the MTD 
through the mobile device. 
 
C. Transaction Execution  
 
Step 17: Since the MTD knows the AppID, it can get K3 and K4 to decrypt the banking details 
of the shop. The MTD transfers the requested amount from the customer account to the shop 
account.  
 
Steps 18-21: After a successful transaction, the MTD generates a Transaction Serial Number 
TSN and corresponding time stamp TSt and forms a Transaction Message for the mobile 
device TMm and a Transaction Message for shop TMs as follows: 
 
TMm = PI||TSN||TSt 
TMs = TMm||[Banking Details] 
 
The MTD encrypts TMm with the key K1 and computes a signature over the ciphertext. It 
sends the encrypted TMm and corresponding signature to the mobile device. The mobile 
device first verifies the signature. In case of an invalid signature, the mobile device discards 
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the message without decrypting it and exits the transaction. Otherwise, it decrypts the 
message and verifies the contents. 
 
The MTD forms the Transaction Message TMs for the shop by appending the Shop Banking 
Details to the previously formed TMm. It encrypts TMs with the key K3 and computes a 
signature over the ciphertext. The MTD sends the encrypted message along with its signature 
to the mobile device which relays it to the shop. The mobile device can neither decrypt this 
message as it does not possess K3, nor alter any contents as they are protected by the 
signature. The shop verifies the signature and if invalid, discards the message without 
decrypting the message. Otherwise, the shop decrypts the message and verifies its contents. 
The contents consist of important transaction information exchanged during the transaction. 
If the shop wants any subsequent clarification, it can approach the MNO quoting the 
Transaction Number TSN and Approval ID AppID received in step 14. 
 
6.2 Protocol Analysis  
In this section, we analyse this protocol from multiple perspectives. This analysis 
encompasses the authentication and security of the messages. We assume that the MNO is 
trust worthy, whereas the customer or the shop can be dishonest. We analyze multiple attack 
scenarios to ascertain the strength of our protocol. 
 
6.2.1 Dishonest Customer 
Scenario 1: A dishonest customer plans to buy some products with payment from someone 
else account. Let’s assume that the dishonest customer knows the IMSI and AccID (IMSI´, 
Acc´ID) of the target victim. The dishonest customer fabricates Cr`req message in step 4 as: 
 
Cr´req = PI||IMSI´||Acc´ID 
 
As this message can be decrypted only by the MTD, the malicious contents remain 
undetected by all other entities of the GSM network. The MTD decrypts the message 
identifies the customer from IMSI´. Since the target victim is a legitimate customer and has 
sufficient funds in his account, the MTD proceeds to fresh authentication of IMSI´. The 
MSC/AuC provides the authentication triplet in step 7 corresponding to IMSI´. The attacker 
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cannot compute a valid response S as he lacks the valid key Ki to compute the response. So, 
the attacker’s response S´ in step 9 to the random challenge R is different from the S in the 
authentication triplet. This fails the authentication and the protocol stops. Thus, someone 
else’s ID cannot be successfully used in this protocol. 
 
Scenario 2: A dishonest customer plans to buy goods without any payment. He accomplishes 
this plan by providing his own banking details, instead of the shop’s, as the recipient. He 
blocks the legitimate message 16. The attacker, then, generates his own set of keys, K´3 and 
K´4, and fabricates message 16 with own banking details and sends it to the MTD. The MTD 
performs transaction against the information provided by the mobile device by deducting the 
amount from the customer account and paying it back to the same customer’s account (both 
accounts may be different to avoid detection). 
 
After the transaction execution, the MTD sends ‘receipts’ in message 18 and 20. The mobile 
device blocks message 20 as this message contains the information of the customer bank 
details as it was used during the transaction. The dishonest customer needs to replace the 
banking detail in this massage with the shop banking details. The customer can decrypt 
message 20 as it is now encrypted with the customer’s malicious key K´3. He needs to change 
the banking details and encrypt them with the shop-generated key K3 in step 15.2. Since the 
customer lacks this key, he cannot generate a valid ciphertext. Moreover, the original 
message is protected by the digital signature. If the customer makes any alteration to the 
banking details, it will void the signature. If the customer does not alter the message in order 
to keep the validity of the signature, the shop can verify the signature but cannot decrypt the 
message (as it is encrypted with the customer’s malicious key K´3). In both cases, the shop 
cannot verify the transaction and a failure message is sent at the end. Hence, a dishonest 
customer is again unsuccessful. 
 
There may be another approach to accomplish the above attack, where the dishonest customer 
plans to buy some goods without payment. The dishonest customer does not communicate 
with the MTD since it is not successful as described above; rather the customer impersonates 
the MTD to the shop in this scenario. The target of the customer is to send fake but 
acceptable receipts to the shop at the end of the protocol by replaying old legitimate messages 
or fabricating new messages. Since the customer is not communicating with the MTD, his 
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account cannot be debited. In the original protocol, the shop receives three messages from the 
mobile device, specially, messages 1, 14 and 20. Message 1 originates from the mobile 
device, whereas messages 14 and 20 actually originate from the MTD but are relayed by the 
mobile device to the shop. A dishonest customer needs to design or replay the latter two 
messages in such a way that they are acceptable to the shop. Both messages are digitally 
signed by the MTD. These messages contain a Temporary Shop ID (TSID) and a Time Stamp 
of the shop (TSs). TSID is a random value generated by the shop every time in the start of the 
protocol. This value does not only serve as a shop ID during protocol, but it also adds 
freshness to the protocol messages. TSs is updated too in every protocol round, but it may be 
predictable to some extent. A combination of these two values, along with the digital 
signatures of the MTD, does not allow either replay or alteration of the messages. Hence the 
dishonest customer is again unsuccessful.  
 
Scenario 3: A dishonest customer plans to pay less than the required amount but intimates to 
shop of full payment. To accomplish this attack, the mobile device sends TP´ in the Credit 
Request message, Crreq, in step 4 to MTD, where TP´ < TP. The mobile device receives the 
Credit Approve message, Crapp, in step 12 from the MTD confirming that the initially 
requested amount TP´ has been approved for transaction. But the mobile device needs to 
intimate the shop in step 14 that the original amount, TP, is approved for transaction. Since 
the approved price is digitally signed, it cannot be amended by the mobile device. So the 
actual price that is approved by the MTD is transmitted to the shop. Hence, this attack fails 
on the proposed protocol. 
 
Scenario 4: A dishonest customer wants to pay through a mobile device which he does not 
own. S/he might have stolen that device or found it as lost property. If the SIM is still valid, it 
can be used for a transaction. After the device receives Payment Information (PI) from the 
shop in step 2, the application installed on the mobile device requires PIN verification from 
the customer. Since the customer does not own the mobile device, s/he does have the 
knowledge about the PIN. So the protocol does not proceed further. Additionally, the 
application can be designed to get blocked after a limited number of failed attempts of PIN 
verification. This provides security to the customers who feel secure that their lost mobile 
device could not be used for any monetary transaction even if the SIM is active. 
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6.2.2 Dishonest Shop 
Scenario 5: The shop is dishonest and plans to draw more than the required amount without 
intimation to the customer. The information about the amount to be transferred is intimated to 
the MNO by the mobile device in the Credit Request message, Crreq, in step 4. A mobile 
device cannot send more than the required price unless the device itself is compromised. 
Therefore, a shop cannot get more than the required amount in this protocol.  
 
Scenario 6: The shop is dishonest and repudiates the receipt of transaction execution 
message in step 20. In this way, the shop does not deliver goods despite receiving the 
required amount. In such a scenario, the mobile device has the signed receipt from the MTD 
indicating a Transaction Serial Number TSN (received in step 18). The TSN is linked to the 
Approval ID AppID generated in step 12. Since both values are digitally signed by the MTD, 
the mobile device can approach the MTD regarding any dispute. 
 
6.2.3 Messages Security 
Apart from the above-mentioned scenarios, we also analyse our protocols from various other 
angles. The data over the GSM network is encrypted according to the GSM specification. 
The key Kc used for the data encryption over GSM link. The data over NFC link in 
Authentication and Credit Approval phase (Step 1, 2 and 14) is sent in clear. This data does 
not contain any sensitive information. Total Price may be considered as sensitive information 
but it is also displayed on the shop terminal for visual information of the customer. The read 
range of the displayed price is much more than the range of the NFC link. Therefore, we 
considered TP as not so sensitive information to be protected over NFC link.  
 
Other information that is sent unencrypted over the NFC link is the Credit Approval ID 
(AppID) in the (Crapp) message (step 14). The AppID is a random string generated by the credit 
approval authority. From an attacker’s perspective, its only significance is its assurance that 
the customer has, at least, TP amount in his account. This assurance can also be achieved if a 
customer successfully pays for some goods. Therefore, AppID does not represent sensitive 
information in this scenario. 
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Role of Approval ID in message 16: AppID acts as a bridge between the Financial Approval 
phase and the Transaction phase. It adds freshness to message 16, so it cannot be replayed in 
future. AppID is XORed to avoid an increase in the message length. Any alternation in the 
first part of the message 16 (Kinfo) results in invalid keys K´3 and K´4. This invalidates the 
MAC and hence detected. 
 
Non-repudiation of Transaction Messages: Transaction Execution messages (Step 18, 20) 
are digitally signed by the MTD. In case of any dispute about payment, the MTD has to 
honour both messages. So both the customer and the shop are completely secured about 
transaction. 
 
Disclosure of Relevant Information: The Crreq message containing price information is not 
disclosed to the base station or any other GSM entity apart from the MTD. 
 
Shop banking detail is a sensitive information as it contains the bank account number etc. It is 
encrypted not only over the GSM link but also over the NFC link. This information is 
transmitted after the credit approval information is received by the shop. The banking detail 
is transmitted through the mobile device to the MTD, yet the former cannot decrypt this 
information. Similarly, the account information of the customer is not communicated to the 
shop in Crapp message. 
 
New set of Keys for every transaction: The encryption and MAC keys for Crreq message, 
K1 and K2, are freshly generated by the mobile device in each round. Similarly, the keys K3 
and K4, generated by the shop are fresh for each transaction. 
 
Encryption and MAC Keys: refers to the corresponding section (5.5.3) in chapter 5.  
 
6.3 Expert Review Evaluation  
This section describes the results of an interview conducted by secure protocol experts with 
respect to the proposed protocol.  
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6.3.1 Scenario Evaluation  
The scenario is designed based on the following six assumptions:  
 
1) The SE is part of the SIM; 
2) Cloud is part of the MNO; 
3) The MNO manages the SE/SIM; 
4) The financial institution(s) are linked with the MNO; 
5) The merchant has no connection with the MNO; 
6) The communication is carried over a single channel: MNO, mobile device and 
merchant;  
7) The banking details or the shopping details are not disclosed to the Base Station (BS). 
This is because the BS may belong to another MNO and therefore an un-trusted party; 
 
The first six assumptions made to design this payment scenario are similar to the second 
proposed scenario. However, there is a great difference between them that is addressed in the 
seventh assumption. This scenario is designed to support multiple MNOs during the 
transaction initiation and execution which can be taken into consideration by the stakeholders 
in order to deploy such payment scenario in a global scale. For example, a particular MNO 
may not operate in certain countries; nonetheless, this scenario provides the opportunity for 
the service provider - which in all proposed scenarios is the MNO - to utilise the BS of the 
network operators functioning in those countries. This scenario enables clients to use their 
mobile payment services while travelling worldwide even if their MNO only operates in their 
home country. Despite the fact that this approach increases the flexibility of the state-of-the-
art technology, it requires the roaming cooperation of network carriers in different countries 
so as it is the case now days. With respect to the other assumptions that has been made to 
design this scenario, the integration of MNO and the financial institution remains as an 
interesting area to be explored. Moreover, again all communications between the merchant 
and the MNO transmits through the SIM (mobile device) that reduces the number of 
exchanged messages in its respective protocol and makes it more feasible in terms of timing 
issues.          
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6.3.2 Protocol Evaluation  
In order to evaluate the proposed protocol, the security of the cryptographic primitives must 
be reviewed according to their cryptographic definitions.  
 
A) Strength and Weaknesses  
 
Unlike the previously proposed protocols, the third protocol is designed based on five entities 
and the detail interactions of these entities are described in greater depth. The MNO as a 
single entity consists of three sub-entities named as MTD, MSC and BS which operates on 
GSM network. The two-factor authentication is executed similarly to the previously proposed 
protocols that add additional security since the SIM correspondingly validates the MNO. 
Likewise, the PIN verification stage is also included in this protocol that is not utilised in 
contactless payments now days; however, it acts as a supplementary step that enhances the 
security of protocol execution.  
 
Although all communications are transmitted through the SIM, the SIM has not been given 
the permission to decrypt the all messages. This is because of the generation of different keys 
that is shared and used amongst the intended parties which ensures the confidentiality of the 
exchanged messages. For instance, in step 3.2, the SIM generates K1 and K2 to encrypt and 
MAC the message that is intended to send and decrypt by the MTD. In this case, as the BS 
lacks those keys, it is unable to decrypt the information; this is important particularly when 
for example a UK based MNO decides to connect to the BS of another network carrier in a 
different country. The use of TSID (step 2) that is contained in the payment information also 
improves the security as it gets updated after each transaction which also prevents the 
intruder from resending the same but this time as a fake message.       
 
The use of digital signatures by the MTD in steps 12 to 15.1 provides integrity, data origin 
authentication and non-repudiation of the message. Consequently, the message remains 
accurate and complete while the sender of the message cannot deny sending the message. 
Likewise, in the transaction execution phase, the MNO signs the message and sends it to the 
SIM through the BS. Since BS does not have the decryption key, the content of the message 
remains unknown to the BS. The cryptographic properties used in this protocol meet the 
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objectives of the developed scenario; however, a proof of concept prototype could be 
implemented in order to effectively determine the reliability of the proposed protocol.  
 
B) Implementation 
 
One of the greatest aspects of such scenario and its respective protocol that may become an 
issue during the implementation is the roaming agreement amongst the network carriers that 
are based in different countries which should also deal with clients’ payment information. 
Having to deal with the bank account information of millions of users from a variety of 
countries should be explicit within the agreement of the network carriers. Despite these 
concerns, the proposed protocol clearly addresses these issues from the security viewpoint 
that can be put in trial by potential stakeholders. Moreover, the concept of the proposed 
protocol can also be extended to a multi-party protocol which may increase the flexibility and 
ease the cooperation of different carriers.  Furthermore, other possible architectures in this 
scenario can be designed to conclude with the most reliable architecture for implementation 
purposes.  
6.3 Summary  
In this chapter, we proposed our third transaction authentication protocol which provides a 
secure communication channel to the involved payment parties. The proposed protocol was 
based on the idea of NFC Cloud Wallet model and is considered as an extension to our 
proposed first and second protocols. This protocol works well with the merchants who wish 
to collaborate with wide range of MNOs in a global scale since the payment service provider 
(MNO in our case) is able to use the BS of other MNO instead of only using its own to reach 
the merchant. For example, a UK based MNO (i.e. Orange) may not have its own BS in a 
specific country (i.e. Iran) to provide cloud-based NFC services to its customers. However, 
since it does collaborate with the national telecom of Iran (Iran-cell), it can use Iran-cell’s BS 
to authenticate the Iranian based merchant in order to provide payment services to its 
customers.  The major advantage of our proposed payment scenarios is to demonstrate a 
different method of payment for all those people who wish to use fast and easy payment 
services. This way of making payments eases the process of purchasing for ordinary people 
as they only have to top up with their MNO without having to follow all the banking 
procedures.   
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7. Overview  
As the standardization of NFC technology shows, many different parties are involved in the 
transaction process. This kind of distributed standardization causes a significant overhead for 
dividing up tasks and the definition of interfaces. Additionally, the participation of groups 
with different interests make the process of standardization tough, as it moves back and 
forward without a common agreement. On the other hand, many different views and opinions 
are considered during the standardization. Contactless technology for the Internet of Things 
requires all parties to agree one common definition and implementation. Having different 
implementations of one technology blocks interoperability, confuses users and raises the 
market entry barrier for companies. The idea of having a technology in mobile phone 
allowing everybody to participate in the Internet of Things will only work if tags, devices, 
readers and application work seamlessly together and if there is an open market for these 
components. Therefore, we described the aim of this thesis as to explore the problems with 
existing NFC transaction ecosystem models, design three novel transaction authentication 
protocols based on our proposed transaction architectures, and to carry out detailed security 
analysis of the proposed protocols.  
 
This chapter concludes the findings of this research and provides a summary of the contents 
discussed in each chapter of this thesis. Moreover, the research limitations are identified and 
discussed in order to provide future research guidelines.   
7.1 Thesis Overview and Findings 
This thesis was ordered in seven chapters. This section briefly reviews the past first six 
chapters: 
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Chapter 1 described the introduction of this thesis that mainly explored the motivations for 
directing this research. The discussion focused on the current issues concerning the 
standardization of NFC payments, most of which originate due to stakeholders not disclosing 
their intention in the beginning. Thus a top - down standardization with a holistic overview is 
not possible. This emphasised the major challenges in standardization, primarily the 
synchronization with other consortia as well as different views of NFC-Forum members. The 
standardization of NFC goes hand-in-hand with the applications and services. Therefore, 
many different institutions with different core-competences are involved. The major problem 
is that there is no central institution coordinating the standardization approaches. 
Consequently, the aim of this research was to explore the problems with existing NFC 
transaction ecosystem models, design three novel transaction authentication protocols based 
on our proposed transaction architectures, and to carry out detailed security analysis of the 
proposed protocols. Subsequently, the objectives of this research were clarified and described 
as the stages to achieve the aim of this thesis.   
 
Chapter 2 delivered an overview of e-payment with its associated processes. A number of 
approaches concerning managing the mobile wallet technology and NFC transaction services 
were examined and security and manageability were identified as the main challenges that 
have delayed the adoption of NFC payment services. A comprehensive overview of the 
literature revealed that the level of security and manageability differ based on the model that 
stakeholders select in order to provide their payment services, which provides an opportunity 
to conduct the research presented in this thesis. 
 
Chapter 3 highlighted the approach used while conducting this research. Thereafter, Design 
Science Research (DSR) was theoretically described and justified as an appropriate 
methodology for this research. Subsequently, the conducted research in this thesis was 
described in accordance to the DSR research cycles. Four iterations were identified and 
presented to accomplish the development of the selection model: (1) Library Research, (2) 
Initial Design Requirements (Ecosystem/Model design), (3) Protocol Design, (4) Security 
Analysis and Validation. 
 
Chapter 4 proposed a transaction protocol that provides a secure and trusted communication 
channel to the communication parties. The proposed protocol was based on the NFC Cloud 
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Wallet model where there is a direct link between the merchant’s POS and the MNO (via a 
shared secret) for secure cloud-based NFC transactions. The operations performed by the 
vendor's reader, an NFC enabled phone and the cloud provider are provided and such 
operations are maybe possible by the current state of the technology, as most of these 
measures are already implemented to support other mechanisms. We considered the detailed 
execution of the protocol and showed our protocol performs securely in the cloud-based NFC 
transaction architecture. The main advantage of this chapter was to demonstrate another way 
of payment for all those people who do not have bank accounts. This way of making 
payments eases the process of purchasing for users as they only have to top up with their 
MNO without having to follow all the banking procedures. 
 
Chapter 5 discussed the NFC ecosystem scenario where cloud computing plays a major role 
in the payment architecture and the MNO and merchant’s POS are have no direct 
communication. Therefore, the merchant’s POS and the MNO communicate through the NFC 
phone (the merchant trusts MNO). We introduced a different insight which proposed a new 
integrated framework based on trusted integrations of cloud-based NFC transaction players, 
namely the MNO, the NFC phone user and the merchant. We considered a cloud-based 
approach for managing sensitive data to ensure the security of NFC transactions over the use 
of a SE within the cloud environment in addition to considering the role of SE within the 
NFC phone architecture. We then proposed a secure transaction protocol based on the above 
scenario and developed a detailed security analysis of the protocol in order to validate its 
security and reliability. The proposed protocol was based on the NFC Cloud Wallet model, 
the first proposed protocol (chapter 4), and Chen’s protocol (Chen et al., 2010) for secure 
cloud-based NFC transactions. We considered a cloud-based approach for managing sensitive 
data to ensure the security of NFC transactions over the use of a SE within the cloud 
environment as well as considering the role of the SE within the NFC phone architecture. 
 
Chapter 6 provided an alternative protocol similar to the scenario used to design the protocol 
which is proposed in chapter five. The main difference of this protocol with the previous one 
is that this protocol enables the merchant to authenticate with multiple MNOs. This capability 
is provided through the introduction of a new entity called a BS that is considered as an un-
trusted party during the execution of our proposed protocol. The structure, execution and 
generally design of this protocol are modified since the MNO and merchant must 
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communicate through a BS. Furthermore, a detailed security analysis of this protocol is 
provided to examine the strength of our protocol against different attacks.    
7.2 Research Contributions  
The aim and objectives described in chapter 1 of this thesis provide the research contributions 
in chapters 4,5 and 6 respectively. In this section, we discuss a summary of the research 
contributions that each of the mentioned chapters present.    
7.2.1 NFC Cloud Wallet Model 
This model provides an overview of our alternative approaches for managing payment 
applications by using the cloud environment and NFC technology. Stakeholders can extend 
their existing models using the idea of NFC Cloud Wallet when deciding on their final NFC 
transaction approaches for service delivery. This model introduces a flexible approach to 
effectively control the security and management of payment applications in the area of 
mobile payments through describing the interactions between involved parties.      
 
Several studies tried to tackle the problem of managing the SE (Van Damme et al, 2009; 
Francis et al., 2010a; Alpar et al, 2012; Madlmayr et al., 2008; Aldershof, P., 2012), however 
they all proposed their own solutions without using existing standards and their specifications 
which was not necessarily accepted by other ecosystem players. Hence, we did not consider 
the standard specifications, as our focus was to evaluate the major proposed models in order 
to develop ours. This approach helps the developer to use the current standards without 
having to consider the complexities of them in order to directly propose new ecosystem 
models to improve the security and manageability of the mobile payment services.    
 
Furthermore, our proposed scenarios are more realistic than those developed in previous 
research as we used real time scenarios which eases the collaboration between ecosystem 
players by combining the cloud technology in order to provide a more flexible and 
manageable SE environment.     
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7.2.2 First NFC Transaction Authentication Protocol:  Direct 
Communication between the MNO and Merchant  
The second contribution has provided a novel NFC transaction protocol based both on the 
NFC Cloud Wallet model as well as the first proposed ecosystem scenario in which the 
merchant and MNO have direct communications through a secure channel. The approach we 
followed to develop this ecosystem scenario is to focus on the MNO as a cloud provider 
during the protocol execution process. This is different from other related work that studied 
NFC ecosystem scenarios (Aldershof, P., 2012; Benyo et al., 2009; Benyo et al., 2007; 
Kerem et al., 2013; Madlmayr et al., 2008; Madlmayr et al., 2009; Ozdenizci et al., 2010; 
Reveilhac et al., 2009; Ulvedal, J. E., 2013), and therefore focused on the role of cloud as the 
central component for managing the payment credentials. The proposed protocol provides 
mobile payment stakeholders with a detailed service execution process in three phases. Phase 
1: authentication; phase 2: keys generation and PIN verification; and phase 3: transaction. 
The security analysis of our proposed protocol was then provided from multiple security 
aspects. This analysis encompassed the authentication and security of the messages among 
customer, merchant’s POS terminal and the MNO. The analysis also included multiple attack 
scenarios, such as a customer being dishonest and having the intention to pay less, or the 
shopkeeper being dishonest and planning to receive more money. This analysis demonstrates 
the protocol’s validity and effectiveness to match the security requirements for the proposed 
mobile transaction scenario. This is mainly valuable in new or rare circumstances, where no 
or very little documentations of best practice are presented. As discussed previously in 
chapter 2 of this thesis, there are cases where several models are implemented and not all of 
them could entirely satisfy all expectations of every involved party in the payment ecosystem. 
Hence the NFC Cloud Wallet scenario with the proposed protocols can help to determine the 
best option.  
 
7.2.3 Second NFC Transaction Authentication Protocol: Merchant’s 
Authentication with Single MNO 
In this thesis, we also provided another novel NFC transaction protocol based on the NFC 
Cloud Wallet model which meets the requirements of second proposed scenario in which 
there is no communication link between the merchant and the cloud provider (MNO) and 
their communication passes through the NFC enabled phone.  The focus of this approach is 
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on the trusted relationship between the vendor and the MNO which enables the 
communication to be carried over a single channel: the MNO, mobile device and the 
merchant’s POS. The key issue in the first ecosystem scenario and its designed protocol is the 
connection between the merchant’s POS and the MNO which differs from the concept of the 
second proposed protocol. This makes the protocol execution process different from the first 
protocol.  The proposed protocol provides a detailed service execution process in three 
phases. Phase 1: authentication; phase 2: Financial Approval; and phase 3: transaction 
execution. We then analysed this protocol from multiple security perspectives. This analysis 
encompasses the authentication and security of the messages. We assume that the MNO is 
trustworthy, whereas the customer or the merchant can be dishonest. We analysed multiple 
attack scenarios to ascertain the strength of our protocol and found that the protocol is robust 
against such attacks.  
 
7.2.4 Third NFC Transaction Authentication Protocol: Merchant’s 
Authentication with Multiple MNOs  
We proposed an extension to the earlier proposed transaction protocol mentioned in chapter 
5. The major contribution of this chapter is the elimination of the requirement for a shared 
secret between the merchant’s POS and the MNO (same as the second protocol), a 
prerequisite in the initially proposed protocol in chapter 4. This has also made the third 
protocol more practicable as the merchant does not need to have itself registered with the 
MNO to perform mobile transaction. Moreover, we considered the real-life collaboration of 
network operators while designing the protocol. This has resulted in bringing the concept of 
BS into the design process of the protocol in which the BS may be of another MNO. We had 
to change the initial design because of this assumption. Initially, we used key Kc between the 
mobile device and the MNO in the second protocol, but now we cannot use this key. The 
reason is that we want to hide information from BS as well to increase the security since BS 
is considered as an un-trusted entity which might be part of a different MNO. Furthermore, 
this protocol performs on the GSM network for both customer and MNO authentication 
mechanisms. The key advantage of this protocol is that it makes the merchant capable of 
authenticating with the BS of a different MNO that cooperates with the main MNO that is the 
service provider of the payment process. This method increases the flexibility among the 
payment ecosystem participants and improves the payment application management from the 
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service provider’s perspective as now it can use the BS of another MNO anywhere in the 
world. Table 10 shows how this research successfully accomplished the objectives 
established in section 1.3.  
 
Table 10: Accomplishments of the Research Objectives 
 
 
Research Objective 
 
Accomplishments 
 
Objective 1: To consider the existing NFC 
transaction models in order to understand the 
limitations which have been raised regarding the 
adoption of this technology.  
 
 
The first objective was achieved in Chapter 2: 
Several studies were conducted based on the 
available literature to understand the limitations 
of existing NFC ecosystem models.  
 
Objective 2: To develop a payment model based 
on the results and limitations obtained from 
consideration of the existing models and to 
propose an ecosystem architecture and its 
respective authentication protocol so as to 
indicate the framework’s utility and value. 
 
 
This objective was met in Chapter 4:  
A cloud-based NFC payment model (NFC Cloud 
Wallet) was developed and its respective protocol 
was designed and analysed from the security 
point of view.   
 
 
Objective 3: To design and evaluate a novel 
secure NFC transaction authentication protocol 
based on our second developed model in which it 
proposes a trusted relationship between a single 
MNO and the merchant in the transaction 
architecture.  
 
 
We accomplished this objectives in Chapter 5: 
A sub-model of the initially NFC Cloud wallet 
was developed in which proposed a new method 
for transaction execution. Thereafter, its 
respective protocol was designed and a detail 
security analysis was provided to justify its utility 
and reliability.  
 
 
Objective 4: To design and evaluate a novel 
secure NFC transaction authentication protocol 
based on our third developed model in which it 
proposes a trusted relationship between multiple 
MNOs and the merchant in order to provide a 
complete transaction solution based on the 
second and third models.      
  
This objective was achieved in chapter 6:  
A secure transaction authentication protocol was 
designed based on the same scenario as the 
second proposed protocol. However, the 
interactions architecture among transaction 
players differs with the second protocol since this 
protocol considers authenticating multiple 
MNOs. a detail security analysis is thus provided 
to justify the utility and reliability of such 
protocol.   
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7.3 Research Limitations and Future Work  
The research in this thesis was based on a number of assumptions enumerated in chapters 4, 5 
and 6. Different directions of future work have been identified, some to reduce or eliminate 
some of these assumptions. Some areas of future work are summarised as follows.  
 
Promising benefits have been presented by cloud computing for both users and service 
providers, thus there is a high possibility for smart phones to be widely used in access points. 
There are several similarities between cloud computing and web servers (Avmerich et al., 
2008) and so similar web server attacks are possible on the cloud environment accordingly. 
Therefore the servers must be protected by appropriate security mechanisms. However, the 
cloud approach must be highly protected since a successful attack on a cloud environment 
can have serious impacts on both users’ personal information as well as service providers. A 
secure authentication mechanism that should not interfere with existing SIM authentication 
can be developed to secure the cloud’s authentication with the NFC device in the second and 
third protocols (chapter 5 and 6).  
 
A proof of concept prototype can be implemented in order to determine the reliability of the 
proposed protocols in terms of number of factors such as timing issues. This implementation 
refers to the performance domain of the proposed protocols which can be taken into the 
account to consider the performance of the protocols rather than their security, which is 
discussed in this thesis. The idea of the proposed protocols can also be extended to a multi-
party protocol. Furthermore, other possible architectures in this area should be explored and 
defined in order to finalize the most reliable architecture for cloud-based NFC payment 
applications. In addition, this thesis provides related issues that are essential to investigate, 
such as other possible ecosystem architectures, players with their roles, different access 
controls and ownership issues in NFC ecosystem. Although this research suggests a new 
payment method, we do not recommend it for large transactions (over £50.00) to avoid 
security limitations imposed by technology providers. In return, our work offers a faster and 
more streamlined purchasing process.  
 
The proposed protocols in this thesis are designed to exchange digital transaction data. 
However, these protocols can be extended to be support contract signing, certified digital 
product delivery, and certified email. Moreover, further research can be carried out to 
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consider the possibilities of enforcing honest transaction party(s) to the proposed NFC 
transaction protocols which might decrease the number of exchanged messages in these 
protocols. Thus, enforcing honest party(s) may result in more efficient NFC transaction 
protocols.  In addition, the origin of customers is known to merchants in the protocols 
proposed in this thesis in which ensures the identity of customers while making the payment. 
However, some customers may prefer to stay anonymous to merchants; therefore, for future 
research, anonymity can be taken into consideration towards extending the proposed 
protocols.  
 
7.4 Summary 
In order to provide an interoperable service for consumers, having a bottom layer 
standardized approach is required. A device that features ISO 18092 may not be able to act as 
a contactless credit card or a reading device for a smart poster. Therefore, all layers above 
require a clear definition of data exchange format, interfaces, and Application Programming 
Interfaces (APIs). The present problem during the standardization of a technology is that a 
stakeholder may not disclose their intention in the beginning.  
 
According to the present trials in developing industries, users have started paying with their 
mobile phones and it seems that they have found it convenient. Assuming these services meet 
the majority of client expectations, NFC mobile payments will rapidly get adopted and used 
within societies. In all cases, the technology is in the position to go live. However, the 
concentration should be on developing standards and understanding the best practices within 
the industry. From a business perspective, more implementation models should be explored 
in order to fit the needs of each stakeholder and support their commercial requirements. Thus 
a particular consideration should be on the SE which is rapidly evolving. For example, 
something that was just a theory and hard to achieve two years ago, is now becoming a 
common practice. Mobile devices may have more than one type of SE and therefore 
potentially, more than one type of SE issuer. Although this offers an increased choice to 
stakeholders, it also makes the ecosystem more complex. 
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